0 N ℃ N Theo Sommer HOPE—AND PARITY he year began with Soviet tanks rumbling into KabuI and ended with Soviet divisions closing the ring around Poland. The rush of events has forced military security back to the top 0f the ・ West's agenda, and the AtIantic alliance must decide how t0 meet the challenges from the Communist bloc. Like previous debates about defense, the present round centers in part on facts and figures, in part on fictions and apprehensions and it is not always easy tO tell which is which. Pessimism colors the presentation Of the facts, fear influences the tabulation of the figures and fiction frequently overrides reality. lt is a fact that Soviet military power has grown enormously over the past two decades, in both relative and absolute terms. Moscow's capability to apply force all over the globe is greater, its posture in Europe more formidable than ever. But the ar- gument that the Kremlin has gained "usable' ' superiority in any significant field is sheer fiction. ln the area 0f strateglc nuclear weapons, the SOViets have attained rough parlty with edness are inadequate. But again it iS sheer fiction tO assume that the SOViet Army is without its shortcomings. Russia's state Of battle readiness is relatively 10W. lts technology leaves much tO be desired. Ship days at sea are far below Western norms and Soviet Air Force pilots 10g only half the number of flying hours of their Western counterparts. At least one-fifth of the Soviet military effort is directed toward China, while the forces Of its East European satellites are underequipped and unrel iable. By contrast, America's West European allies make a powerful contribution t0 Western defense. They provide 91 per cent of NATO's ground forces, 86 per cent of the air forces, 75 per cent of the tanks. They keep 3 million soldiers ready for any crisis contingency, whereas the United states has 2. i million troops under arms and on ly a limited mobilization reservorr. The Atlantic alliance faces stiff problems. lt must continue t0 spend a significant share 0f GNP on defense. Three per cent would seem a fair proportion, but just spending money is not the United States rough be- cause they have more delivery systems than the Americans while U. S. arsenals hold far more warheads. Russia's theater nucle- ar weapons assigned tO Europe have been modernized and strengthened, but anyone whO contends that the Kremlin has a clear edge over NATO would be guilty 0f making a very unsophis- ticated numerical analysis. ln the conventional field, the Soviets are ahead in numbers and weapons Despite the Soviet Union's military buildup, the horrid,though effective, balance Of te 了「 0 「 remains essentially れ change everything. The reintroduction Of the draft in the United States would dO more tO bolster Western defense preparedness than any conceivable decision abou t weap- ons procurement. Three Other sig- nificant tasks lie before NATO: First: NATO must decide how to deal with challen ges ar1Sing out- side the treaty area. Ad hoc CO- operation Of the kind practiced at present in the lndian Ocean would appear tO be the best answer. But such cooperation presupposes but they would be loony t0 attempt a walkover in Europe. The basic balance—the horrid, though effective, balance of terror t0 which the world owes 35 years of peace in the Northern Hemisphere has not changed. lt is a fact that SOViet intercontinental missiles pose more of a threat to the land-based U. S. missile force than they did at the time Of the Cuban cr1Sis in 1962 ; they are more numerous, more accurate, more powerful. Yet it is a figment Of despondent imagination that the Kremlin leaders might yield t0 the temptation of "taking out' ' the U. S. land-based missiles with one devastating blow. Such fears totally neglect the technical diffculties of such an operation, the improbability 0f success and, above all, the certainty Of a retaliatory American strike from its missiles in the depths of the world's oceans. The fundamental truth of the nuclear age belies the fears of the military's gold-braided button- counters : the underlying panty in mutual destructive power will continue tO deter the main actors on the world stage from en- croaching on each other's spheres Of protection. lt is a fact, t00 , that NATO must not slacken its defense efforts if it wants tO keep pace with the 、 Marsaw Pact. The Western armed forces have their weak spots—their stocks Of ammunition, prepositioning Of equipment, reserves and general state Of prepar- NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 agreement about what we may have tO confront. The West cannot engage itself on behalf 0f every faraway African or Asian nation whose dictator elects tO call for Soviet help. Second : The AtIantic alliance must give serlous thought to the practical implications Of what the concept Of "division of labor ” actually means. There are many things that only the Ameri- cans can dO. B ut at the same time the allies cannot leave everything to Washington. What compensatory measures, for instance, are the Germans, the British and the French going to take if the Pentagon decides t0 withdraw forces from Central Europe for rapid deployment elsewhere? Third : BuiIding up military strength is not suffcient to obtain security. ・ Winding down the arms race and creating economic and societal stability are 」 ust as important. We had a pretty bad year in 1980 , a year of confrontations between and within alliances, Of accelerating arms programs and a darkening 0ut100k for world peace. Beefing up transatlantic cooperation is one task Of the future. The Western nations will need clarity 0f purpose t0 d0 what is necessary, sober judgment tO recognize what is impossible and enough wisdom tO tell the one from the other. Theo So 襯な e 市た加 - c んイ 0 / の Zeit.

