26 PART ONE ・ CLASSICAL SOCIOI OG ℃ A し THFORY seeing ideas as simple reflections Of economic factors, 、 Meber saw them as fairly autonomous forces capable 0f profoundly affecting the econonuc world. Weber certainly devoted a lOt Of attention tO ideas, particularly systems Of religious ideas, and he was especially concerned with the impact Of religious ideas on the economy. ln Pro 厩ん c れ d ど S 〃か″可 Ca 〃″記な襯 ( 1904 ー 05 / 1958 ) , he was concerned with Protestantism, mainly as a system Of ideas, and its impact on the rise Of another system Of ideas, the 、、 spirit Of capitalism," and ultimately on a capitalist economlc system. Weber had a similar interest in Other world religions, looking at how their nature might have obstructed the development of c 叩 italism in their respective societies. On the basis of thi s kind Of work, some scholars came t0 the conclusion that Weber developed his ideas in opposition to those Of Marx. A second view Of Weber' s relationship tO Marx, as mentioned earlier, is that he did not SO much oppose Marx as try tO round out his theoretical perspective. Here 、 Meber is seen as working more within the Marxian tradition than in opposition to it. His work on religion, interpreted from this point of view, was simply an effort tO show that not only dO material factors affect ideas but ideas themselves affect material structures. This interpretation Of 、 Meber' s work obviously places it much closer tO, in fact in line with, Marxian theory, A good example 0f the view that Weher was engaged in a process 0f rounding out Marxian theory is in the area Of stratification theory. ln this work on stratification, Marx focused on SOCial C / 0 、、 , the economic dimension Of stratifica- ⅱ on. Although Weber accepted the importance of this factor, he argued that other dimensions Of stratification were also important. He argued that the notion Of social stratification should be extended い include stratification on the basis Of prestige ル引 and 〃 0 ルど The inclusion Of these Other dimensions does not constitute a refutation Of Marx but is simply an extension Of his ideas. BOth Of the views outlined above accept the importance of Marxian theory for 、 Meber. There are elements of truth in both positions; at some points 、 Meber ル working in opposition tO Marx, while at Other points he 観 extending Marx' s ideas. However, a third view Of this issue may best characterize the relationship between Marx and Weber. ln this view, Marx is si mply seen as only one of many influences on Weber' s thought. 、 Me can identify a number い t_ 、 sources of Weberian theory, including German histonans, philosophers, economi sts, and political theorists. Among those whO influenced Weber. the philosopher lmmanuel Kant ( ロ 24 ー 1804 ) stands out above all the others. But we must not overlook the impact of Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844—1900)—especially his emphasi on the hero—on Weber's work on the need for individuals tO stand up tO the impact Of bureaucracles and Other structures Of modern S OC iety. The influence of lmmanuel Kant on Weber and on German sociology generally shows that German sociology and Marxi sm grew from different philosophical roots. As we have seen, it was Hegel, not Kant, wh0 was the important philosophical influence on Marxian theory. Whereas Hegel' s philosophy led Marx and the Marxists tO lOOk for relations, confiicts, and contradictions, Kantian philosophy led at least some German sociologists tO take a more static perspective. TO Kant the

CHAPTER 4 : MAX WEBER 127 、 Mhile classes exist in the economic order and status groups in the SOCial order, parties can be found in the political order. TO Weber, parties "are always 翔 c ル struggling for domination" (cited in Gerth and Mills, 1958 : 195 ; italics added). Thus parties are the most organized elements Of 、 Meber' s stratification system. 、 Meber thinks 0f parties very broadly as including not only those that exist in the state but alSO those that may exist in a social club. Parties usually, but not always, represent class and/or status groups. Whatever they represent, parties are oriented tO the attainment Of power. 嶬市ⅱ e Weber remained close to his action approach in his ideas on social stratification, these ideas already indicate a movement in the direction Of macro-level communities and structures. ln most Of his other work, 、 Meber focused on such large-scale units 0f analysis. N0t that Weber lost sight 0f the action; the actor simply moved from being the focus 0f his concern t0 being largely a dependent variable determined by a variety 0f large-scale forces. For example, as we will see, Weber believed that individual CaIvinists are impelled to act in various ways by the norms, values, and beliefs Of their religion, but his focus was not on the individual but on the collective forces that impel the actor. Stru ctu res Of AuthO ⅱ Weber' s sociological interest in the structures Of authority was motivated, at least in part, by his political interests. Weber was no political radical; in fact, he was 0ften called the "bourgeois Marx" tO reflect the similarities in the intellectual interests of Marx and Weber as well as their very different political