12 PART ONE: CLASS ℃ AL SOCIOLOG ℃ AL THEORY 3 The individual was not even seen as the most basic element within society. A society consisted Of such component parts as roles, positions, relationshlps, structures, and institutions. The individuals were seen as dOing little more than filling these units within society. 4 The parts Of society were seen as interrelated and interdependent. lndeed, these interrelationships were a major basis Of society. This view led tO a conservative political orientation. That is, because the parts were held tO be interrelated, it followed that tampermg with one part could well lead t0 the undermining 0f 0ther parts and, ultimately, 0f the system as a whOle. This meant that changes in the social system should be made with extreme care. 5 Change was seen as a threat not only to society and its components but also tO the individuals in SOCiety. The various components Of SOCiety were seen as satisfying people' s needs. When institutions were disrupted, people were likely t0 suffer, and their suffering was likely to lead to social disorder. 6 The general tendency was tO see the various large-scale components Of society as useful for bOth society and the individuals in it. AS a result, there was little desire tO lOOk for the negative effects Of exisung social structures and social institutions. 7 SmaII units, such as the family, the neighborhood, and religious and occupational groups, alSO were seen as essential tO individuals and society. They provided the intimate, face-to-face environments that people needed in order tO survlve lll modern societies. 8 There was a tendency tO see various modern social changes, such as industrialization, urbanization, and bureaucratization, as having disorganizing effects. These changes were viewed with fear and anxiety, and there was an emphasis on developing ways 0f dealing with their disruptive effects. 9 、 Mhile most of these feared changes were leading to a more rational society, the conservative reaction led tO an emphasis on the importance Of nonrational factors (ritual, ceremony, and worship, for example) in social life. 10 FinaIly, the conservatives supported the existence of a hierarchical system in society. lt was seen as important tO society that there be a differential system Of status and reward. These ten propositions, derived from the conservative reaction tO the Enlight- enment, should be seen as the immediate intellectual basis 0f the development 0f sociological theory in France. Many 0f these ideas made their way int0 early sociological thought, although some 0f the Enlightenment ideas (empincism, for example) were alSO influential. Although we have emphasized the discontinuities between the Enlightenment and the counter-Enlightenment, Seidman makes the point that there alSO are continuities and linkages. First, the counter-Enlightenment carried on the scientific tradition developed in the Enlightenment. S econd, it picked up the Enlightenment emphasis on collectivities ()s opposed to individuals) and greatly extended it. Third, both had an interest in the problems of the modern world, especially its negative effects on individuals.

CHAPTER 12 : CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THEORY 459 that all men, in their individual daily actions, work continuously and energetically tO create and sustain. 、 Momen resist only occasionally but are to be discovered far more Often either acquiescing in or actively working for their own subordination. The puzzle that psychoanalytical feminists set out to solve is why men bring everywhere enormous, unremitting energy tO the task Of sustaining patriarchy and why there is an absence of countervailing energy on the part of women. ln searching for an explanation tO this puzzle, these theorists give short shrift to the argument that a cognitive calculus Of practical benefits is sufficient for male support for patriarchy. Cognitive mobilization does not seem a sufficient source for the intense energy that men invest in patriarchy, especially because, in light of the human capacity tO debate and second-guess, men may not always and everywhere be certain that patriarchy is Of unqualified value to them. Moreover, an argument anchored in the cognitive pursuit Of self-interest would suggest that women would as energetically mobilize against patriarchy. lnstead, these theorists 100k to those aspects 0f the psyche so