GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT AND LOCAL TASTE / 157 3 000 studies sh()W a consrstent correlation between 、 V1e 、 V10- lence and aggressive behavior. '' On an average diet 0f films and TV according t0 several 0f these studies, the child is not 0 司 y likely t0 become fearful Of being a victim Of violence, but 引 SO callous about 29 violence directed at others. Movies are more violent than network- or cable-television fare. But crltics have been gentler with movies than with television, pre- sumably because movies dO not intrude intO the h01 e in the same way. A small child can turn on the tube, become transfixed, and watch for hours. MTV has a code of conduct that limits nudity and violence. But in SChOOlS Of commumcatlon and media, earnest graduate students are cataloging instances 0f 、 'crotch-grabbing hands, gyrating pelvises and perfect curves bursting out Of molded spandex" ln music videos 3 0 and counting acts Of violence. One research team, after watching 100 hours of music-video programming, found that there were eigh- teen ViOlent or hOStile acts either actually depicted on the screen or communicated in lyrics every hour. 、 'Heavy metal rock lyrics and music videos routinely romanticize bondage, sexual aggresslon, and death; and popular teen movles are showcasing role models engaged in the most criminally indulgent, morally ambiguous and self- 31 destructive forms Of behavior," another researcher concludes. Much Of the violence is subtle. 、 [OSt Of it iS against women. lt all takes place in a dreamy setting in which there are no consequences. MTV has invited special scrutiny not only because 0f its success but because 0f its hyperbolic claims. 。、 MTV provides reason t0 live," the twenty-four-hour-a-day cable channel promises, an escape from the 、、 botched world" portrayed by network news programs. 32 MTV founder Robert Pittman claims that "TV babies ” think fundamen- tally differently from their parents, who grew up in the pre-TV world. 、、 The pre-TV adults," he says, "are the 'one thing at a time' genera- . The TV babies, by contrast, seem to be processing infor- t10n. mation from different sources almost simultaneously. They can dO homework, watch TV, talk on the phone and listen t0 the radio all at the same time. lt's as if information from each source finds its way tO a different cluster of thoughts. And at the end 0f the evening, it all makes sense. " Pittman proposes that the new commumcatlons tech- 33 mques be imported intO the classroom. But many teachers believe that TV has quite enough influence in the classroom already. Z 叩 ped by hours 0f video, the TV babies, far

MASS PRODUCTION IN POSTMODERN TIMES / 269 overseas. '' ln 1904 , the year after the company was organized, Ford set up assembly plants in canada and lreland and supplied them with identical parts t0 make identical cars. lnterchangeabl% look-alike Fords were so 旧 all over the wor 旧 . But in the 1920S Ford Europe and Ford North America began tO evolve in ways that were different from one another. Each subsidiary 、、 had its own product development ca- pability," Benton explained. "We were producing different cars for different parts 0f the wor 旧 . " ln the Depression the differences became more pronounced. Governments began tO insist that foreign compa- nies produce cars with more 10C 引 parts if they wanted access tO the 10Ca1 market. That meant adapting the cars t0 thelocallabor force and tO local suppliers. we are intO phase Benton con- tinued, 、、 where we are moving from multinationalism tO globalism once agam.... With product-development COSts geomet- rically, we must coordinate product development. ' Ford had been SIOW tO integrate lts non-U. S. operations. 、 Ot until the early 1960S did Ford bring its Canadian and U. S. manufacturing operations together by exchanging parts and rearranging assembly. The push behind it was to qualify for favorable tariff treatment. Then in 1967 the company integrated its plant at C010gne, Germany, with its factory in Halewood, England, t0 produce the Capri. For Ford it was a forttlltous decision. Britain was on the brink Of a wave Of strikes and labor conflict. ()n 1970 alone Ford experienced 155 strikes in Britain. ) lntegration made it possible tO shift production from the BritiSh tO the German plant S1nce a single model—except for the location 0f the steering wheel—was now produced for both the British and Continental markets. ln the 1970S Ford began to