lin has been suspicious Of nationalism in East- ern Europe and oflslamic militancy in Central Asia because bOth movements pose threats tO its empire. lndeed, it is Moscow's de- termination tO preserve its empire that lies behind what the West refers to as the Brezhnev doctrine—a policy that justified Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and iS current- ly used tO justify SOViet assistance tO Third rld nations the Kremlin sees as threatened by the dark forces of imperialism. et 、 /loscow must live with the knowl- edge that t0 invade P01and is t0 aban- don all hope of détente with the West—at least for the foreseeable future. The NATO allies made it clear that they will im- pose trade, econom1C and technological sanc- tions as soon as 、 Marsaw Pact troops cross the border. During a visit tO Moscow late in the year, Sen. Charles Percy, the incoming chairman Of the Senate Foreig n ReIations Committee, bluntly told Soviet leaders that intervention in Poland "would be SO cata- strophic it would not only change the face 0f the earth, but it would probably make im- possible any ma. 」 or agreements with the Soviet Union in our lifetime. '' ln recent years, the Soviets have counted heavily on closer eco- nomic cooperation with Western Europe, and sanctions would severely limit their econom- ic—and strategic—flexibility. One pro. 」 ect that would surely suffer is Moscow's 3 , 000- mile natural-gas pipeline tO Western Europe, an agreement designed tO provide energy for several nations on the Continent and tO give the Soviets hard currency to finance their development and industrial programs. a 0 ・ d tO 90 b ・ fO 「・ the K 「・ m れ decided that ・れ ough 響 as ・ 00M9h ? SO far, the Soviets have counted on the 尾 4 ー the region has been closed tO foreign travel in recent weeks. Of invasion tO put Poland back on the straight and narrow road At the same time, there are powerful constraints working against tO Communist orthodoxy. "They appear to be playing for time SOViet intervention. POIish workers and soldiers are likely to resist in the hope the Communist leadership can work things out on Moscow's military presence—some by taking up arms, others its own and calm the situation," said a Western diplomat. ln by refusing tO cooperate with the occupying forces. Either way, fact, after Russian troops encircled Poland, union leaders and resistance IS certain tO make a bad economic situation much church offlcials urged workers tO cooperate with the party lead- worse. And the Soviets would be forced to assume Poland's $ 23 ership t0 bring about reforms. Just how much the Soviets will billion debt at a time when they are having diffculty feeding leave up tO the POles remains unclear, however. The Kremlin their own people. There is also the question of わ ow Moscow's has tolerated a remarkable degree ofeconomic reform in Hungary, Communists, whO ostensibly get their authority from the working and Romania has wide latitude in its foreign policy; in fact, Bu- class, couldjustify putting down a workers' revolt. Unlike Czecho- charest Often directly contradicts the Russian line. But the Soviets slovakia in 1968 , when the Soviets moved against dissident in- may feel that after four months ofchaos and uncertainty in Poland, tellectuals, Walesa and his allies come from solid proletarian the time has come tO make some radical changes. stock. The KremIin has tried to get around the problem by de- These are not easy times for the aging Soviet leadership. The picting the workers as "anti-socialist elements, ' ' or t001S Of Western old men in the Kremlin must not only face the problem of Poland, subversives, but the subterfuge is transparent. they must alSO manage their own orderly succession. Some Western analysts believe that a younger group 0f Soviet leaders might n the surface, political ideology plays a strong part in be more flexible and pragmatic, more confident in their country's SOViet decision-making. MOSt Soviet citizens may tune out strength—and thus more willing tO explore possiblities ofeconomic the daily exhortations tO fOllOW the Leninist course, but liberalization at home and in Eastern Europe. Butjust what options the Soviet machine. of state still moves along the principles of the new generation will face depends on the policies Of the ger- historical inevitability, the irreversibility Of socialist progress and ontocracy now in power. The current leadership has been schooled proletarian