CHAPTER 2 : KARL MARX 53 P 尾ど〃行 0 れ is the immediate contact that people have with nature through their senses, but a mass Of unorganized perceptions is likely tO leave actors quite disoriented. What is needed is a process Of or 〃 0 〃 that organizes, patterns, and imposes a framework on the vanous perceptions 0f the world. Once the world has been perceived and the perceptions organized, the stage is set for 0 〃〃 ropr 0 川 in WhiCh actors use their creaUve powers on nature in order tO satisfy their needs. The conscious, creaüve capacity Of human beings makes sense in Marx' S View only when it is seen in relationship tO the perception, onentatlon, and appropnation Of nature. N0t only does the nature 0f people' s powers and needs shape the form 0f perception, orientation, and appropriation, but the form that they take in a particular social setting affects, in turn, the nature Of these powers and needs. This reciprocity reinforces the idea that for Marx human nature was not carved in stone but was very much affected by the nature 0f the social setting. Following Marx, we may differentiate three basic epochs in the relationship between human potential and the processes Of perception, orientation, and ap- propnation—pnmitive society, capitalism, and communism. ln 〃川″ⅳ society people used natural resources tO produce the things that they needed (for example, boats and shelters). Because relatively few things were produced—and those rather inefficiently—we can say that people developed their capacifies tO only a slight degree. Because powers were expressed tO only this slight degree, the needs 0f people remained at a minimallevel in pnmltive society (OIIman, 1976 : 91 ). ln earliest times, people were busy desperately trying t0 survive and, as a result, were able tO develop and express only a limited number . few human needs have yet been Of needs: "ln lowest stages Of production . produced, and thus few [need] t0 be satisfied" (Marx, 1857 ー 58 / 1974 : 398 ). The ability Of people tO think, their consciousness, was limited and amounted tO little "sheep-like," consciousness (Marx and Engels, 1845 ー 46 / 1 蝨 ore than animal, 1970 : 51 ). Ca. 〃″ 0 / な襯 iS the economic system in WhiCh the bourgeoisie owns the means Of production and the proletariat must sell its labor-time tO the capitalist in order tO survive. lt was viewed by Marx as an epoch in which the creative capacity Of most human beings as it is expressed in the act Of appropriation is virtually eliminated. lnstead, most people are reduced tO wanting tO make enough money tO be able tO 0 ルれ the commodities they desire. Thus the goal becomes ownership rather than the expression Of human potential. ln comparmg pnmitive society tO capitalism, Marx noted, "The ancients provide a narrow satisfaction, whereas the modern world leaves us unsatisfied, or, where it appears tO be satisfied with itself, it is vulgar and 川どれ " ( 1857 ー 58 / 1964 : 85 ). CO 襯襯″れな襯 , however, was viewed as an era in WhiCh the Stn-lCtUral forces leading tO this distortion Of human nature are overthrown, and people are allowed tO express their human potential in ways never before possible. The meanness Of pnmitive life permitted only a minimal expression 0f that potential' and the structures 0f c 叩 italism (for example, division 0f labor, private property, and money), while freeing people from the limitations 0f primitive society, represent barriers tO the expression Of many species powers and needs. But capitalism was
140 PART ONE: CLASS ℃ AL S000LOG ℃ AL THEORY As the Middle Ages came t0 a close, the guilds began to disintegrate. This disintegration was crucial because the traditional guilds stOOd in the way Of technological advance. With the dissolution 0f the guild system came the rise 0f the domestic system Of production, especially the 'putting out" system in the textile industry. ln such a system, production was decentralized, with much 0f it taking place within the homes 0f the workers. Although domestic systems were found throughout the world, it was only in the Occident that the owners controlled the means 0f production (for example, t001s, raw materials) and provided them to the workers in exchange for the right to dispose of the product. Whereas a fully developed domestic system developed in the West, it was impeded in other parts of the world by such barriers as the clan system (China), the caste system (lndia), traditionalism, and the lack of free workers. Next, Weber details the development of the workshop (a central work setting without advanced machinery) and then the emergence of the factory in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. ln Weber' s view, the factory did not arise out of craft work or the domestic system, but alongside them. SimiIarIy, the factory was not called intO existence by advances in machinery; the tWO developments were correlated with each other. The factory was characterized by free labor that performed specialized and coordinated activities, ownership Of the means Of production by the entrepreneur, the fixed c 叩 ital 0f the entrepreneur, and the system Of accounting that is indispensable tO such capitalization. Such a factory