integrate its U. S. and European oper- ations, which for years had been treated as completely different mar- kets. America was a land 0f big cars and cheap gas. Eur0P% on the Other hand, was a continent Of narrow streets and fiercely taxed and small cars were a necessity. }綫0 、 only meant mmiprofits but, conventional wisdom had Americans would not buy them. profit margins are higher not only on big cars but on trucks and vans because companies which produce and partic- ipate in that field have chosen t0 keep the price up where everybody makes a very good margin," according t0 Benton. They didn't con- spire, he hastily assured us. AII the makers had the same interest in preventing another round 0f price wars as had happened when the Japanese entered the IJ. s. car market. There is 引 SO another reason why automakers like big vehicles that he did not mention. Pickups

A MATTER OF TASTE / 255 two frozen-vegetable packing plants in salinas' California' laying 0 仟 530 workers, and moved much 0f the operatlon t0 Morelia. 、 'We just couldn't compete in california," a company spokesman explained. Almost half the board members of the Western Growers Association lease land in MexiCO and farm there. 、、 The peso is SO 10W that 46 almost a built-in profit," one California grower put it. Cheap labor and favorable exchange rates are not the only attrac- t10ns. Land iS cheap, and environmental are easily circumvented. (Sewage from Nogales, Mexico, flows down hillsides into Nogales' Arizona, which now has hepatitis rates twenty times the national average. ) The Mexican government has little bargalmng power tO enforce envlronmental regulation the foreign 、 it has come tO depend, but the effects are felt not just by Mexicans but 引 so in the United states. 4 companies able t0 buy up or lease the scarce arable land are siphoning 0 幵 scarce water for irrigation. iCO iS a big country, but much Of it has excellent SOil for cactuses and not much else. Two-thirds 0f the arable land already ShOWS the effects Of serious erosion, and on 25 percent Of the arable 48 land can be irrigated. smaller U. S. producers fear that they will be driven out 0f the market by companies operating in Mexico free 0f the financial obli- gatIOns tO protect the environment demanded Of COmpames operat- ing in the United states. Florida and California have been hurt badly because the giant food-processing companies have moved SO many Of their operations across the border. Globalization 0f the f00d system is taxing the capabilities 0f na- tional governments tO maintain their own standards for the fOOd their people eat. AS more and more foreign fruit and vegetables enter the United states, American consumers face potential new health hazards. A number Of pesticides banned in the United States are widely used in MexiC0 by U. S. -owned companies and contract farm- ers producing for export t0 the United States. AII f00d from abroad is subJected t0 inspection by the F00d and Drug Administration. But only about 1 percent 0f U. s. f00d imports are actually inspected. At the inspection Stat10n in the Arizona border town Of Nogales 800 trucks arrive daily from MexiCO. There are tWO inspectors on hand who take five to ten samples a day on the 2 billion pounds 0f Mex- 49 rcan produce that comes through each year. Unfortunately, some 0f the greatest health hazards resulting from global food movements elude border inspection altogether. Mexican sewage seeps into thousands 0f wells on the U. S. border where pack-

BANKERS 1N A WORLD OF DEBT / 379 Just as its earlier campaign t0 lend money t0 Third World governments, Citi'S loan officers competed with one another tO make the most loans, with only casual concern about whether the borrow- ers would be a トに tO make their interest payments. Fees were earned by committing money, lending money' and finding additional money by syndicating loans with 0ther bankS' not by turning down loans. ln the boom years Citi OffiCialS had no lncentive tO be ChOOSY about who t00k their millions. The bonus system reflected the go-go culture of the day as well as Reed's own penchant for risk-taking. Young, relatively inexperienced bank officers received fat bonus checks based on the quantity 0f dollars they lent out. The loans were made on the basis Of overly optinustlC econom1C assumpt10ns and prOJec- tions. When the economy turned down in 1989 , many 0f the ト or - rowers could not make their payments. BY December 1991 Citi had amassed a