internationalism. Together with SOViet opportunism, in the StaIinist era and steeled by the bitter realities of the cold such slogans provide the rationale for ruthless international behav- war. Judging by their past performance, they seem likely tO resist ior because, in the final analysis, the Soviets are intent on keeping all efforts to diminish their holdings. Whatever else it leaves to a firm gnp on their acquisitions. Losing P01and would call into its heirs, the Brezhnev generation is determined tO have the legacy question the viability 0f the Communist model; it would also include a strong, umfied Eastern bloc—including a Communist diminish the wealth of the Soviet Union's holdings. The Krem- Poland. Laski—Sipa-BIack Star NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 29

at home that would rather be Red than dead, but in the heat of the Pol- ish crisis bOth men gave Washington strong signals Of their resolve. "Gis- card continues tO talk a soft game tO the Russians, but it's for internal consumption," said one U. S. diplo- mat. "He makes it very clear tO the White House that he can be trusted in an emergency. And he believes the emergency is at hand. ' There is no guarantee that Western Europe's hard line will not turn soft even if the Polish crisis is resolved peacefully. The Common Market has poured billions ofdollars into extend- ing credit and building up trade links with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, an investment that stems, in part, from a conviction that trade can help t0 break down political and ideological barriers. And there has also been a ma. 」 or psychological in- vestment, especially by West Ger- many, in the belief that Europe can build bridges between the superpow- ers that will diminish the threat of Richard Melloul—Sygma war. Those hopes will not be aban- Giscard and Schmidt: 'Europe and the United states have different interests' doned lightly. The conviction that détente was failing became apparent at year in Atlantic relations. ln the spring, NATO offcials described different stages to Europe's leaders. British Prime Minister Mar- the alliance as being in its worst crisis in a quarter Of a century. garet Thatcher and then ltalian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga But beneath the tensions, new patterns were emerging. Europeans condemned the Soviet's Afghan adventure from the start, and regarded the election 0f Ronald Reagan in the United States quickly fell in step with U. S. policy. But Giscard and Schmidt as a sign 0f America's desire for firm leadership. ln France, tried for months tO maintain their special links with the Soviet Gaullists—and even Socialists—began to attack Giscard for hob- Union. After assuring Western diplomats that France would ob- nobbing with Brezhnev. ln Germany, the opposition Christian serve the U. S. boycott on sales of grain and high technology, Democrats were beating Schmidt with an anti-détente stick. And French businessmen continued to make highly profitable deals while Thatcher continued to come under widespread attack for with Moscow. At the same time, shipments of EEC cereals some- her economic policies, her opposition tO SOViet adventu rrsm re- how found their way tO Russian granaries. ln May, Giscard himself mained as popular as ever. flew tO Warsaw for an unannounced—and totally fruitless—dis- cussion with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. ne result Of Europe's newly raised consclousness may be Schmidt's efforts t0 keep his Ostp01itik alive worried Wash- a loosening Of the strong Franco-German connection. NOW ington even more than Giscard's Gallic histrionics. Schmidt went that Reagan is t0 be in charge in Washington, Bonn and along with the U. S. boycott 0f the Moscow Olympics, but he Paris are likely to look increasingly—if never publicly—to the was alSO the first Western leader tO go tO Moscow after the United States. As a disgruntled omcial 0f West Germany's ruling Afghan invasion, bringing home some SOViet concessions on future Social Democrats said earlier this month, "Giscard has left us arms talks. Under pressure from the détente-oriented wing Of in the lurch. He has given up on détente, partly for electoral his Social Democratic Party—which still dreams of unifying Ger- reasons. And that allows us no alternative but closer ties to the many—he continued t0 bang the drum for détente. U. S. ” Schmidt, in fact, began turning to Washington