future Ford would put up a 10t of money to get Tomaso started 0 Ⅱ building important numbers of the Pantera, or that American Motors would engage the talent Of Giotto Bizzarrini tO design and develop an AMX in a similar envelope using the AMC V8 engine. As the true engineer that he is, GiuIio Alfieri decided to go back to basics, and methodically analyse all options for new-model layout and architecture. He did れ ot need much time. Within a few days, whilst still carrying out all his normal duties, he had completed an analysis ofthe layout possibilities for new Maserati models. The choice was narrowed down tO three configurations. 1. The Citroén solution, with front wheel drive and the engine mounted behind the front wheel axis. 2. The emidships' engine solution, with rear wheel drive and the engine mounted ahead of the rear wheel axis. 3. The classical solution, followed by Maserati since the beginnlng, with front-mounted en- gme and rear Wheel drive. Bora frame was えれ gra d ん the わ Od ツ s ケレ己リ尾 form 0 ん g んな g レれ . T んなな the rs 〃 r 祝 0 い〃 e 24

Chapter 5 Origins and evolution Of the Maserati V8 Maserati's strongest point was englne tech- Ⅱ 010gY. The experience gained by lng. Alfieri and his staff over the years had led to a great depth in understanding Of the combustion process, and a bank of knowledge concerning the effects on cylinder filling, fuel atomisation, turbulence, and knock limits of detail alterations in valve angles, port layout, valve timing, piston profile, and camshaft lift. Expemmental engmes were not created except when slated for production. The experlmental content tended tO be slight, for when a new engine design came offthe drawing board, there were few uncertainties about itS performance and re- liability. Little or no fundamental research was under- taken. Engine testing, however, was a continuous activity at Maserati, and, even in the days before the first petroleum shock, aimed more at improv- ing the emciency Ofthe engines than tO raise their power output. Specific fuel consumption was steadily pushed down.eA drop of 5 grams per hp- hour was a big galn in fuel economy, says Alfieri. Maserati's engine programme had been con- centrated on V8s since the Sebring was taken out of production ⅲ 1966. A V8 has the advantage 0f being short and relatively 10W , g1Ving an in- stallation package that is quite compatible with 55

Chapter 6 The proof 0f the BO pudding From the moment When 、 journalists were invited to drive the Bora, the car staked a firm claim for a place ⅲ the élite 0f the highest- performing cars in the world. We had to draw the inevitable comparison with the Ghibli and yet keep the two separate in our minds. The spectre 0f the Miura would haunt the background tO any attempt at evaluating the Bora, as it would with any new car using that chassis configuration and having the same pre- tensions as tO performance. You can have all the facts 0 Ⅱ Maserati right in your head. You can memorize the detail specifi- cations Of the Bora. You can go and see how the cars are made. But you still would not know the real meaning Of the name Maserati or properly understand the Bora until you had driven the car. The driving experlence must not be dismissed as a few quarter-mile acceleration tests, and maybe a crack at pushing the speedometer needle to the top end 0f the scale. NO, the car has tO be driven under all sorts Of conditions, bOth leisurely and hurriedly. You must drive it enough tO obtain an easy familiarity with the car. Then and only then do you get the proper feel 0f it. lt's a feeling that comes when you begin t0 work as an extension Of the machinery and not as an OUtSide agent trying tO badger it around. That won't 82

Chapter 8 Out of the French ashes and intO the Argentinian fire lt is diffcult to pinpoint any one single factor as bearing the full guilt for bringing Maserati to its corporate knees. The fact is that the company was losing money t00 fast, and finally Citroén decided to throw in the towel. A few facts on the Maserati operation during Citroén's ownership Of the Modenese car company sheds some light on the matter. Maserati sales had been 643 cars in 1967 , climbing t0 698 ⅲ 1968. Due to cutbacks ⅲ production While the resources were con- centrated on new-model preparations, sales slip- ped to 560 cars in 1969 , but made a good recovery to 648 in 1970. During 1970 , the average number of workers at ノつ Maserati was 520. The hiring continued in 1971 , as the model range expanded and the order flow was speeding up, t0 786. The payroll grew t0 836 people in 1973 and peaked at 920 in 1974. Orsi influence on company policy was severely diminished ⅲ the autumn of 1972 , when Adolfo Orsi died at the age of 74. ln the period that followed, engine production for Citroén occupied far more personnel than the building Of Maserati A あ 0 んえル the engine cars. That period was brought to a halt by OPEC's compartment om わ e んえ〃 d the car ん ard な reveals ん e engine action 0 Ⅱ 0 ⅱ prices and deliverles in Oct0ber 1973. 観 all—submerged under lots Demand for the SM dwindled, and sales nose- 可 ducting, ん mb g , 0 れ d dived. Maserati delivered 2750 engines to Cit- を、 113