was, in Weber' s view, a capitalistic organization. ln addition to the development of the factory, Weber details the rise Of Other components Of a modern capitalistic economy, such as advanced machinery, transportation systems, money, banking, interest, bookkeeping systems, and SO on. What most clearly defines modern rational capitalistic enterprises for Weber is their calculability, which is best represented in their reliance on modern bookkeeping. lsolated calculable enterprises existed in the past in the Occident as well as in Other societies. However, an entire SOCiety iS considered capitalistic only when the everyday requirements 0f the population are supplied by c 叩 italistic methods and enterprises. Such a society is found only in the Occident and there only S1nce the mid-nineteenth century. The development of a c 叩 italistic system hinged on a vanety of developments within the economy as well as within the larger society. 、 Mithin the economy, some of the prerequisites included a free market with large and steady demand, a money economy, inexpensive and rational technologies, a free labor force, a disciplined labor force, rational capital-accounting techniques, and the commercialization Of economic life involving the use 0f shares, stocks, and the like. Many 0f the economc prerequisites were found only in the Occident. Outside the economy, Weber identified a vanety 0f needed developments such as a modern state with 'professional administration, specialized officialdom, and law based on the concept of citizenship" ( 1927 / 1981 : 313 ) , rational law "made by jurists and rationally interpreted and 叩 plied" ( 1927 / 1981 : 313 ) , cities, and modern science and technology. TO these Weber adds a factor that will concern us in the next section, "a rational ethic for the conduct of life . . a religious basis for the ordering 0f life
CHAPTER 5 : GEORG SIMMEL 179 reciprocal knowledge, and this knowledge upon the basis 0f actual relations. B0th are inextricably interwoven" ( 1906 / 1950 : 309 ). ln all aspects Of our lives we acquire not only truth but alSO ignorance and e or. However, it iS in the interaction with Other people that ignorance and error acqurre a distinctive character. This relates tO the inner lives Of the people with whom we interact. People, in contrast tO any Other Object Of knowledge, have the capacity tO ⅲれ行 0 れ〃 ) reveal the truth about themselves or tO lie and conceal such information. The fact is that even if people wanted to reveal all (and they almost always dO not), they could not dO SO because SO much information "would drive everybody into the insane asylum" (Simmel, 1906 / 1950 : 312 ). Thus, people must select the things that they report to others. From the point of view 0f Simmel' s concern with quantitative issues, we report only "fragments" Of our mner lives tO Others. Furthermore, we choose which fragments tO reveal and which tO conceal. Thus, in all interaction, we reveal only a part Of ourselves, and which part we opt tO shOW depends on hOW we select and arrange the fragments we choose tO reveal. This brings us tO the 〃 , a form of interaction in which the liar ⅲ〃 0 れ 0 〃 ) hides the truth from Others. ln the lie, it is not just that Others are left with an erroneous conception but alSO that the error is traceable tO the fact that the liar intended that the others be deceived. Simmel discusses the lie in terms 0f social geometry, specifically his ideas on distance. For example, in Simmel's view, we can better accept and come tO terms with the lies of those who are distant from us. Thus, we have little difficulty learning that the politicians who habituate Washington, D. C. , frequently lie t0 us. ln contrast, 。、 If the persons closest to us lie, life becomes unbearable" (Simmel, 1906 / 1950 : 313 ). The lie of a spouse, lover, or child has a far more devastating impact on us than the lie 0f a government official whom we know only through the television screen. 、åore generally, in terms Of distance, all everyday commumcation combines elements known tO bOth parties with facts known tO only one or the Other. lt is the existence Of the latter that leads tO "distanceness" in all social relationships. lndeed, Simmel argues that social relationships require bOth elements that are known tO the interactants 〃 d those that are unknown tO one party or the Other. ln Other words, even the most intimate relationships require bOth nearness and distance, reciprocal knowledge and mutual concealment. Thus, secrecy is an integral part 0f all social relationships, although a relationship may be destroyed if the secret becomes known t0 the person from whom it was being kept. Secrecy is linked to the size of society. ln small groups, it is difficult to develop secrets; "Everybody is t00 close tO everybody else and his circumstances, and frequency and intimacy Of contact involve tOO many temptations tO revelation (Simmel, 1906 / 1950 : 335 ). Furthermore, in small groups, secrets are not even needed because everyone is much like everyone else. ln large groups, in contrast, secrets can more easily develop and are much more needed because there are important differences among people.