within days of Reagan's election, and he became the first foreign leader to he French and German actions were far meet with the President-elect. lt is, Of course, t00 early tO predict a renaissance Of NATO. in a European context than they sometimes appeared in Washington. The Afghan invasion caught the whole of the But the short-term prospect is for strengthened solidarity. Even West by surprise. lt also came at a time when European leaders before the Polish crisis, Paris, London and Bonn were leaning were profoundly concerned about Jimmy Carter's ability t0 gve toward bigger defense budgets, although the economic recession direction t0 the Western Alliance. The widespread image 0f the has already forced some countries—notably West Germany— United S tates in the early months ofthe year was that ofa rudderless tO renege on promises tO increase defense spending by 3 per cent republic with a naive and indecisive captain at the helm. Moreover, annually. Within NATO, the Europeans have also agreed t0 take Schmidt and Giscard sincerely believed that Carter overreacted up some 0f the slack caused by U. S. deployment in the lndian tO the invasion. And they had serious reservations about the Ocean and the Persian GuIf.. That does not mean that Western effectiveness Of economic boycotts. As French political scientist Europe will suddenly turn bellicose; the conviction remains that Pierre Lellouche put it : "Europe and the United States have dif- in the long run , reasonable accommodation with the East is ⅲ ferent interests in a number Of parts Of the world. ln the Persian Europe's best interest. Nevertheless, an important psycholoycal GuIf, for example, the stakes are higher for us—something that change has taken place. The world, most Europeans have decided, Washington cannot seem tO understand. is far t00 perilous for the West to rely exclusively on a doctrine Such widely divergent interests made for a tense and acerbic 0f détente that has not changed since the ' 6 . 33 NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981

EUROPE DETENTE'S DARK DAYS By S00 靆 SuIIivan n Western Europe, détente came under greater strain in 1980 than ever before. With SOViet soldiers encamped in Afghani- stan, and Warsaw Pact troops massed on Poland's borders, European leaders had t0 face up t0 the fact that the nature 0f Soviet imperialism had not changed. lt was a painful admission— not least because East-West tensions endangered profitable eco- nomic ties. But even France and West Germany, which had insisted for months that dialogue with the SOViet Union must be maintained at all costs, acknowledged that the threat t0 P01and had hammered home the message 0f Afghanistan. Everywhere, advocates 0f dé- tente at any prrce were on the defensive. The new mood became clear at NATO's annual meeting in December. Both France and West Germany backed U. S. calls for quick, tough Western responses tO any SOViet move in POland. AII the NATO leaders even those who j ealously maintain the distinction between NATO as a military alliance and the European Economic Community as an economic forum—agreed tO coordi- nate economic reprisals through the alliance. "Our public opinion simply would not understand if this time we failed tO react on the economic front," said one NATO Foreign Minister. The Polish situation is the main reason for Europe's get-tough attitude, but not the only one. At the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Madrid, the Soviets openly showed their contempt for Western concerns over human rights. Despite worldwide protests, they exiled physicist Andrei Sakharov and jailed several other dissidents. N0t a single soldier has been with- d rawn from Afghanistan, and the Russians have rebuffed every European effort tO negotiate a solution there. By November, French Foreign MinisterJean Frangois-Poncet was ready tO banish détente from his vocabulary. "Since Afghanistan," he said, "l れ 0 longer much like the word 'détente. ' I no longer feel it describes the over-all relations we have with the Eastern countries. ” lt was a startling admission for any French minister tO make especially since détente began with Charles de Gaulle in the 1960S. But it was indicative Of the turmoil that has beset European leaders in the past year, the sharpness Of their frustrations and the shift in their thinking. American critics Of European attitudes are inclined tO be cynical about such shifts. They point out that while French President VaIéry Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt described the Afghan invasion as "unacceptable," they continued tO dO business as usual with the Russians. ln a midyear interview, former U. S. Secretary Of State Henry Kissinger said that "certain Europeans have developed a new concept Of the division 0f labor in which they 100k after détente while the United States attends t0 defending the st. " As late as mid-December, French and West German banks were extending credit tO the Soviet Union for a $ 14 billion gas-pipeline pro. 