record $ 7.8 billion worth of bad commercialloans. These loans could not have been made without the encouragement 0f top management. Reed became CEO just as leveraged buyouts became the craze on Wall Street. ln the next four years Citi (along with Manufacturers Hanover Trust CO. and Bankers Trust) put them- selves ln a dominant position tO finance the Of mergers and leveraged buyouts. The junk bonds sold by Drexel Burnham and its imitators on ・ wall street became famous as the prrmary means Of financrng corporate takeovers but supplementary financrng was al- most always crucial, and the three big banks dominated this market. As the main banker for Drexel Burnham, Citi was the leader in what came t0 be .known in the industry as HLTs (highly leveraged trans- actions). ln the good years Citi earned substantial fees for its work on leveraged buyouts and hostile takeovers. BY thelate 1980S Citi' Man- ufacturers Hanover, and Bankers Trust thought nothing 0f lending money tO a number Of rival bidders intent on devouring the same corporation. Loyalty t0 01d established clients was sacrificed in the scramble for quick profits. Thus Citi bankers agreed t0 finance a hostile bid to take over Gillette, a long-standing customer; Gillette's 39 management promptly cut all ties t0 the bank. ln the second half of the 1980S , as Reed himselflater put it, Citi bankers became"dealjunkies. " BY the end of the decade Citi was tied with Manufacturers Hanover for the dubious distinctl()n Of having put more money intO highly leveraged transactions than any Other bank, about $ 6 billion. By 1991 almost 20 percent 0f this portfolio was nonperforming. Citi was the agent for a $ 4.2- bi Ⅲ on loan t0 the Canadian developer R0bert Campeau nine months before he 6 に d for

A MATTER OF TASTE / 235 izing tastes. ln Korea, young girls are spending the WhOle afternoon nibbling french fries, sipping C0ke, and listening t0 American rock music at McDonald's or Wendy's or Burger King or Kentucky Fried Chicken just as kids their age are doing in Peoria or J0hannesburg. (McDonaId's alone had 760 restaurants in Japan and fifty-one in tiny Hong Kong at last count. ) ln his classic treatise on eating' the eighteenth-century French gastronome Anthelme Brillat-Savar1n wrote that f00d was the key t0 understanding human beings. 、 'Tell lf, indeed, we are me what you eat, and I will tell you what you are. ' what we eat, a 10t Of us, despite vast cultural differences, language barriers, and great distances, are becomrng alike. Changes in global f00d technology are accelerating this process. Thanks tO advances in refrigeration, packaging, and transportation, New Yorkers can 6 Ⅱ their market baskets with Mexican strawberries or New Zealand kiwis in the dead Of winter. Grapes are now routinely eaten in February in Chicago that just ten days before were growing on a V1ne in Chile. London supermarkets feature sno 、 peas from Kenya, garlic from Egypt, baby corn from Zambia' starfruit from Ma- laysia, and papayas from Brazil. Between 1970 and 1989 , Americans lncreased their per-capita consumption Of vegetables by 42 percent and of fruit by 22 percent. Partly, this had t0 d0 with growing concern about the effects 0f diet on health. But this major dietary change could not have happened had the global food companies not been able t0 take advantage 0f Southern Hemisphere growing seasons (which co- incide with North American W1nters) and Of sunny climates in Other once-maccessible places. T0day New York' Londom PariS' Geneva' and Tokyo grocers, except in poor neighborhoods are seldom with- out fresh grapes, asparagus, and peaches. Not surprisingly, grapes hauled 6 000 miles or more are expensive; at each stage 0f their journey from the vineyard t0 the delivery plat- form at the supermarket, they depend upon a complex chain 0f refrigerated storage areas inside freighters, and trucks. Trop- ical fruits such as atemoya, breadfruit, starfruit, and lychee can com- mand especially high prices because these products 0f poor countries are exotlc novelties in affluent neighborhoods across the Temperate zone. some Of the poorest countrres in the world, therefore, are lncreasingly basing their econonues on the export Of fresh fruits and vegetables tO upscale markets in the industrialized countries. Fresh fruit is Chile's major export after copper, and it is available all over the world. But of the four largest Chilean fruit shippers, 0 司 Y one is 7 still owned by Chileans.