orientations. AIthough 、 Meber was almost as critical of modern capitalism as Marx was, he did not advocate revolution. He wanted t0 change society gradually, not overthrow it. He had little faith in the ability Of the masses tO create a "better" society. But 、 Meber alSO saw little hope in the middle classes, which he felt were dominated by shortsighted, petty bureaucrats. Weber was critical Of authoritarlan political leaders like Bismarck, whO he felt made no provision for leadership succession. Nevertheless, for Weber the hope—if indeed he had any hope—lay with the great political leaders rather than with the masses or the bureaucrats. Along with his faith in political leaders went his unswerving nationalism. He placed the nation above all else: "The vital interests Of the nation stand, Of course, above democracy and parliamentarianism" ( 、 Meber, 1921 / 1968 : 1383 ). Weber preferred democracy as a political form not because he believed in the masses but because it offered maximum dynamism and the best milieu t0 generate politicalleaders (Mommsen, 1974 ). Weber noted that authority structures exist in every social institution, and his political views were related tO his analysis Of these structures in all settings. Of course, they were most relevant tO his views on the polity. 、 Meber began his analysis Of authority structures in a way that was consistent with his assumptions about the nature Of action. He defined dO 川ⅲ行 0 れ as the 'probability that certain specific commands ()r all commands) will be obeyed by a given group 0f persons" (Weber, 1921 / 1968 : 212 ). Domination can have a variety Of bases, legitimate as well as illegitimate, but what mainly interested 、 Meber were

CHAPTER 4 : MAX WEBER 125 objective necessity Of making economlc provision, but the belief that it is necessary" ( 1921 / 1968 : ). ln embedding his analysis in mental processes and the resulting meaningful action, Weber ( 1921 / 1968 ) was careful to point out that it is erroneous to regard psychology as the foundation 0f the sociological interpretation of action. Weber seemed tO be making essentially the same point made by Durkheim in discussing at least some nonmaterial social facts. That is, sociologists are interested in mental processes, but this is not the same as psychologists' interest in the mind, personality, and so fo h. Although Weber implied that he had a great concern with mental processes, he actually spent little time on them. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills called attention to Weber's lack of concern with mental processes: " 、 Meber sees in the concept of personality a much abused notion referring tO a profoundly irrational center Of creativity, a center before which analytical inquiry comes to a halt" ( 1958 : 55 ). Schutz ( 1932 / 1967 ) was quite correct when he pointed out that although Weber' s work on mental processes is suggestive, it is hardly the basis for a systematic mcrosociology. But it was the suggestiveness Of 、 Meber's work that made him relevant to those who developed the theories of individuals and their behavior— symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and SO fO れ h. ln his action theory, 、 Meber' s clear intent was tO focus on individuals and patterns and regularities Of action and not on the collectivity. "Action in the sense Of subjectively understandable orientation Of behavior exists only as the behavior Of one or more ⅲ市ⅵ d レ記 human beings" (Weber, 1921 / 1968 : 13 ). Weber was prepared tO admit that for some purposes we may have tO treat collectivities as individuals, "but for the subjective interpretation Of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated as 0 the resultants and modes Of organizatlon Of the particular acts Of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course 0f subjectively understandable action" ( 1921 / 1968 : 13 ). lt would seem that Weber could hardly be more explicit: the sociology of action is ultimately concerned with individuals, れ 0 ー collectivities. Weber utilized his ideal-type methodology to clarify the meaning of ac れ by identifying four basic types 0f action. N0t only is this typology significant for understanding what 、 Meber meant by action, but it is also, in part, the basis for Weber' s concern with larger social structures and institutions. Of greatest importance is 、 Meber' s differentiation between the tWO basic types Of rational action. The first is 襯ど住れ s - どれホ ra 行 0 れ″ or action that is "determined by expectations as tO the behavior Of objects in the environment and Of other human beings; these expectations are used as 、 conditions' or 'means' for the attamment Of the actor' S own rationally pursued and calculated ends" (Weber, 1921 / 1968 : 24 ). The second is ↓観〃化 ra 行 0 れ〃 , or action that iS "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake Of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects for success" (Weber, 1921 / 1968 : 24 ー 25 ). Affectual action (which was Of little concern tO Weber) is determined by the emotional state Of the actor. Tra 市行 0 ′ ta / action (which was Of far greater concern to 、 Meber) is determined by the actor' s habitual and customary ways of behaving.