effectively mapped by the Freudians: the zone of human emotions, Of half-recognized or unrecognized desires and fears, and 0f neurosis and pathology. Here one finds a clinically proven source of extraordinary energy and debilitation, one sprmging from psychic structures so deep that they cannot be recognized or monitored by individual consciousness. ln searching for the energic underpinmngs ofpatriarchy, psychoanalytical feminists have identified two possible explanations for male domination Of women: the fear Of death and the socio- emotional environment in which the personality of the young child takes form. Fear of death, of the ceasing of one' s individuality, is viewed in psychoanalytic theory as one Of those existential issues that everyone, everywhere, must on occasion confront and as one that causes everyone, in that confrontation, tO expenence terror. Feminist theorists whO develop this theme argue that women, because Of their intimate and protracted involvement with bearing and reanng new life, are typically far less oppressed than men by the realization of their own mortality (al-Hibri, 1981 ; Dinnerstein, 1976 ). Men, however, respond with deep dread t0 the prospect of their individual extinction and adopt a series of defenses, all of which lead to their domination of women. Men are driven to produce things that will outlast them—art and architecture, wealth and weapons, science and religion. AII these then become resources by which men can dominate women (and each other). Men also are driven—partly by envy of women' s reproductive ro 厄 , partly by their own passionate desire for immortality through offspring—to seek to control the reproductive process itself. They clalm ownership of women, seek to control women' s bodies, and lay claim through norms of legitimacy and paternity t0 the products 0f those bodies, children. Finally, driven by fear, men seek to separate themselves from everything that reminds them 0f their own mortal bodies: birth, nature, sexuality, their human bodies and natural functions, and women, whose association with so many of these makes them the symbol of them all. AII Of these aspects Of existence must be denied, repressed, and controlled as men seek constantly tO separate from, deny, and repress their own mortality. And women, who symbolize all these forbidden topics, also must be treated as Other: feared, avoided, controlled.

S000LOG ℃ AL METATHEORIZING AND A METATHEORET ℃ AL SCHEMA 647 Macroscopic Microscopic 0 CO 0 0 WO ュ d ・ systems Societies Organizations Groups 0 lnteraction 0 lndividual thought and action 0 0 c b 0 -C 0 Objective Subjective Social construction Of 「 eality, norms, values, and so forth Mixed types, combining ゴ varying deg 「 ees objective and subjective elements; examples include the state,family. WO 「 k WO ュ d,religion Actors, action, inte 「ー action, bureaucratic structures, law, and so forth FIGURE A. 2 The Objective-Subjective Continuum, with ldentification of Some Mixed Types structures, law, and the state apparatus. lt is possible tO see, touch, or chart all these objective phenomena. However, there are SOCial phenomena that exist SO in the realm Of ideas; they have no material existence. These are sociological phenomena such as mental processes, the social construction Of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 ) , norms, values, and many elements of culture. The problem with the Obj ective- subj ective continuum i s that there are many phenomena in the mi ddle that have わ 0 objective and subjective elements. The family, for example, has a real material existence as well as a series Of subjective mutual understandings, norms, and values. SimiIarIy, the polity is composed 0f objective laws and bureaucratic structures as well as subjective political norms and values. ln fact, it is probably true that the vast maJ0rity 0f social phenomena are mixed types representing some combination Of objective and subjective elements. Thus it iS best tO think Of the objective-subjective continuum as tWO polar types with a series 0f variously mixed types in the middle. Figure A. 2 shows the objective- subjective conUnuum. Although these continua are interesting in themselves, the interrelationship Of the tWO continua iS what concerns us here. Figure A. 3 iS a schematic representation Of the intersection Of these tWO continua and the four major levels Of social analysis derived from it.