344 PART TWO: MODERN S000LOG ℃ AL THEORY: THE MAJOR SCHOOLS ln Other words, tO have a self, one must be a member Of a community and be directed by the attitudes common t0 the community. While play requires only pieces 0f selves, the game requires a coherent self. Not only is taking the role 0f the generalized other essential t0 the self' but it is also crucial for the development 0f organized group activities. A group requires that individuals direct their activities in accord with the attitudes Of the generalized Other. The generalized 0ther also represents Mead' s familiar propensity t0 give t0 the social, since it is through the generalized Other that the group influences the behavior of individuals. Mead also 100ks at the self from a pragmatic point 0f view. At the individual level, the self allows the individual t0 be a more efficient member 0f the larger society. Because 0f the self, people are more likely t0 d0 what is expected 0f them in a given situation. Since people Often try tO live up tO group expectations, they are more likely tO avoid the inefficiencies that come from failing tO dO what the group expects. Furthermore, the self allows for greater coordination in society as a whole. Because individuals can be counted on tO dO what is expected Of them, the group can operate more effectively. The preceding, as well as the overall discussion 0f the self, might lead us t0 believe that Mead' s actors are little more than conformists and that there is little individuality, since everyone is busy conforming tO the expectations Of the generalized 0ther. But Mead is clear that each self is different from all 0thers. Selves share a common structure, but each self receives unique biographical articulation. ln addition, it is clear that there is not simply one grand generalized 0ther but that there are many generalized Others in SOCiety, because there are many groups in society. people, therefore, have multiple generalized 0thers and' as a result' multiple selves. Each person' S unique set Of selves makes him or her different from everyone else. Furthermore, people need not accept the community as it is; they can reform things and seek tO make them better. are able tO change the community because Of our capacity tO think. But Mead is forced tO put this issue Of individual creativity in familiar, behavioristic terms: "The only way in which we can react against the disapproval Of the entire community is bY setting up a higher so 0f community . he may stand out by himself WhiCh in a certain sense out-votes the one we find . over against it. But tO dO that he has tO comprehend the voices Of the past and Of the future. That is the only way the self can get a voice which is more than the voice of the community" ( 1934 / 1962 : 167 ー 168 ). ln other words, t0 stand up t0 the generalized Other, the individual must construct a still larger generalized other' composed not only from the present but also from the past and the future' and then respond tO it. Mead identifies two aspects, or phases, 0f the self, which he labels the "l" and the "me. '' As Mead puts it, 、、 The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases" ( 1934 / 1962 : 178 ). lt is important t0 bear in mind that the 、 'I" and 、、 me" are processes within the larger process 0f the self; they are not "things. " The 、 'l" is the immediate response Of an individual tO Others. lt is the incalculable, unpredictable, and creative aspect 0f the self. People d0 not know in advance what the action 0f the 、 'l" will be: 、、 But what that response will be he does not know and nobody else knows. Perhaps he will make a brilliant play or an e 江 or.