IF MUSIC BE THE FOOD 0F LOVE / 133 . 1t'S very uncommon tO get use Of fill scenes before a release . Sony shot extra footage for its film D c ″信 for theatrical release. use in one 0f its CD-Rom-based video games. 39 Schulh0f promoted the 61m H00 た in Europe with a fifteen-minute video called 、 'The Making of H00 た ' ' that played on Sony television sets in 5 , 000 win- dOWS Of retail outlets across the continent well before the motion picture was released. The 61m made even more money in Europe than in the United States. At the same time the glamour of Sony films, Schulhof promised, would give new luster to Sony VCRs and televi- SIOn sets. Putting hardware and software under one roof had made it all possible, Schulhof claimed, but other industry executives point out that these techniques had been used before. Yet no miracles occurred. Sony'S disastrous experience with digital audio tape players (DAT) was not averted because the company could put some Of the world's hOttest musrc properties on itS digital tape. Fans could hear them on CDs, music videos, and old-fashioned tapes that were much cheaper. lt was becoming equally clear that 0 、 software was not the only way tO assure access tO it. Licens- lng arrangements are an alternative, and usually cheaper. The market itself makes it dangerous for companies tO engage ln economrc war- fare by tryrng tO deny entertainment software tO their hardware com- petitors. Sony and Philips squared 0 幵 against each other in 1992 for a global fight over whether the home-recording format of the decade would be the Japanese-designed Mini Disc or the Dutch-designed digital compact cassette (DCC), or neither as many expect. As each entertarnment-hardware conglomerate aggressively lined up its own stars, Sony announced that it would make tapes tO fit Philips's new machine. 、、 Every record company will put mtISlC out tO support any legitimate hardware format—which includes DCC," Schulh0f de- clared. "lf the Mini-Disc hardware takes 0 幵 , it will create business ” 40 not only for Sony Music, but for all record companies. The point seems clear, but it does raise the question why the cohabitation Of hardware production and artistic creativity under one corporate roof iS such a good idea, especially when it requires the outlay 0f billions. NO doubt, the search for synergy through corpo- rate acquisitions has handsomely benefited some Of the owners Of the acquired companies. When Matsushita acquired MCA, Lew Wasser- man, the chairman, SOld his StOCk tO the Japanese electronics giant for $ 327 million; David Geffen had done even better when he sold his record company for $ 710 million worth 0f MCA stock. 41 But for Sony the experience has confirmed some Of the predictions expressed ” 38

A SMALL TOWN GLOBAL GIANT / 71 own bunker was ln range Of Russian mortars. The destructlon 0f the fin 引 days finished what Allied bombers had been doing for more than three years. The daily ration in industrial regions of Germany fell to less than 700 calories a day. Konrad Adenauer, the future chancellor of the Federal Republic, shivered in his unheated room, sleeping in his suit and overcoat, and hiS driver slept in a hospital bathtub. ln the smalltown of Gütersloh where the Bertelsmann en- ter.prise lay in ruins life was somewhat easier, but not much. Arriving back in Germany in early 1946 with a potato sack hold- ing all his worldly possessions, Mohn, now barely 25 , felt the weight of four generations of Bertelsmanns. His great-grandfather, CarI Ber- telsmann, the founder of the firm, was the pioneer lithographer 研 WestphaIia. When he opened a prin い hop in GütersIoh in 1824 , he prospered almost immediately, and soon he was able to build an imposing residence t0 house both his business and his family. The NaziS razed the original Bertelsmann town house on K S 〃れ ac わー in 1938 because a Jew had been living in it. The company rescued a single beam, WhiCh iS no 、 set ln a concrete wall in BerteIsmann's sprawling headquarters building on Carl Bertelsmannstrasse in Güt- ersloh. The firm was born as a family project. ln 1835 when Carl Ber- telsmann applied for a license from the Prussian government tO set up a religious publishing house, his marn motlve was tO provide a pub- lishing outlet for his son-in-law, who had compiled a collection of hymns. A few months after the press started, BerteIsmann published its first blockbuster, a hymnal for children entitled T わど廱な M な 5 わ″ 日 4 ゆ that over the next few decades sold over 