CHAPTER 4 : MAX WEBER 123 will soon encounter the basic paradox in 、 Meber' s work: despite his seemlng commitment tO a sociology Of small-scale processes, his work is pnmarily at the large-scale levels 0f the social world. (Many Weberians would disagree with this portrayal 0f paradox in Weber' s work. Kalberg [ 1994 ] , for example, argues that Weber offers a more fully integrated micro-macro, or agency-structure, theory.) What SocioIogy? ln discussing what Weber meant by sociology, as well as the inconsistencies between his programmatic statements and his substantive sociology, we should remember that his work on sociology per se came late in his career, long after he had done most of his historical studies. lt may well be that the g 叩 s and inconsistencies that appear in his work are traceable tO the inherent differences between sociology and history and not simply to differences between his programmatic statements and his substantive WO ⅸ . ln articulating his view on sociology, 、 Meber Often tOOk a stance against the large-scale evolutionary sociology, the organicism, that was preeminent in the field at the time. For example, 、 Meber said: 。、 I became one [a sociologist] in order tO put an end tO collectivist notions. ln Other words, sociology, t00 , can only be practiced by proceeding from the action Of one or more, few or many, individuals, that means, by employing a strictly 'individualist' method" (R0th, 1976 : 306 ). Despite his stated adherence tO an "individualist" method, 、 Meber was forced tO admit that it is impossible t0 eliminate totally collective ideas from sociology. But even when he admitted the significance 0f collective concepts, Weber ultimately reduced them t0 patterns and regularities Of individual action: "For the subjective interpretation Of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated as SO い the resultants and modes Of organization Of the particular acts Of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course Of subjectively understandable action" ( 1921 / 1968 : 13 ). At the individual level, Weber was deeply concerned with meaning, and the way in which it was formed. There seems little doubt that Weber believed in, and intended t0 undertake, a microsociology. But is that, in fact, what he did? Guenther ROth, one Of 、 Meber' s foremost interpreters, provides us with an unequivocal answer in his description 0f the overall thrust 0f Eco れ 0 襯 ) れ d SOC 0. ・ "the first strictly ど川〃 ~ C / CO 川〃 ar な 0 れ 0 工 SOCial S な〃 C ル尾 and normative order in ル or / d - んなー 0 ca / depth" ( 1968:xxvii). Mary Fulbrook directly addresses the discontinuity in Weber' s work : 、 Meber's overt emphasis on the importance Of [individual] meanings and motives in causal explanation Of social action does not correspond adequately with the true mode Of explanation involved in his comparative-historical studies Of the world religions. Rather, the ultimate level Of causal explanation in 、 Meber's substantive writings iS that Of the social-structural conditions under WhiCh certain forms Of meaning and motivation can achieve historical efficacy. (FuIbrook, 1978 : 71 ) 4 ln fact, Weber's idealtypes 尾 collective concepts.