」 ect that would increase European dependence on Russian-supplied energy through the 1990S. ut Europe was also sending signals Of another kind. France increased its defense budget beyond NATO requirements and cooperated with Britain and the United States in es- tablishing a naval force in the lndian Ocean. Britain, West Ger- many and ltaly have chosen sites for the installation Ofnew theater nuclear missiles t0 counter the Soviet buildup 0f SS-20 missiles. Giscard and Schmidt still must contend with important elements NATO t 「 00P5 0 れ ma れ・ u ・′ in West Germany: す h ・ shO 杙・「 m p 「 05P ・ ct was fO 「 a 5 0n9 ・「 AtIantic a a れ 0 ・ 32 Jacob Sutton—Gamma-Liaison NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981

Maggie Steber—Sipa-BIack Star 0 「 ban po ・杙 y in Haiti: す h ・ WO Bank and 彙 h ・ IMF bOth promised tO be mo 「・ 90 れ・′ 0 5 with す h ⅳ WorId ー oa れ 5 must provide long-term loans with less ngorous conditions tO give countries more time tO adjust. Commercial bankers have become much more involved With the more dynamic Third World countries, such as Brazil and South Korea, since they began lending them large sums in the early 1970S. Now, however, they are more apprehensive about their credit-worthiness in the face 0f higher 0 ⅱ prices. ln 1980 , they began looking t0 the IMF as either their guarantor or their debt-collector. Western bankers were ambivalent about clos- er links with the offlcial institutions, and some Of them feared that if they got guarantees they would also get interference. One banker commented: "Our policy is 'help, but hands 0 . The chief advocate of closer links with the IMF was (). W. ) Tom CIausen, president of the Bank of America. And in October, Clausen was nominated tO succeed McNamara as president Of the World Bank. One ofthe ma 」 or issues facing Clausen will be the determination Of the wealthy oil-producing states tO increase their voting power in both the World Bank and the IMF before they take a more active part in Third World development. TO that end, the Arab countries devoted much Of their attention during the year tO beefing up their presence in the tWO institutions. y the end 0f the year, the North-South deadlock, if not broken, was at least more confused. 市ⅱ e the ideologues of free enterpnse, such as Thatcher or Milton Friedman, insisted on the sanctity Of the international capital market, many bankers were not sure hOW sanctified they wished it tO be. Third ′ orld militants still insisted on drastic restructuring to achieve their "new international economic order, " but many Of them looked t0 Western investment and bank loans for help. StiII, the Third WorId's prospects for the 1980S remain full of uncertainty. The extension of both lending and aid depends NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 critically on East-West relations and the cost Of the arms race. ln cynical terms, greater arms spending by bOth sides could stim- ulate economic activity and push up the pnce Of some Third WorId commodities—perhaps providing a new boom for several countnes, particularly in Latin America. But it would cut back the surplus funds available for international lending and aid not linked to military 0bj ectives, causing new hardships for Third WorId countries that produce purely peaceful commodities, or simply struggle t0 survive. any Third WorId leaders enter 1981 with renewed fears in the political arena as well. They worry that preoc- cupation with the Communist threat and the rhetoric of a new confrontation could lead the West back to crude cold- war simplifications, particularly the assumption that the whOle world must be classified as either pro-Communist or anti.Com/ munist. Past turnabouts in Asia and Africa, they note, have shown the dangers Ofthis assumption. Many newly independent countnes once lOOked tO the SOViet Union tO provide arms for their wars of liberation, only