2 million copies. This could not help but be taken as a sign 0f divine favor, for the popu- lation in the German states was not prosperous, and only 40 percent of the people could read. The king of Prussia, though sympathetic to anything that encouraged piety, prohibited b00ks on controversial current topics, and indeed, until the Revolution Of 1848 , even news- 2 papers were barred from covermg contemporary events. CarI BerteIsmann then decided he would publish a newspaper to reflect his own archconservatlve vrews, but when the editor he hired accepted an ad for a c 引 carnival, he closed the paper down on the grounds that the promotion Of ribaldry was a sin. ln the revolution- ary year 0f 1848 he brought out a violently antirevolutionary paper but quickly bowed t0 the spirit 0f the times and ceased publication after tWO 1SSues. HiS son Heinrich then tried tO orgamze a conser- vative party tO oppose the rising SOCial democrats ofWestphalia, and

66 / GLOBAL DREAMS the first 1 or Japanese company tO invite a non-Japanese on lts board and now has two: Michael Schulhof, the vice-chairman of Sony USA, and Jacob Schmuckli, a Swiss who is chairman 0f Sony Europe, which is based in C010gne. (Translators whisper in their ears at board meetings in T0kY0. ) Sony Europe' Morita explains was trying 、。 t0 become a proper European company" long before the further integration Of the continent tOOk effect in 1993. Most of sony's 、 'leading edge" research is still carried on in the home islands, but gradually the all-important refinements and market-driven wrinkles that give new life tO familiar products will take place in laboratories outside Japan. The company now has tech- nology centers in stuttgart and in Basingstoke, Hampshire' with more than 200 scientists. ThiS will free the engineers in Japan tO concen- trate on the unsolved riddles Of the twenty-first-century technologies now under development—an audiovisual center pact enough tO be installed in front Of a single tourist-class airplane seat, a tiny digital audiocassette tape recorder that can play for tWO hours using a cassette no bigger than a postage stamp' and high- definition television, on which Sony has pinned great hopes. ln 1991 Sony Europe performed better than Sony's divisions in either the United states or Japan. Sony sells about 30 percent 0f its consumer-electronics products on the Continent. The company says that its European factories use an average Of 60 percent 10C 引 mate- rialS and labor and in some cases, such as televisions, than 90 percent. 1 Although it would be cheaper t0 ship components from Southeast Asia, "that is not corporate P01iCY"' says Schmuckli' whO believes that being strongly tied intO Europe is a more important consideration than labor COStS. AS Europe expands tO include its eastern half, sony is on the 100k0ut for new factories and suppliers. Hungary has been picked as a promising place t0 make loudspeakers. AII operations in Europe are expected tO report tO Cologne' not Tokyo. Rainer Kurr, the general manager 0f Sony's European televi- SIOn operations, was removed from his position after stating publicly that sony's factories in Europe were still controlled from T0kY0. "That's wrong," Schmuckli told a British business publication' 、、 and that's why he is no longer in the ⅳト . N0t because he said that' but because he did not understand the structure Of the organization. He ” 52 But the more always felt it was quicker t0 go direct t0 T0kY0. decentralized Sony's global operations become, the harder it is t0 marntaln a coherent strategy. The fourth leg of Sony's global strategy to reinvent itself was the

THE TECHNOLOGY OF PLEASURE / 43 wealthy samurai family, had been in the business, and it was a fore- gone conclusion that Aki0, the eldest son, would eventually take it over. From the time he was in the third grade his father would take him tO the brewery tO learn about balance sheets and market strat- egy. 