Chapter 1 A belief in a certain type Of car One of the most remarkable qualities of the Bora is that it came t0 be held in greater esteem after the end ofits production run than it was during its career. Few parallels exist in history. ln its class, it is possibly a unique case. Something analogous occurred with such dis- parate cars as the R011s-Royce Phantom III and the Fiat 500 T 叩 ol 0. Neither was fully apprec- iated while they were available, new, from the factory. But afterwards, mmor cults have sprung up t0 honour them. B0th the big British luxury car and the small ltalian economy car were creations Of the mid-thirties, and its was only about 25 years later that their particular genius and values were recognized. The Bora, having arrived on the motoring scene 1 Ⅱ amoremodern era, andbeing averyrecent casualty, could not be expected tO acquire similar status for many years, but the phenomenon Of changing times, with re-ordered priorities forced upon the whOle industrialised world, seems tO have accelerated the process Of enhancing the Bora's reputation and raising the consclousness Of its worth among car enthusiasts everywhere. lts true character was widely misunderstood during the years 0f its production-life. Paul Fröre was probably the first one whO sensed and was able t0 express the need t0 try and correct the 1 Above 観ん er 可 the 召 0 / れ g. G 〃 0 Alfieri, as he な da ツ , ca レ g んれ his わレ office 観Ⅳレ 0 し 0 ん am わ orgん Right First production-model 召 0r0. カ as springtime 〃 the Em 〃 0- omag 〃 0 region 可カ 0 ん e the BO went i 〃〃 rod レ c 0 8

CHAPTER EIGHT and acceleration times shortened. Within two years, the SS had replaced the basic Merak ⅲ the line up. ln the meantime, the 2 litre engine had come through its development phase and was ready for production. The Merak 2000 was first shown in Turin in November, 1976. lt was aimed parti- cularly at the ltalian market, where a new tax on engines above 2000 cc had just been enacted, but alSO offered in Other European countries where Maserati customers were expected tO take a greater interest in saving fuel. 122

CHAPTER EIGHT At first Citroén intended to close the plant at the end ofMay, 1975 , but then relented and agreed t0 assume all liabilities incurred in keeping the plant in operation up tO the 30 June. Omer Orsi, with Giulio Alfieri and the sales director, Ald0 Turrusio, tried tO negotiate with the 0 伍℃ ial recelvers 0 Ⅱ one hand and the workers 0 Ⅱ the other, seeking a way tO keep Maserati in business. Alfieri even tackled new projects, starting with TiP0 124 , a 2 十 2 coupé with ltal Design styling. Production was maintained, but at a slower and slower rate. Worried about losing their jobs completely, the workers began de- monstrating for rescue by the ltalian government. Moving fast behind the scenes, lining up fresh finance quicker than a civil servant can find his date stamp, was the wily Argentinian, Alejandro de TO Ⅱ naso. ln mid-August, the situation was resolved. Maserati was taken over as a jOint subsidiary Of De Tomaso ( 30 per cent) and a state-sponsored investment organisation, GEPI ( 70 per cent). De Tomaso already had a recovery plan in mind, and his own ideas about who would have the task of implementing it. Orsi, Alfieri and Turrus10 were not included. Recounts Alfieri : el had a true filial love for Maserati—up t0 a certain moment. The lawyers called me ⅲ and t01d me I had 15 minutes t0 get out ofthe factory'. The order came, ofcourse, from Alejandro De Tomaso. The date was 25 August 1975. After more than 22 years with the firm, that was Alfieri's reward. AIfieri later 」 oined Lamborghini as general manager. Turrusio found a position outside the automobile industry. Omer Orsi resigned himself to the real-estate business and died in 1981. Maserati's new general manager was a young engineer named Aureli0 Bertocchi (son Ofthe test 116