544 PART THREE: RECENT INTEGRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 爪 SOCIOLOG ℃ AL THEORY in this work Bourdieu is linking taste for refined objects with taste for the most basic food flavors. Because 0f structural invariants, especially field and habitus, the cultural prefer- ences Of the varlous groups within society (especially classes and fractions Of classes) constitute coherent systems. Bourdieu is focally concerned with varlations in aesthetic 。、 taste," the acquired disposition tO differentiate among the varlous cultural objects Of aesthetic enjoyment and tO appreciate them differentially. Taste is alSO practice that serves, among Other things, tO give an individual, as well as others, a sense Of his or her place in the SOCial order. Taste serves tO unify those with similar preferences 〃 d tO differentiate them from those with different tastes. That is, through the practical applications and implications of taste, people classify objects and thereby, in the process, classify themselves. We are able to categonze people by the tastes they manifest, for example, by their preferences for different types of music or movies. These practices, like all others, need tO be seen in the context Of all mutual relationships, that is, within the totality. Thus, seemingly isolated tastes for art or movies are related tO preferences in fOOd, sports, or hairstyles. TWO interrelated fields are involved in Bourdieu' s study of taste—class relationships (especially within fractions 0f the dominant class) and cultural relationships. He sees these fields as a serles Of positions in which a variety Of games" are undertaken. The actions taken by the agents (individual or collective) wh0 occupy specific positions are governed by the structure 0f the field, the nature Of the positions, and the interests associated with them. However, it is also a game that involves self-positioning and use Of a wide range Of strategies tO allow one tO excel at the game. Taste is an opportunity bOth tO experlence and tO assert one' s position within the field. But the field 0f social class has a profound effect on one's ability t0 play this game; those in the higher classes are far better able to have their tastes accepted and tO oppose the tastes Of those in the lower classes. Thus, the world of cultural works is related to the hierarchical world of social class and is itself both hierarchical and hierarchizing. Needless tO say, Bourdieu also links taste tO his Other ma. 」 or concept, habitus. Tastes are shaped far more by these deep-rooted and long-standing dispositions than they are by surface opinions and verbalizations. Peoples' preferences for even such mundane aspects 0f culture as clothing, furniture, or cooking are shaped by the habitus. And it is these dispositions 、、 that forge the unconscious unity Of a class" (Bourdieu, 1984a : 77 ). Bourdieu puts this more colorfully later: 、、 Taste is a matchmaker . . through which a habitus confirms its affinity with Other habitus" ( 1984a : 243 ). DialecticaIIy, of course, it is the structure of the class that shapes the habitus. WhiIe both field and habitus are important to Bourdieu, it is their dialectical relationship that is 0f utmost importance and significance; field and habitus mutually define one another: The dispositions constituting the cultivated んわ / れ岱 are only formed, only function and are only valid in a ど雇 in the relationship with a field ... which is itself a 'field of possible forces,' a 'dynamic' situation in which forces are only manifested in their
130 PART ONE: CLASS ℃ AL S000LOG ℃ AL THEORY 5 The staff that fills these offices does not own the means 0f production associated with them; staff members are provided with the use Of those things that they need t0 do the j0b. 6 The incumbent is not allowed tO appropriate the position; it always remams part Of the organization. 7 Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in wnting. A bureaucracy iS one Of the rational structures that iS playing an ever-increasing role in modern society, but one may wonder whether there is any alternative tO the bureaucratic structure. 、 Meber' S clear and unequivocal answer was that there iS no possible alternative: "The needs Of mass administration make it tOday completely indispensable. The chOice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration ” ( 1921 / 1968 : 223 ). Although we might admit that bureaucracy is an intrinsic part 0f modern c 叩 italism, we might ask whether a socialist society might be different. ls it possible tO create a socialist SOCiety without bureaucracies and bureaucrats? Once 、 Meber was unequivocal: " 、 Mhen those subject tO bureaucratic control seek tO escape the influence 0f existing bureaucratic apparatus, this is normally possible only by creating an organization Of their own which is equally subject tO the process Of bureaucratization" ( 1921 / 1968 : 224 ). ln fact, Weber believed that in the case 0f socialism we would see an lncrease, not a decrease, in bureaucratization. If socialism were tO achieve a level Of efficiency comparable tO capitalism, 、 'it would mean a tremendous increase in the importance Of professional ( 、 1921 / 1968 : 224 ). ln capitalism, at least the owners are not bureaucrats and therefore would be able tO restrmn the bureaucrats, but in socialism even the top-levelleaders would be bureaucrats. Weber thus believed that even with its problems "capitalism presented the best chances for the preservation Of individual freedom and creative leadership in a bureaucratic world" (Mommsen, 1974 : xv ). We are once again at a key theme in weber' s work: his view that there is really no hope for a better world. Socialists can, in weber' s view, only make things worse by expanding the degree Of bureaucratization in society. 、 Meber noted: "NOt summer' s bloom lies ahead Of us, but rather a polar night 0f icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now" (cited in Gerth and Mills, 1958 : 128 ). A ray 0f hope in weber' s work—and it is a small one—is that professionals wh0 stand outside the bureaucratic system can control it tO some degree. ln this category weber included professional politicians, scientists, intellectuals (Sadri, 1992 ) , and even capitalists, as well as the supreme heads Of the bureaucracies. For example' Weber said that politicians "must be the countervailing force against bureaucratic domination" ( 1921 / 1968 : 1417 ). His famous essay "P01itics as a Vocation" is basically a plea for the development 0f politicalleaders with a calling t0 oppose the rule Of bureaucracies and Of bureaucrats. But in the end these appear tO be rather Here and elsewhere in his work weber adopts a Marxian interest in the means Of production. This 7 is paralleled by his concern with alienation, not only in the economic sector but throughout sociallife (science, politics, and so f0 h ).