516 PART THREE: RECENT INTEGRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN S000LOG ℃ AL THEORY in the next several sections). Elias' s most basic point is that the threshold 0f embarrassment has gradually advanced. What people did at the table with little or no embarrassment in the thirteenth century would cause much mor- tification in the nineteenth century. What is regarded as distasteful is over time increasingly likely t0 be " 尾襯 0 d わⅲ d “ど〃可 c / / 旅 " (Elias, 1939 / 1994 : 99 ). For example, a thirteenth-century poem warned, "A number of people gnaw on a bone and then put it back in the dish—this is a senous offense" (Elias, 1939 / 1994 : 68 ). Another thirteenth-century volume warns, "lt is not decent to poke your fingers intO your ears or eyes, as some people dO, or tO pick your nose while eating" (Elias, 1939 / 1994 : 71 ). Clearly, the implication 0f these warnings is that many people at that time engaged in such behaviors and that it generally caused them, or those around them, no embarrassment. There was a perceived need for such admonitions because people did not know that such behavior was "uncivilized. '' As time goes by there is less and less need tO warn people about such things as pickmg one' s nose while eating. Thus, a late sixteenth-century document says, "Nothing is more improper than tO lick your fingers, tO touch the meats and put them intO your mouth with your hand, tO stir sauce with your fingers, or tO dip bread intO it with your fork and then suck it" (Elias, 1939 / 1994 : 79 ). Of course, there 尾 things, picking one' s nose for example, more improper than licking one' s fingers, but by this time civilization has already progressed t0 the point that it is widely recognized that such behaviors are uncivilized. With nose picking safely behind the scenes, society found Other, less egregious behaviors that it defined as uncivilized. One Of Elias' s points in this context, and in others, is that these changes are not made rationally. He sees their sources more in emotions than in rational considerations. (For example, in hiS discussion Of the increasing restrictions on spitting, Elias contends that the motivation for them came from social consideration and not from medical concerns; such restrictions existed long before there was any scientific evidence about the potentially unhealthy effects 0f spittle. ) And, as was already pointed out, these changes are not brought about consciously, but rather emerge unconsciously. As Elias puts it, "Obviously, individual people did not at some past time intend this change, this 、 civilization,' and gradually realize it by conscious, 'rational,' purposive measures" ( 1939 / 1982 ). Another central point is that these changes generally emanate from a single source (especially, as we will see, the court in French society) and then disperse throughout society. Here is the way Elias summarizes these points: Certain forms of behavior are placed under prohibition, not because they are unhealthy [a rational reason] but because they lead t0 an offensive sight and disagreeable associations; shame at offering such a spectacle, originally absent, and fear Of arousing such associations are gradually spread from the standard setting circles tO larger circles by numerous authorities and institutions. However, once such feelings are aroused and firmly established in society by means ofcertain rituals ... they are constantly reproduced SO long as the structure Of human relations is not fundamentally altered. (EIias, 1939 / 1994 : 104 )

CHAPTER 14 : AGENCY-STRUCTURE INTEGRATION 561 all history. One Of the pressing needs in the agency-structure literature is tO begin tO specify the relative weight Of agency and structure in different historical epochs. Furthermore, there are clearly contemporaneous differences in the relative weight Of agency and structure in vanous societies around the world. AII these crucial differences are lost if we talk only in very general terms about agency and structure. SUMMARY This chapter deals with the largely European literature on the agency-structure linkage. This literature has a number Of similarities tO the American work on micro-macro integration, but there are alSO a number Of substantial differences between the literature s. 市ⅱ e a large number of contemporary European theorists are dealing with the agency-structure relationship, the bulk 0f this ch 叩 ter is devoted t0 the work 0f four major examples 0f this type 0f theorizing. The first is Giddens' s structuration theory. The core Of Giddens' s theory is his refusal tO treat agents and structures apart from one another; they are seen as being mutually constitutive. Next is Archer' s theory 0f the culture-agency relationship. Archer is critical 0f Giddens' s refusal t0 separate agent and structure for analytic purposes. More generally, she is critical 0f agency-structure theorists for ignormg culture, and she seeks tO rectify this problem by dealing with the agency-culture relationship. We then turn t0 Bourdieu' s theory, which focuses primarily on the relationship between habitus and field. Finally, we analyze Habermas' s recent ideas on life-world and system and the colonization Of the life-world by the system. Following a discussion of these specific agency-structure works, we return tO a more general discussion Of this literature. み e begin with a discussion Of major differences in this literature, including differing views on the nature Of the agent and structure. Another source Of difference is the varying theoretical traditions on which these works are based. Some Of these works strain in the direction Of agency, while Others pull in the direction Of structure. The next issue iS the similarities between the agency-structure and micro-macro literatures. BOth literatures share an interest in integration and are wary Of the excesses Of micro/agency and macro/structural theories. There are, however, far 1 れ ore differences than similarities between these literatures. There are differences in their images Of the actor, the ways in which structure is conceived, the theories from which their ideas are derived, the degree to which they may be subsumed under the idea 0f levels 0f analysis, the extent t0 which they are embedded in a historical, dynamic framework, and the degree t0 which they are concerned with moral issues. Finally, we deal with some of the reasons for the differences between the American and European literatures. The American micro-macro theorists have been heavily influenced by fields, like economics, with a long history 0f concern for rmcro-macro issues. The European theorists have been greatly affected by the philosophical literature on agency. The chapter concludes with the point that the ultimate question is the relative weight Of agency and structure in different cultural and historical settings.