CHAPTER SEVEN have used ifAlfieri had set out to design a V6 from scratch. The 90 degree angle gives even firing intervals for a V8, while 60 degrees ()r 120 ) gives the same result in a V6 in which each pair 0f connecting rods share a crankpin. ln view of the shortness of the V6, there was Ⅱ 0 practical advantage tO be gained by mounting the camshaft drive inboard. lt would have been better from an assembly and repmr vlewpoint tO have fitted all the timing chains under the front cover. AISO, it was not a Citroén design. Citroén had 0 Ⅱ ly two engine families at that time, the water- cooled units, which were robust in-line four- cylinder designs from 1.9 t0 2.3 litres displace- ment ; and the air-cooled units, which were horizontally opposed twins and fours. If Citroén were tO design a new S1x-cylinder engine, it probably be a horizontally-opposed one, water- cooled, with pushrod-operated valves and hemi- spherical combustion chambers. Such an engine had in fact been designed in 1951 for the project that resulted ⅲ the DS19 four years later. No, this V6 was pure Maserati. The fact that cuts through the middle is that it was not designed as a V6 but as a V8. Alfieri had drawn up a V8 of 2965 cc for a proposed new car (whose specifi- cations have never been revealed) about 1965. lt was, 0f course, laid out with 90 degrees between the banks, and followed the typical Maserati layout with four overhead camshafts. What was different in this one, 仕 om all earlier Maserati V8s, was the camshaft drive. As was the case with all Other production- model Maserati engmes, the camshafts were chain-driven. Here, hO 、 Mever, the drive were spaced out at vanous POints along the length ofthe camshafts. 、Ⅵ ? TO limit high-speed whip at the crankshaft ends. BY spreading the The V6 engine al 0 s ra れ best 観ん g ん rpm, 0 d was alSO extremely 〃〃 g rev 106

CHAPTER FIVE 12 13 21 17 52 53 31 18 32 26 56 55 35 57 58 37 60 40 50 596 38 48 43 47 46G0 = 45 44 41 midships engine location. Alfieri argued that a flat-12 would be better, for the reasons that the horizontal configuration gives a lower centre Of gravity ; further that its greater width would not clash with space require- ments for structural or mechanical members ; and that a 12 is a smoother, better-balanced engine than a V8. But a flat-12 would not be suitable for use in the front-engme models, and Maserati's finances were not such that they could justify a completely new engine that could not be shared among several models. Consequently, the Bora had t0 make use Of an existing V8. The engine for the Bora was taken directly from the GhibIi, but in slightly detuned form. This was C ん 0 え〃 drive え t 0 stages as used for 0 〃ル肝 camshafts 可 the BO V8. C ん 0 〃 tensioner parts are 47 ー 57 56

CHAPTER TWO moment 0f inertia would be 10W , making for fast response. The biggest mass, the engine, being positioned close t0 the rear wheels, adds tO the weight 0 Ⅱ the driving wheels and improves traction. A further consideration was the lower centre of gravity, glving increased lateral stability and lessening any tendency tO sway 0 Ⅱ curves, while also opening the way for lower bOdy profiles, new proportions, and lmproved forward ViSion over short, sloping bonnet. But how could Alfieri reconcile the central-engine layout without re- pudiating the existing front-engine models ? There was Ⅱ 0 contradiction, for according to him the Bora was just a continuation of the same product policy. ln fact, if we disregarded the difference 1 Ⅱ engme location, we can easily recognise the fact that the priorities in the Bora s リ or d こん e e 〃尾 ar S リ S 〃 e S え 0 れ as e 〃 as ん e e 〃 g えれ e. ・ clever Z00 26