60 PART ONE: CLASS ℃ AL S000LOG ℃ AL THEORY least human feeling left" (Venable, 1945 : 137 ). Then there is the P0int that human beings are no longer creative but are oriented solely toward owmng and possessing objects. TO Marx, pnvate property makes people so "stupid and one-sided" that they feel that an Object is only theirs when they possess it, that is, when it is "eaten' drunk, worn, inhabited," and so f0 h. For all these reasons, work in capitalism largely ceases tO be an expression Of human potential. ln fact' in many ways it is the opposite. With human functions so highly alienating, a person is no longer able tO satisfy human powers and needs and is forced tO concentrate on natural powers and needs. As a result, therefore, man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his animal functions—eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up' etc. ; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself t0 be anything but an animal. 、 Mhat is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal. (Marx, 1932 / 19 : 111 ) Perhaps this is the height 0f unanticipated consequences. people have produced a society that allows them t0 feel comfortable only when they function like animal S. Marx argued that c 叩 italism is an inverted world, in which those wh0 should be on top are relegated tO the bottom, and those whO deserve tO be on the bOttom rise tO the pinnacle Of society. Thus the people whO are the most important tO society—the proletariat—are near the bottom, generally scraping bY on a sub- sistence wage and dominated by the c 叩 italists. The capitalists' wh0 simply live 0ff the labor 0f the proletariat, are the dominant force in society. AISO inverted is the sense 0f what is real in society. For example, it is people (those wh0 sell good* services, labor-time, and SO (n) whO set pnces, but they fail tO see their essential role in this process. Rather, it appears as if it is the unreal "market" that sets prices. Finally, the reality 0f life in capitalism is hidden while illusion is seen as fact. For example, from Marx' s perspective, the capitalists exploit the proletariat' but the dominant belief is that the abilities 0f the capitalist lead t0 success for the worker. We shall return to this theme later in a discussion 0f ideology in capitalism' but the key point is that in many ways, capitalism is an inverted and distorted social system. However, Marx was not vindictive. He did not want tO see the emergence Of a society with the proletariat on top, but rather a society with true equality. Emancipation Marx's cnuque Of capitalist society is not an end in itself, Of course, but an e 代 0 to help bring about the changes needed t0 create a society in which human potential can be adequately expressed. We can say that the goal 0f Marx' s sociology lies in the ultimate emancipation Of humanity from the enslavement Of capitalist society (Mészåros, 1970 : 200 ). As Marx put it: "Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man ... has become a 挈ど ci - わⅲ g " (cited in Bender, 1970 : 66 ). Vernon Venable catches the essence of the problem and the need for reform quite well:
342 PART れⅣ 0 : MODERN SOCIOLOG ℃ AL THEORY: THE MAJOR SCHOOLS ability tO put ourselves unconsciously intO others' places and tO act as they act. As a result, people are able tO examine themselves as Others would examine them. As Mead says: lt is by means of reflexiveness—the turning-back 0f the expenence 0f the individual upon himself—that the whole social process is thus brought int0 the expenence 0f the individuals involved in it; it is by such means, which enable the individual t0 take the attitude 0f the other toward himself, that the individual is able consciously t0 adjust himself tO that process, and tO modify the resultant process in any given social act in terms Of his adjustment tO it. (Mead, 1934 / 1962 : 134 ) The self also allows people t0 take part in their conversations with Others. That is, one iS aware Of What one iS saying and as a result iS able tO monitor what iS being said and tO determine what is going tO be said next. ln order tO have selves, individuals must be able tO get "outside themselves" SO that they can evaluate themselves, SO that they can become objects tO themselves. To do this, people basically put themselves in the same experiential field as they