CHAPTER 12 : CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THEORY 467 life: the human body, its sexuality and involvement in procreation and child rearing; home maintenance, with its unpaid, invisible round Of domestic tasks; emotional sustenance; and the production 0f knowledge itself. ln 〃 these life-sustaining activities, exploitative arrangements profit some and impoverish Others. Full comprehension Of all these basic arrangements Of life production and exploitation is the essential foundation for a theory Of domination. This redefinition of the concept Of material conditions transforms the Marxian assumption that human beings are producers Of goods intO a theme Of human beings as creators and sustainers Of all human life. This shift brings us tO the second point Of difference between Marxian historical materialism and historical materlalism as it is developed in socialist feminlsm, namely, the latter perspective' s emphasis on what some Marxians might call, dismissively, 川夜 1 / or / d ど 0 行 0 ′ ta / 〃んれ 0 襯れ 0. ・ consciousness, motivation, ideas, SOCial definitions Of the situation, knowledge, 8 ideology, the will tO act in one' s interests or acquiesce tO the interests of others. TO socialist feminists all these factors deeply affect human personality, human action, and the structures Of domination that are realized through that action. Moreover, these aspects Of human subjectivity are produced by social structures that are inextricably intertwined with, and as elaborate and powerful as, those that produce economic goods. 、 Mithin all these structures, t00 , exploitative arrangements enrich and empower some while impovenshing and immobilizing others. Analysis Of the processes that pattern human subjectivity is vital tO a theory Of domination, and that analysis also can be honed to precision by 叩 plying the principles of historical materialism. The third difference between socialist feminists and Marxians is that the object 0f analysis for socialist feminists is not primanly class inequality but the complex intertwining Of a wide range Of social inequalities. Socialist feminism develops a portrait Of social organization in which the public structures Of economy, polity, and ideology interact with the intimate, pnvate processes Of human reproduction, domesticity, sexuality, and subjectivity tO sustain a 襯行 c d ゞ襯 0 ア dO - ⅲ砒れ , the workings 0f which are discernible b0th as enduring and impersonal social patterns and in the more varied subtleties Of interpersonal relationships. TO analyze this system, socialist feminists shuttle between a mapping Of large-scale systems Of domination and a situationally specific, detailed exploration Of the mundane daily expenences 0f oppressed people. Their strategy for change rests in this process 0f discovery, 担 which they attempt t0 involve the oppressed groups that they study and through which they hope that both individuals and groups, in large and small ways, will learn tO act in pursuit Of their collective emancipation. An important criticism Of socialist feminism, and indeed Of all the varieties Of feminism described so far, is that despite their emancipatory claims they tend t0 be located in the assumptions and aspirations Of white, middle-class, North Atlantic women. There is a growing concern within feminist theory over the practical and theoretical problematic posed by the exploitation of women of one class, race, ethnic 8 Admittedly some neo-Marxians, notably the critical theorists, have a ト 0 reevaluated the explanatory significance of ideology (see Chapter 8 ).