122 PART ONE: CLASSICAL SOCIOLOG ℃ AL THEORY warned researchers tO be careful about the role Of values: "lt should be constantly . exactly at which point the scientific investigator becomes silent and made clear . the evaluating and acting person begins t0 speak" (Weber, 1903 ー 17 / 1949 : 60 ). 、 Mhen expressing the value positions, sociological researchers must always keep themselves and their audiences aware Of those positions. There is a gap between what Weber said and what he actually did. Weber was not afraid t0 express a value judgment, even in the midst Of the analysis 0f historical data. For example, he said that the Roman state suffered from a convulsive sickness of its social b0dy. lt can be argued that in Weber' s actual work values were not only a basic device for selecting subjects tO study but alSO were involved in the acquisition 0f meaningful knowledge 0f the social world. Gary Abraham ( 1992 ) has made the point that Weber' s work, especially his views on Judaism as a world religion, was distorted by his values. ln his sociology 0f religion (discussed later in this chapter), Weber termed the Jews pariah people. '' Weber traced this position Of outsider more tO the desire Of Jews tO segregate themselves than tO exclusion by the rest of society. Thus Weber, accepting the general view 0f the day, argued that Jews would need tO surrender Judaism in order tO be assimilated intO German society. Abraham argues that this sort 0f bias affected not only Weber' s ideas on Judaism, but his work in general. This casts further doubt on Weber as a "value-free" sociologist, as well as on the conventional view Of 、 Meber as a liberal thinker. As Abraham says, "Max Weber was probably as close t0 tolerant liberalism as majority Germany could offer at the time" ( 1992 : 22 ). Weber was more 0f a nationalist supporting the assimilation Of minonty groups than he was a classical liberal favoring pluralism, and those values had a profound effect on his wo ⅸ . MOSt American sociologists regard 、 Meber as an exponent Of value-free sociology. The truth is that most American sociologists themselves subscribe tO the idea 0f value-freedom, ・ and they find it useful t0 invoke Weber's name in support Of their position. As we have seen, however, 、 Meber' s work is studded with values. One Other aspect Of 、 Meber's work on values worth noting is his ideas on the role Of the social sciences in helping people make choices among vanous ultimate value positions. Basically, 、 Meber' s view is that there is れ 0 way Of scientifically choosing among alternative value positions. Thus, SOCial scientists cannot presume tO make such choices for people. "The SOCial sciences, WhiCh are Str1Ctly empirical sciences, are the least fitted t0 presume t0 save the individual the difficulty 0f making a choice" (Weber, 1903 ー 17 / 1949 : 19 ). The social scientist can derive certain factual conclusions from social research, but this research cannot tell people what they "ought" t0 d0. Empirical research can help people choose an adequate means t0 an end, but it cannot help them choose that end as opposed to other ends. Weber says, "lt can never be the task Of an empirical science tO provide binding norms and ideals from which directions for immediate practical activity can be derived" ( 1903 ー 17 / 1949 : 52 ). SUBSTANTIVE SOCIOLOGY We turn now to Weber' s substantive sociology. We will begin, as did Weber in his monumental E ( ・ 0 れ 0 川 ) , れ d SO ( ・ at the levels Of action and interaction, but we

CHAPTER 4 : MAX WEBER 139 Although we have emphasized the differences among Weber' s four types 0f rationalization in thiS section, there are a number Of commonalities among them. Thus as we move from institution tO institution in the ensuing discussion, we, like 、 Meber, focus sometimes on rationalization in general and at Other times on the specific types Of rationalization. Economy The most systematic presentation Of 、 Meber' s thoughts on the rationalization Of the econom1C institution iS tO be found in hiS G どれど ra / ECO れ 0 川 ~ C 〃な 0. 、 Meber' s concern is with the development Of the rational capitalistic economy in the Occident, which is a specific example Of a rational economy defined as a "functional organization orlented tO money-pnces which originate in the interest-struggles 0f men in the 襯 0 et " ( 、 Meber, 1915 / 1958 : 331 ). Although there are the outlines Of a general evolutionary trend in General Eco れ 0 襯〃な 0 , 、 Meber, as always, is careful to point out that there are various sources of capitalism, alternative routes tO it, and a range Of results emanating from it. ln fact, in the course 0f rejecting the socialistic theory 0f evolutionary change, Weber rejects the whole idea 0f a "general evolutionary sequence" ( 1927 / 1981 : 34 ). Weber begins by depicting vanous irrational and traditional forms such as the household, clan, village, and manorial economies. For example, the lord of the manor in feudalism was described by Weber as being t00 traditionalistic, " t00 lacking in initiative tO build up a business enterpnse in a large scale intO which the peasants would have fitted as a labor force" ( 1927 / 1981 : 72 ). However, by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the Occident, feudalism began to break down as the peasants and the land were freed from control by the lord and a money economy was introduced. 、 Mith this breakdown, the manorial system 、 'showed a strong tendency t0 develop in a c 叩 italistic direction" (Weber, 1927 / 1981 : 79 ). At the same time, in the Middle Ages, cities were beginning t0 develop. Weber focuses on the largely urban development 0f industry involved in the transformation 0f raw materials. Especially important t0 Weber is the development 0f such industrial production beyond the immediate needs 0f the house community. N0table here is the rise 0f free craftsmen in the cities. They developed in the Middle Ages in the Occident because, for one thing, this society had developed consumptive needs greater than those Of any Other. ln general, there were larger markets and more purchasers, and the peasantry had greater purchasing power. On the other side, forces operated against the ma. 」 or alternative tO craftsmen—slaves. Slavery was found tO be tOO unprofitable and t00 unstable, and it was made increasingly more unstable by the growth 0f the towns that offered freedom to the slaves. ln the Occident, along with free craftsmen came the development of the guild, defined by Weber as "an organization Of craft workers specialized in accordance . [with] internal regulation of work and monopoli- with the type of occupation . zation against outsiders' ' ( 1927 / 1981 : 136 ). Freedom of association was also characteristic 0f the guilds. But although rational in many senses, guilds also had traditional, anticapitalistic aspects. For example, one master was not supposed tO have more capital than another, and this requirement was a barrier tO the development Of large capitalistic organizations.