t0 become disillusioned by the inability of the Soviets tO provide the peaceful equipment they desperately needed later for development. Even among those Third World states which apparently had been moving closer tO Moscow, the SOViet invasion Of Afghanistan provoked protests and concern. The I ran-lraq war also has raised senous questions about which side is the least unfriendly tO Western interests. The events 0f 1980 showed the danger 0f generalizing about the line-up between the Third World and the Soviet Union. ln the months ahead, the challenge for both the West and the Third World will be to resume their dialogue with a heightened sense 0f urgency fostered during the last dangerous year. NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL CO れル″″れ g ed ″ 0 ′ / 〃 0 れア Sa 襯 2 $ 0 〃 0 ん 0 d the 召 ra れ市 CO 襯な豆 0 〃′ 0 な

WORLD BUSINESS Roland Neveu—Gamma-Liaison Saudi Arabia's Sheik Yamani ( 0 ・ 0 ・の in a 0 p 「 ic ・ 5 keep soaring' CO sum ・′ 5 face 9 「 a 0 ・ 00 れ omic disruptions A DOUBLE-DIP SLUMP West Germany and Britain have condemned those nations' econo- By 00 as Ramsey mies tO negative growth in recent months—but bOth have benefited by making strong gains in the battle against inflation. ln the he world economy is in stagflationary limb0. Despite sub- United States, FederaI Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker's stantial pockets Of growth in Latin America and Asia, the monetary prescnptions met with less success. The on-again, 0 Third WorId is beset by rising debts and dwindling export again recovery left U. S. inflation rates unchanged, and by NO- markets. The United States and most Western European nations vember the Fed tightened credit severely. The likely result: an will start the new year in recession, and growth throughout 1981 almost certain "double dip" return tO recession during the first will probably be flat. For rich and poor countries alike, the short- quarter 0f 1981. term future is clouded by fears Of another bout with inflation High interest rates have not made life any easier for anyone. and sky-high interest rates. The critical factor is 0 ⅱ . "The world European central banks have been forced tO keep their rates in economy is already at a 10W point," says Rimmer de Vries, chief line with the Fed's tO avÖid a costly run on their countnes' cur- economist at Morgan Guaranty Trust CO. in New York. "But rencies. AS a result, the average COSt Of borrowing money in the real question is : what would we d0 if 0i1 actually does go the Eurod011ar market jumped past 20 per cent. That, in turn, to $ 50 a barrel? ” added billions of dollars to the $ 400 billion in debts owed by That price—which Saudi Arabian 0i1 minister Ahmed Zaki Third World nations. ln 1980 , that was not fatal; many countries Yamani said last week could come by sprmg—is a figure that could dip intO large currency reserves built up when interest few governments or economists wish tO contemplate. "lt would rates were lower and export markets stronger. 、・ OW , however, be a disaster all around," says de Vries. The price hikes announced the margin for maneuver has narrowed and the COSt Of new bor- by the OPEC nations at their meeting in BaIi have already prompt- rowing may be prohibitive for many developing countries. ed economic forecasters tO revise their estimates Of Western 0 ⅱ bills in 1981. The new figures come on top of a do ″わ / 加 g of n 1981 , few nations will be able to count on export growth the cost Of 0 ⅱ during the past year—and analysts attribute much t0 pay their 0 ⅱ bills or finance their growth. "There will Of the current economic downturn tO the fact that past oil-price be no help on the foreign-trade front," says Ott0 von Fieandt, increases lopped billions 0f dollars 0 the purchasing power 0f Chief economic adviser tO Eurofinance S. , . in PariS. Economists the oil-importing nations. "lt was a supply-side shock of- tre- at London's brokerage firm 0f Phillips and Drew agree; they mendous magnitude," says Chase Econometrics analyst David predict that world trade will stagnate in the coming twelve months. RoIIey. "Oil-price increases have played the largest role in de- That is in sharp contrast with the upturn following the recession termining the course Of the world economy over the last year. ' of 1975 , when the American market recovered vigorously and For the industrial nations, that course has been rocky at best. the United States began pulling in record imports. This time, The U. S. economy suffered a steep, short recession in midyear, economists see no such rebound, which will make it harder for then Western Europe followed suit. Harsh monetary policies in 5 ス U D ー A R A 田 0 NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 46