CHAPTER 16 : STRUCTURA 凵 SM, POSTSTRUCTURALISM, POSTMODERNISM 603 officials to oversee all they control with a single g ど . Second is the ability to make れ or 川記たⅲ g アイ dg 襯どれな and tO punish those whO violate the norms. Thus, one might be negatively judged and punished on the dimensions of time (for being late), activity (for being inattentive), and behavior (for being impolite). Third is the use Of ど x のれⅲ 0 0 れ tO observe subjects and tO make normalizing judgments about people. The third instrument 0f disciplinary power involves the other two. Foucault does not simply take a negative view toward the growth of the disciplinary society; he sees that it has positive consequences as well. For example, he sees discipline as functioning well within the military and industrial factories. However, Foucault communicates a genuine fear of the spread of discipline, especially as it moves intO the state-police network for which the entire society becomes a field of perception and an object of discipline. Foucault does not see discipline sweeping uniformly through society. lnstead, he sees it "swarming" through society and affecting bits and pieces Of society as it goes. Eventually, however, most maJOr institutions are affected. Foucault asks rhetorically, "ls it surpnsing that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?" ( 1979 : 228 ). ln the end, FoucauIt sees the development Of a carceral system in which discipline is transported "from the penal institution t0 the entire social body" ( 1979 : 298 ). Although there is an iron-cage image here, as usual Foucault sees the operation Of forces in opposition tO the carceral system; there is an ongolng structural dialectic in Foucault' s work. Although Foucault' s greater emphasis on power in D な c ゆ〃れど 0 れ d P ″れなん is evident in the discussion tO this point, he is also concerned in this work with his usual theme Of the emergence Of the human sciences. The transition from torture tO prison rules constituted a switch from punishment Of the bOdy tO punishment Of the soul or the will. This change, in turn, brought with it considerations Of normality and morality. Prison officials and the police came to judge the normality and morality of the prisoner. EventuaIIy, this ability to judge was extended to other "small-scale judges," such as psychiatrists and educators. From all of this adjudication emerged new bodies of scientific penal knowledge, and these served as the base 0f the modern "scientifico-legal complex. '' The new mode of subjugation was that people were defined as the object 0f knowledge, 0f scientific discourse. The key point is that the modern human sciences have their roots here. Foucault bitterly depicts the roots Of the human sciences in the disciplines: "These sciences, which have SO delighted our 'humanity' for over a century, have their technical matrix in the petty, malicious minutiae Of the disciplines and their investigations" ( 1979 : 226 ). One other point about D な c 〃れどれ d P ″〃なん is worth mentioning. Foucault is interested in the way that knowledge gives birth to technologies that exert power. ln this context, he deals with the Panopticon. A Pa れ 0 〃行 co れ is a structure that allows officials the possibility of complete observation of criminals. ln fact, officials need not always be present; the mere existence Of the structure (and the possibility that officials might be there) constrains criminals. The Panopticon might take the form Of a tower in the center Of a circular prison from which guards could see into all

130 PART ONE: CLASS ℃ AL S000LOG ℃ AL THEORY 5 The staff that fills these offices does not own the means 0f production associated with them; staff members are provided with the use Of those things that they need t0 do the j0b. 6 The incumbent is not allowed tO appropriate the position; it always remams part Of the organization. 7 Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in wnting. A bureaucracy iS one Of the rational structures that iS playing an ever-increasing role in modern society, but one may wonder whether there is any alternative tO the bureaucratic structure. 