124 PART ONE: CLASS ℃ AL S000LOG ℃ AL THEORY Lars Udehn ( 1981 ) has cast light on this problem in interpreting Weber' s work by distinguishing between Weber' s methodology and his substantive concerns and recogmzing that there is a conflict or tension between them. ln Udehn' s view'Weber uses an "individualist and subjectivist methodology" ( 1981 : 1 引 ). ln terms 0f the latter, weber is interested in what individuals d0 and why they d0 it (their subjective motives). ln the former, Weber is interested in reducing collectivities tO the actions Of individuals. However, in most Of his substantive sociology ()s we will see), Weber focuses on large-scale structure (such as bureaucracy or capitalism) and is not focally concerned with what individuals d0 or why they d0 it. 5 such structures are not reduced by Weber tO the actions Of individuals, and the actions Of those in them are determined by the structures, not by their motives. There is little doubt that there iS an enormous contradiction in Weber' S work, and it concern us through much 0f this ch 叩 ter. With this as background, we are now ready for Weber' s definition 0f soc g ) ・・ . iS a c れ c concerning itself with the ~ れ r, 〃尾行ソリれ d れ d ⅲ g Of "Soci010gy ・ SOCial ac 0 れ and thereby with a ca リ sa / explanation Of itS course and ( 1921 / 1968 : 4 ). This definition provides a useful bridge between the preceding section on 、 Meber' s methodology and the ensuing discussion Of his substantive work. Among the themes discussed earlier that are mentioned or implied in this definition are: Soci010gy should be a science. Soci010gy should be concerned with causality. (Here, 叩 parently, Weber was combining sociology and history.) Soci010gy should utilize interpretive understanding ( ん ). We are now ready for the specific components 0f Weber' s microsociology ・ SOCi Actio n 、 Meber' s entire sociology, if we accept his words at face value, was based on his conception Of social action (Turner, 1983 ). He differentiated between action and purely reactive behavior. The concept Of behavior is reserved, then as now (Ritzer' 1975a ) , for automatic behavior that involves no thought processes. A stimulus is presented and behavior occurs, with little intervening between stimulus and response. such behavior was not Of interest in 、 S sociology. He was concerned with action that clearly involved the intervention 0f thought processes (and the resulting meaningful action) between the occurrence Of a stimulus and the ultimate response. TO put it slightly differently, action was said t0 occur when individuals attached subjective meanings tO their action. TO 、 Meber, the task Of sociological analysis involved "the interpretation Of action in terms Of its subjective meaning ( 1921 / 1968 : 8 ). A good, and more specific, example 0f weber' s thinking on action iS found in hiS discussion Of CO れ 0 襯 ~ C ac 行 0 川 WhiCh he defined as "a conscious' . for what matters is not the 〃川 00 , onentation tO economc consideration . Udehn argues that one exception is Weber's analysis 0f the behavior 0f leaders. 5

1 16 PART ONE: CLASS ℃ AL SOCIOLOG ℃ AL THEORY Finally, some have argued that 怩んれ involves b0th 叩 proaches. P. A. Münch ( 1975 ) , for example, said that to understand action fully we must ( 1 ) identify the sense Of the action as intended by the actor and ( 2 ) recognize the context in which the action belongs and makes sense. The multiple interpretations of 怩んどれ help us to see why Weber occupies such a central role in sociological theory. The cultural-level interpretation Of ソんれ would be consistent with large-scale theories (for example, structural functional- ism), whereas an individual-level view is 叩 propriate for small-scale theories (for example, symbolic interactionism). Münch' s compromse positlon would be acceptable tO bOth sets Of theories. Which Of these three interpretations is correct? At one level, we can say that it does not really matter. 、 Mhat is important is that there are different interpretations and that they have influenced different theoretical perspectives. On another level, we must come tO some conclusion about ソん〃 on the basis Of 、 Meber' s WO ⅸ . lt is in his substantive work, rather than in his programmatic statements about methodology, that we will find the most reliable information on what Weber really meant by 怩んれ and by the other methodological tOOls that we encounter. As we will see, 、 Meber's focus on the cultural and social-structural contexts Of action leads us tO the view that リ e ん e れ is a tOOl for macro-level analysis. CausaIity Another aspect of Weber's methodology was his commitment to the study of causality. 