THE SOVIET BLOC By WiIIiam E. Schmidt ech Walesa hardly seemed like a man to make a revolution. He is unassuming, unimposing and, until he tOOk control of Poland's labor movement, he was also unemployed. But ⅲ 1980 , Walesa led a workers' revolt against the Polish Gov- ernment—and its Soviet overlords—that shook the world. He forced an Eastern-bloc government tO recognize a free labor union for the first time ever, and he wrote a charter for that union that did not pay obeisance tO the Communist Party. His message was simple and he said it over and over again during the workers' struggle: "l want democracy. WaIesa's trlumph was electrifying largely because the odds against him were SO long. Yet in his victory lurked the specter of defeat. Even in August, during the first strikes ⅲ the Gdansk shipyards, the threat Of a SOViet invasion loomed as a sobering counterpoint t0 the exhilarating upnsing 0f the P01ish working class. The workers made history, but they evoked history, t00 : Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were painful re- minders that expenments in freedom could be crushed by Soviet tanks. As the year drew tO a close, the lingenng question remained unanswered: how far would the workers be permitted t0 go before the Kremlin decided enough was enough? No one doubted that the Soviets would move on Poland if they felt the country was slipping from their grasp. Yet even as Russian troops massed at the border, KremIin offlcials said they hoped the P01ish Government could solve its own problems. "We do not want to interfere in the Polish situation or harp on its negative aspects," said Vadim Zagladin Ofthe SOViet Commu- Striking 00a ー miners in SiIesia: HO 響 far 響 0 ー the 響 0 「 ke 「 5 be nist Party's foreign department. With 80 , 网 troops in Afghan- istan and another half million along the Chinese border, attacking Yet the erosion of Communist control in Poland—and the possible evolution Ofa more nationalistic, pluralistic state would Poland would be a costly and awkward undertaking for Moscow. And the United States and its allies were quick to issue harsh be an unacceptable challenge t0 the SOViet Union. TO SOViet mili- tary planners, P01and is the linchpin 0f the Eastern-bloc defense warnings. President Jimmy Carter said that ・ "the future policies Of the United States toward the Soviet Union would be directly network, a strategic link between the western edge Of the SOViet and adversely affected by any use of Soviet force in P01and. ' Union and frontline units in East Germany. SOViet concerns about Although Carter' s tough warnings tO the Soviets over Afghanistan the geopolitical and strategic stakes 0f losing con trol 0f P01and had softened when Western allies failed to respond, this time were apparent in a recent Tass commentary: it warned that a he had the full cooperation 0f NATO leaders. "Afghanistan is nationwide rail strike in P01and would cripple the link between one thing, " said a government omcial in Bonn. "This is Europe. Moscow and East Germany—and pose a direct threat tO POIish Moscow has already resorted tO nonmilitary strategies in an security. attempt tO correct POlish waywardness. Communist Party leader Edward Gierek was replaced by Stanislaw Kania, who reshumed iberalization in Poland poses more than a military threat, the PoIitburo and enlisted the support of hard-liner Gen. Miec- however: Soviet leaders fear that Poland will become 4 zyslaw Moczar as the party's enforcer. "Moscow put the POIes model for Other Eastern-bIoc nations beset by the economlc on probation," said one European diplomat. "While it may have problems and food shortages that triggered the P01ish strikes. ruled out armed intervention for a while, this may be the necessary The KremIin leadership is also worried about unrest from within. first step tO eventual intervention. ' ' The second step, some analysts SOViet industrial workers, like their POlish counterparts, face severe suggested, could be an invasion in the guise Of Warsaw Pact shortages 0f meat and dairy products, and party boss Leonid maneuvers, designed tO put the Western allies 0 the track and Brezhnev has lately taken to reassuring the public that the gov- head 0 the diplomatic and economic sanctions the West has ernment is working t0 solve the problem. 