、 Meber' S clear and unequivocal answer was that there iS no possible alternative: "The needs Of mass administration make it tOday completely indispensable. The chOice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration ” ( 1921 / 1968 : 223 ). Although we might admit that bureaucracy is an intrinsic part 0f modern c 叩 italism, we might ask whether a socialist society might be different. ls it possible tO create a socialist SOCiety without bureaucracies and bureaucrats? Once 、 Meber was unequivocal: " 、 Mhen those subject tO bureaucratic control seek tO escape the influence 0f existing bureaucratic apparatus, this is normally possible only by creating an organization Of their own which is equally subject tO the process Of bureaucratization" ( 1921 / 1968 : 224 ). ln fact, Weber believed that in the case 0f socialism we would see an lncrease, not a decrease, in bureaucratization. If socialism were tO achieve a level Of efficiency comparable tO capitalism, 、 'it would mean a tremendous increase in the importance Of professional ( 、 1921 / 1968 : 224 ). ln capitalism, at least the owners are not bureaucrats and therefore would be able tO restrmn the bureaucrats, but in socialism even the top-levelleaders would be bureaucrats. Weber thus believed that even with its problems "capitalism presented the best chances for the preservation Of individual freedom and creative leadership in a bureaucratic world" (Mommsen, 1974 : xv ). We are once again at a key theme in weber' s work: his view that there is really no hope for a better world. Socialists can, in weber' s view, only make things worse by expanding the degree Of bureaucratization in society. 、 Meber noted: "NOt summer' s bloom lies ahead Of us, but rather a polar night 0f icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now" (cited in Gerth and Mills, 1958 : 128 ). A ray 0f hope in weber' s work—and it is a small one—is that professionals wh0 stand outside the bureaucratic system can control it tO some degree. ln this category weber included professional politicians, scientists, intellectuals (Sadri, 1992 ) , and even capitalists, as well as the supreme heads Of the bureaucracies. For example' Weber said that politicians "must be the countervailing force against bureaucratic domination" ( 1921 / 1968 : 1417 ). His famous essay "P01itics as a Vocation" is basically a plea for the development 0f politicalleaders with a calling t0 oppose the rule Of bureaucracies and Of bureaucrats. But in the end these appear tO be rather Here and elsewhere in his work weber adopts a Marxian interest in the means Of production. This 7 is paralleled by his concern with alienation, not only in the economic sector but throughout sociallife (science, politics, and so f0 h ).

CHAPTER 14 : AGENCY-STRUCTURE INTEGRATION 537 exist. Bourdieu sees these theories as concentrating on agency and ignormg structure. lnstead, Bourdieu focuses on the dialectical relationship between objective structures and subjective phenomena: . form the basis for . . representations and On the one hand, the objective structures . constitute the structural constraints that bear upon interactions: but, on the Other hand, these representations must alSO be taken intO consideration particularly if one wants tO account for the daily struggles, individual and collective, which pu 甲 0 t0 transform or tO preserve these structures. (Bourdieu, 1989 : 15 ) TO sidestep the objectivist-subjectivist dilemma, Bourdieu ( 1977 : 3 ) focuses on practice, which he sees as the outcome Of the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. Practices are not objectively determined, nor are they the product 0f free will. (Another reason for Bourdieu' s focus on practice is that such a concern avoids the Often irrelevant intellectualism that he associates with objectivism and subjectivism. ) Reflecting his interest in the dialectic between structure and the way people construct social reality, Bourdieu labels his own onentation "constructivist structuralism,' "structuralist constructivism,' or genetic structuralism. '' Here is the way Bourdieu defines genetic structuralism: The analysis Of objective structures—those of different fields—is inseparable from the analysis 0f the genesis, within biological individuals, 0f the mental structures which are tO some extent the product Of the incorporation Of social structures; inseparable, t00 , from the analysis Of the genesis Of these social structures themselves: the social space, and Of the groups that occupy it, are the products 0f historical struggles ()n which agents participate in accordance with their position in the social space and with the mental structures through which they 叩 prehend this space). (Bourdieu, 1990 : 14 ) He subscribes, at least in part, tO a structuralist perspective, but it is one that is different from the structuralism Of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss ()s well as the structural Marxists). While they, in