、 Meber was inclined tO see the study Of the causes Of social phenomena as being within the domain 0f history, not sociology. Yet t0 the degree that his- tory and sociology cannot be clearly separated—and they certainly are not clearly separated in 、 Meber's substantive work—the issue Of causality is rel- evant tO sociology. Causality is also important because it is, as we will see, another place in which Weber sought t0 combine nomothetic and idiographic 叩 proaches. By ca 記 Weber ( 1921 / 1968 ) simply meant the probability that an event will be followed or accompanied by another event. lt was not, in his view, enough tO 100k for historical constants, repetitions, analogies, and parallels, as many historians are content tO dO: lnstead, the researcher has tO lOOk at the reasons for, as well as the meamngs of, historical changes (R0th, 1971 ). Although Weber can be seen as having a one-way causal model—in contrast tO Marx' s dialectical mode Of reasoning—in his substantive sociology he was always attuned tO the interrela- tionships among the economy, society, polity, organization, social stratification, religion, and so forth (R0th, 1968 ). Thus, Weber operates with a multicausal approach in which " ん OS な Of interactive influences are very Often effective causal factors" (Kalberg, 1994 : 13 ). Weber was quite clear on the issue of multiple causality in his study of the relationship between Protestantism and the spirit 0f c 叩 italism. Although he is sometimes interpreted differently, Weber ( 1904 ー 05 / 1958 ) simply argued that the Protestant ethic was 0 〃ど Of the causal factors in the rise Of the modern spirit Of c 叩 italism. He labeled as "foolish" the idea that Protestantism was the sole cause.

CHAPTER 1 : A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SOCIOLOG ℃ AL THEORY: THE EARLY YEARS 29 Of view, rationalization constituted an even greater problem in socialist than in capitalist societies. Also in Weber's favor was the form in which he presented his judgments. He spent most 0f his life doing detailed historical studies, and his political conclusions were often made within the context of his research. Thus they usually sounded very scientific and academic. Marx, although he did much serious research, also wrote a good deal 0f explicitly polemical material. Even his more academic work is laced with acid political judgments. For example, in C 叩″記 ( 1867 / 1967 ) , he described capitalists as "vampires" and "werewolves. '' 、 Meber' s more academic style helped make him more acceptable tO later sociologists. Another reason for the greater acceptability of Weber was that he operated in a philosophical tradition that also helped shape the work of later sociologists. That is, 、 Meber operated in the Kantian tradition, which meant, among other things, that he tended to think in cause-and-effect terms. This kind of thinking was more acceptable t0 later sociologists, who were largely unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the dialectical logic that informed Marx's wo ⅸ . Finally, Weber 叩 peared to offer a much more rounded approach to the social world than Marx. Whereas Marx 叩 peared to be almost totally preoccupied with the economy, 、 Meber was interested in a wide range Of SOCial phenomena. This diversity Of focus seemed tO give later sociologists more to work with than the apparently 1 蝨 ore single-minded concerns Of Marx. Weber produced most of his major works in the late 1800S and early 1900S. Early in hiS career, 、 Meber was identified more as a historian WhO was concerned with sociological issues, but in the early 1900S his focus grew more and more sociological. lndeed, he became the dominant sociologist of his time in Germany. ln 1910 , he founded (with, among others, Georg Simmel, whom we discuss below) the German Sociological Society. His home in HeideIberg was an intellectual center not only for sociologists but for scholars from many fields. AIthough his work was broadly influential in Germany, it was tO become even more influential in the United States, especially after Talcott Parsons introduced Weber' s ideas (and those of other European theorists, especially Durkheim) t0 a large American audience. Although Marx' s ideas did not have a significant