、 'You are the boss from the start," his father would tellthe small boy. Morita grew up in one of the few Japanese families surrounded by global products. The chauffeur-driven family car was a Buick and the refrigerator was a Westinghouse from a distant land he knew on from HoIIywood films and his uncle's home moues of a visit to Coney lsland. His father bought one of the first Victor phonographs in Japan, an electrical monster that COSt about half the price Of a car. When his father put on Ravel's "Bolero," Morita recalls, the sound 、 'bowled me over. ''1 He dreamed of making a phonograph himself. By the early 1930S making radios was becoming a popular hobby in Japan, and columns offering diagrams and advice for eager amateur engmeers appeared regularly in newspapers. The young Aki0 spent every minute he could tinkering with wires and electrical compo- nents, and he managed t0 put together a crude electric phonograph and radio receiver all by himself while still a schoolboy. At Osaka University Morita became a protégé of a well-known professor 0f physics. On the eve 0f World ・ War Ⅱ Japanese consumer goods were considered junk in most places around the world, but Japanese sclentlsts were secretly at work on such advanced technol- ogres as light-beam telephone transmsslon and heat-seeking weap- ons. Morita was a navy C0n11 1SSl()n tO work on the latter pr0Ject all during the war. On the day Japan surrendered, he recalls putting on his uniform, buckling on his sword, and standing at at- tention as the Son Of Heaven spoke tO his people for the first time. The world had turned upside down, and Morita did not know exactly what he would do. The one thing he knew he did not want to dO was tO go intO the sake business. For the first son in a Japanese family not tO go intO hiS father's business was much more than a career ChOice. lt was, as Morita puts it, like "taking on another family. ''2 During his navy service Morita had met Masaru lbuka, an electrical engrneer WhO had run a successful instrument company before the war. Although lbuka was thirteen years older, the two men became friends. Morita was lmpressed with lbuka's ingenuity and audacious turn of mind. He liked the idea that lbuka hired music students with perfect pitch tO determlne whether his radar devices oscillated at exactly the right number 0f cycles.

THE GLOBAL CUSTOMER / 171 affectionate. ” subtle differences in taste across the world are another hurdle. The opulent bouquet in the perfume ad for the New York market must be replaced with a single exquisite rose if the ad is tO work itS mag1C in Rome. GIobal advertisers have 引 so learned from experience that 10C 引 sensibilities must be respected. You can use agmg celebrities tO sell PoIident anywhere, but do not try selling shampoo aimed at 、 'the over-40 woman" in Spain. She will not identify herself by stepping up 22 Japanese mothers found Procter & Gamble's tO the cash register. ads for pampers overbearing. On the advice 0 日 ocal specialists the company introduced pink diapers for girls and blue ones for b0YS' pushing both with a television spot in which a talking diaper prom- ises that it will not leak. Pampers now sell well in Japan. Advertisers are learning which products can travel the world via a single ad and which cannot. Levi Strauss, which used t0 film its ads for the world market in various locations, now ShOOtS a glObal jeans ad twice a year in Los Angeles. Using 1960S American rock music and silent actors, the ad stresses 、 'the ruggedly American virtues Of its Jeans" and is used without alteratlon in Latin America, Australia, and Europe. (However, the ad has t0 be reshot by 10Ca1 crews in Australia because of the ban on imported advertising. ) G10bal ads for sham- P00 , disposable diapers, diamond watches, scotch' and many other household and luxury products are now being aired across the world. lt was the extraordinary reach Of television in the 1980S that made global advertising possible. According t0 a Ⅳ 4 ″ & 〃川 4 / sur- vey, CNN reaches 78 million homes in more than 100 countries. The MTV networks claim more than 200 million V1ewers. There are more than eighty pan-European TV channels. The Middle East Broadcast Center reaches audiences in North Africa and the Middle East with programs in Arabic. Deregulation 0f media and the mergmg 0f mar- kets mean that a single ad can now reach a Europe-wide audience. Although switzerland no longer requires that television commercials feature dwarfs in children's roles, Other national obstacles remain. ln poland, lyrics must be sung in P01ish. Brazil has a 、 10Ca1 content" law that requires global ads t0 be redone in Brazil• Norway prohibits beer commercials aired elsewhere in Europe. The simultaneous rise Of glObal markets for consumer goods and global media for promotion has boosted worldwide expenditures on advertising. ln 1989 corporations were spending over $ 240 billion on advertising and another $ 380 billion on packaging' design' and 23 Other eye-catching promotlon. The combined tOtal amounts tO