put everyone else. Everyone is an important part Of that expenential situation, and people must take themselves intO account if they are tO be able tO act rationally in a given situation. Having done this, they seek tO examine themselves impersonally, objectively, and without emotion. However, people cannot expenence themselves directly. They can d0 so only indirectly by putting themselves in the position 0f others and viewing themselves from that standpoint. The standpoint from which one views one' s self can be that 0f a particular individual or that 0f the social group as a wh01e. As Mead puts most generally, "lt is only by taking the roles 0f others that we have been able t0 come back t0 ourselves" ( 1959 : 184 ー 185 ). We will have more t0 say shortly about this important distinction between putting ourselves in the place Of a specific individual or putting ourselves in the position Of a collectivity. Mead is very interested in the genesis Of the self. He sees the conversation Of gestures as the background for the self, but it does not involve a self' since in such a conversation the people are not taking themselves as objects. Mead traces the genesis 0f the self through two stages in childhood development. The first is the 〃 ) 訂 ag it is during this stage that children learn tO take the attitude 0f particular 0thers t0 themselves. While lower animals also play, only human beings "play at being someone else" (Aboulafia, 1986 : 9 ). Mead gives the example 0f a child playing (American) "lndian" : "This means that the child has a certain set 0f stimuli which call out in itself the responses they would call out in others, and which answer tO an lndian" (Mead, 1934 / 1962 : 150 ). As a result 0f such play, the child learns t0 become both subject and object and begins t0 become able t0 build a self. However, it is a limited self because the child can take only the role 0f distinct and separate others. Children may play at being "mommy" and "daddy" and in the process develop the ability t0 evaluate themselves as their parents, and other specific individuals, d0. However, they lack a more general and organized sense 0f themselves.
SOCIOLOG ℃ AL METATHEORIZING AND A METATHEORET ℃ AL SCHEMA 645 architecture and law as tWO examples Of material (objective) social facts. However, most Of Durkheim' s work emphasizes nonmaterial (subjective) social facts: Of course it iS true that not all consciousness achieves such externalization and materialization. NOt all aesthetic spirit Of a nation is embodied in the works it inspires; not all morality is formulated in clear precepts. The greater part is diffused. There is a large collective life which is at liberty; all sorts of currents come, go, circulate everywhere, cross and mingle in a thousand different ways, and just because they are constantly mobile are never crystallized in an objective form. Today a breath of sadness and discouragement descends on society: tomorrow, one ofjoyous confidence will uplift all hearts. (Durkheim, 1897 / 1951 : 315 ) These social currents do not have material existence; they can exist only within the consciousness Of individuals and between them. ln Suicide, Durkheim concentrated on examples Of this kind Of social fact. He related differences in suicide rates tO differences in SOCial currents. For example, where there are strong currents Of anomie (normlessness), we find high rates Of anomic suicide. social currents such as anomie, egoism, and altruism clearly do not have a material existence, although they may have a material effect by causing differences in suicide rates. lnstead, they are intersubjective phenomena that can exist only in the consciousness Of people. Peter Blau ( 1960 ) has been in the forefront of those employing an objective- subjective continuum. His differentiation between institutions (subjective entities) and social structures (objective entities) is of this genre. He defined どけⅳど ⅲ S 行ル行 0 れ as "the common values and norms embodied in a culture or subculture' (BIau, 1960 : 178 ). Conversely, there are social c ル r that are "the networks of SOCial relations in WhiCh processes Of SOCial interaction become organized and through which social positions of individuals and subgroups become differentiated' (BIau, 1960 : 178 ). lt can be argued that the objective-subjective continuum plays