positive effect on American sociological theorists until the 1960S , Weber was already highly influential by the late 1930S. Georg Simmel was Weber' s contemporary and a cofounder of the German Soci010gical Society. As with Marx and Weber, we will devote a chapter to Simmel ()h 叩 ter 5 ) ; here we place him within the historical development of sociological theory. Simmel was a somewhat atypical sociological theorist (Frisby, 1981 ; Levine, Carter, and Gorman, 1976a , 1976b ). For one thing, he had an immediate and profound effect on the development 0fAmerican sociological theory, whereas Marx and Weber were largely ignored for a number of years. Simmel' s work helped sh 叩 e the development 0f one Of the early centers 0f American sociology—the University of Chicago—and its major theory, symbolic interactionism. The Chicago school and symbolic interactionism came, as we will see, tO dominate American sociology ln the 1920S and early 1930S (Bulmer, 1984 ). Simmel' s ideas were influential at

CHAPTER 4 : MAX WEBER 1 15 Once we have realized that the historical method is nothing more or less than the classical method Of interpretation applied tO overt action instead of tO texts , a method alming at identifying a human design , a " meaning ' ' behind Ob servable events, we shall have no difficulty in accepting that it can be just as well applied to human interaction as to individual actors. From this point Of view all history is interactlon, which has to be interpreted in terms Of the rival plans Of various actors. (Lachman, 1971 : 20 ) ln Other words, Weber sought tO use the tOOls Of hermeneutics tO understand actors, 3 interaction, and indeed all 0f human hi sto . One common misconception about ソどんど〃 is that it is simply the use of intuition" by the researcher. Thus many crit1CS see it as a "soft," irrational, subjective research methodology. However, Weber categorically rejected the idea that ソんどれ involved simply intuition, sympathetic participation, or empathy ( 1903 ー 17 / 1949 ). To him, んどれ involved doing systematic and rigorous research rather than simply getting a "feeling" for a text or social phenomenon. ln other words, for Weber ( 1921 / 1968 ) んど〃 was a rational procedure of study. The key question in interpreting 、 Meber' s concept of ↓んビれ is whether he thought that it was most 叩 propriately applied to the subjective states of individual actors or tO the subjective aspects Of large-scale units Of analysis (for example, culture). We can find aspects of Weber's work that support both alternatives, and there are supporters Of bOth perspectives among 、 Meber' s interpreters. If we 100k only at 、 Meber' s bare position statements, there seems to be overwhelming evidence on the side of the individual-level interpretation of 怩んど〃 (for example, Weber, 1903 ー 06 / 1975 : 125 ). This interpretation is sup- ported by a number 0f observers (Burger, 1976 ; Schutz, 1932 / 1967 ; Warriner, 1969 ). But a number Of people have interpreted v どんどれ , and Weber' s statements about it, as a technique aimed at understanding culture. Susan Hekman sees this as the newer interpretation Of what 、 Meber meant by focusing on such cultural elements as "intersubjective meanings or socially constituted rules which define the meaning 0f action within a given society" ( 1983 : 46 ). L. M. Lachman was particularly clear on this: "The plan elements which interest us are not the millions Of individual purposes pursued, but the common elements Of norms, institutions, and Of the general environment in which all these plans have t0 be carried out" ( 1971 : 21 ). Along the same lines, W. G. Runciman ( 1972 ) and Murray Wax ( 1967 ) saw 怩んどれ as a t001 for learning the culture and the language 0f a given society. Wax argued not only 、ル r the large-scale interpretation Of リどんどれ but alSO 2g0 ⅲ an individual perspective. 、 Max used the term ⅲ甲 0 れ al ⅲル″れ tO refer tO the individual view. TO him, 、 Meber did not intend that we use v どんどれ tO understand actors, but rather that we use it tO understand the larger culture in which actors exist and which constrains their thoughts and actions. Hermeneutics has become a major intellectual concern in recent years, especially in the work Of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jurgen Habermas (Bleicher, 1980 ). For a strong argument in favor Of using hermeneutics today, see Sica ( 1986 ) , and for an appreciation ofWeber's hermeneutics, see OIiver ( 1983 ). 3