turn, fccused on structures in language and culture, Bourdieu argues that structures also exist in the social world itself. Bourdieu sees "objective structures [as] independent Of the consciousness and will Of agents, which are capable Of guiding and constralning their practices or their representa- tions" ( 1989 : 14 ). He simultaneously adopts a constructivist position which allows him to deal with the genesis 0f schemes of perception, thought, and action as well as Of social structures. While Bourdieu seeks to brldge structuralism and constructivism, and he succeeds tO S01 れ e degree, there iS a bias in hiS work in the direction Of structuralism. lt is for this reason that he (along with Foucault and others—see Ch 叩 ter 16 ) is thought Of as a poststructuralist. There is more continuity in his work with structuralism than there is with constructivism. Unlike the approach of most others (for example, phenomenologists, symbolic interactionists), Bourdieu' s construc- tivism ignores subjectivity and intentionality. He does think it important to include

CHAPTER 4 : MAX WEBER 1 51 Religion and Capitalism in China One crucial assumption that allowed Weber to make legitimate the companson between the West and China is that both had the prerequisites for the development 0f c 叩 italism. ln China, there was a tradition Of intense acquisiuveness and unscrupulous competition. There was great industry and an enormous capacity for work in the populace. Powerful guilds existed. The population was expanding. And there was a steady growth in precious metals. 嶬宝 h these and Other material prerequisites, why didn't capitalism arise in China? AS has been pointed out before, Weber' s general answer was that social, structural, and religious barriers in China prevented the development Of capitalism. This is not tO say that capitalism was entirely absent in China. There were moneylenders and purveyors who sought high rates of profit. But a market, as well as varlous Other components Of a rational capitalistic system, were absent. ln Weber' s view, the rudimentary capitalism Of China pointed in a direction opposite tO the development Of rational economlc corporate enter- prises" ( 1916 / 1964 : 86 ). Structural Ba な Weber listed several structural barriers tO the rise of capitalism in China. First, there was the structure Of the typical Chinese community. lt was held together by rigid kinship bonds in the form of sibs. The sibs were ruled by elders, wh0 made them bastions 0f traditionalism. The sibs were self-contained entities, and there was little dealing with Other sibs. This encouraged small, enc 叩 sulated land holdings and a household-based, rather than a market, economy. The extensive partitioning of the land prevented ma 」 or technological developments, because economies Of scale were impossible. Agricultural production remained in the hands Of peasants, industrial production in the hands Of small-scale artisans. Modern cities, which were to become the centers of 、 Mestern capitalism, were inhibited in their development because the people retained their allegiance t0 the sibs. Because Of the sibs' autonomy, the central government was never able tO govern these units effectively or tO mold them intO a unified whOle. The structure Of the Chinese state was a second barrier tO the rise Of capitalism. The state was largely patnmonial and governed by tradition, prerogative, and favorltism. ln 、 Meber' s view, a rational and calculable system Of administration and law enforcement, which was necessary for industrial development, did not exiSt. There were very few formal laws covenng commerce, there was no central court, and legal formalism was rejected. This irrational type 0f administrative structure was a barrier tO the rise Of capitalism, as Weber made clear: "Capital investment in industry is far t00 sensitive tO such irrational rule and t00 depen- dent upon the possibility 0f calculating the steady and rational operation 0f the state machinery t0 emerge within an administration 0f this type" ( 1916 / 1964 : 103 ). ln addition to its general structure, a number of more specific components Of the state acted against the development Of capitalism. For example, the officials Of the bureaucratic administration had vested material interests that made them oppose capitalism. Officials often bought offices pnmarily t0 make a profit, and this kind 0f orientation did not necessarily make for a high degree of efficiency. A third structural barrier tO the rise Of capitalism was the nature Of the Chinese