a crucial role in the thought of people like Marx, Durkheim, BIau, and many others. But there is a rather interesting problem in their use of the continuum: they employ it almost exclusively at the macroscopic level. However, it also can be applied at the microscopic level. Before giving an example, we need tO underscore the point that we must deal not only with the microscopic-macroscopic and objective-subjective continua わリーな 0 W' ″んⅲ rac 行 0 れわどどれど襯 . ()ne example Of the use Of the objective-subjective continuum at the microscopic level is an empirical study by Mary and R0bert Jackman ( 1973 ) of what they called "objective and subjective SOCial status. '' Their mcro-subjective concern was "the individual' s perception Of his own position in the status hierarchy" (Jackman and Jackman, 1973 : 569 ). Micro subjectivity in this study involved the feelings, percepuons, and mental aspects Of the actors' positions in the stratification system. These are related to vanous components Of the micro-objective realm that include the actor' S socioeconomic status, SOCial contacts, amount Of capital owned, ethnic group membership, or status as a breadwinner or a union member. lnstead Of dealing
640 APPENDIX units, those wh0 operated within this paradigm had difficulty dealing with relational issues such as emergence, innovation, and creativity. ThiS early and primitive paradigm left only a small mark on the development 0f sociology and persists today in only isolated domains. lt was replaced, historically, by the c / OS ど d - 号立ど襯 model, whose supporters saw society as composed Of separate but interrelated elements. Those whO operated within this paradigm tended tO see one element as dominant over the Others. ln Eisenstadt and Curelaru' s view (but not this author' s), Marx was operating within this paradigm with his emphasis on the economic sector. This paradigm was replaced, in turn, by the 0 〃トど襯 川 Od ど / , WhiCh focuses on the 、、 internal systemic dynamcs, interconnections, and continuous feedback processes among the components Of the social order" (Eisenstadt and Curelaru, 1976 : 92 ). Although the evolution 0f these paradigms follows "no simple, natural, chronological trend," and there is "considerable there iS in temporal and operative overl 叩 ping 0f the several 叩 proaches,' Eisenstadt and Curelaru' s view a long-term trend toward the open-system paradigm. Charles Lemert argued that rather than being composed 0f multiple paradigms, sociology is unified in its ん 0 襯 OC れなな襯 , "the peculiarly nineteenth-century idea which holds that 襯れ is the measure 0f all things" ( 1979 : 13 ). lt is questionable whether sociology is unified around a concern for the person. One equally plausible conclusion is that there are multiple paradigms in sociology and that the sources Of their differences are their vaned interpretations Of humankind. ln the author' s view, homocentrism and multiple paradigms are not mutually exclusive ideas. Lemert concluded that in spite Of their homocentrism, the vanous modes Of sociological discourse display important paradigmatic differences. He differentiated among them on a linguistic basis. The first is c 記 sociology, which is pnmarily technical in onentation. Second is s 川れ ca / OC / og ) , which focuses on the interpretation 0f meaning that only people (not animals) are capable 0f producing ・ Finally, there is れ c 行 ca / sociology, which is much more politicalin its onentation tO sociology. Thus, for Lemert, there 尾 multiple paradigms, at least in con- temporary sociology ・ Major S00i0 gic Paradigms Although all the preceding perspectives have some degree 0f utility, it is my own earlier work on the paradigmatic status 0f sociology (Ritzer, 1975a , 1975b , 1980 ) that provides the basis for the metatheoretical perspective that has guided the analysis 0f sociological theory throughout this b00k. Like most 0f the theorists discussed in the previous section, I conceive Of sociology as a multiple-paradigm science. ln my view, there are 尾ど paradigms that dominate sociology, with several others having the potential t0 achieve paradigmatic status. I label the three paradigms the soc / c な , soc / - d イⅲ行 0 れ , and 50C / - ん 0 ⅵ or paradigms. Each paradigm is analyzed in terms 0f the four components 0f a paradigm, which were outlined in the definition given earlier.