、、 Can we take for granted been threatening. Other analysts contended that Moscow would any longer the fear and long-suffering patience 0f the Soviet peo- continue t0 keep its distance, negligible though it might be, as ple?' ' wondered one diplomat. Another concern is that the up- long as the P01es did not take an overtly anti-Soviet line. "One heaval in P01and, coming on top 0f an lslamic rebellion in Af- Of the critical differences between the situation in Poland and ghanistan, could create problems in the SOViet Union's ethnic Czechoslovakia, ' ' a diplomat told NEWSWEEK, "is that so far republics. Lithuania, which shares a border with P01and and no one has attacked the Soviet Union, or the basic nature of is largely Cath01ic, is a special worry. Soviet fears 0f a sympathetic Soviet-Polish ties. ' Lithuanian reaction tO the events in POland may explain why NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 28

き ! ート Afghan ins 「 9e0 彙 5 in a mountain hide-out: 'We have fought a supe 「 po 響・′ tO a standstill fO ′ t 0 ⅳ 0 months' after thirteen Khalqi army omcers were executed on suspicion 0 the Soviet occupiers and the remnants of the Afghan Army. of plotting a coup. At that point, the Parcham faction began 'We take our guns on the battlefield from the Russians," claimed a full-scale purge of its rivals from all top military and government Jamal Ahmad, who belongs to another insurgent group. positions. Despite dogged resistance from the insurgents, it seems likely that historic and geographic realities will dictate the establishment he incessant feuding in Kabul has had a predictable effect : of a leftist government in KabuI that is more or less sympathetic it has narrowed the base Of the Communist Party—preciseIy to 、åoscow ' s concerns. ln the meantime, the Soviets are digglng the opposite 0f what the Soviets had hoped for when they in for a long stay. A major depot for fuel and materials is under installed Karmal. By waging war on the Khalq, KarmaI has construction at Pul-i-Khumri, in north-central Afghanistan, and alienated the party faction that commands 60 per cent Of Com- the Soviets are laying a large 0i1 pipeline tO the area. They have munist support in the country. Outside the party the situation alSO extended the runways at four air bases ⅲ Afghanistan, built is even worse, because while it is unlikely that the Khalqi leaders huge aircraft hangars, constructed new housing for personnel and set up seven reglonal military commands Of division strength. would ever defect tO the non-Communist Muj ahedin insurgents, the same cannot be said of many of their followers. There have This is disturbing news for both the rebels and for Pakistan, already been rumblings of a Khalq-Muj ahedin alliance, and if smce the Soviets are bound tO step up pressure on Pakistan's the reports turn out tO be true Karmal's position may become President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq to force him to curb the exiles' untenable. That, in turn, creates still another headache for the freedom. MiIitariIy, the Soviets may also continue their frequent SOViet overlords and increases the likelihood of long-term oc- violations Of Pakistani airspace, and perhaps even resort tO hOt cupation. "lt has been clear from the beginning," said a Western pursuit 0f the guerrillas fleeing into Pakistan. ambassador, "that the Soviets' Obj ective ⅲ entering Afghanistan was t0 provide a securlty umbrella under which an Afghan regime OSCOW appears tO have ruled out any suggestion that the could rebuild all the country's institutions. There has not been United Nations send a fact-finding mission to the area. a shadow 0f progress. ' That, ⅲ turn, eliminates the possibility Of an interna- The prospect of cooperation between the Khalq and the Mu- tionally negotiated settlement. One Western intelligence source j ahedin is chilling tO the Soviets because the non-Communist believes the Kremlin may eventually see certain benefits flowing rebels have been a formidable foe even without any indigenous from the occupation. "The Soviet Army has not been bloodied allies. " have fought a superpower to a standstill for twelve for a long time," he said 、 "Afghanistan provides a handy, nearby months," claimed Najibullah Lafraise, a member of a Peshawar- training ground tO test weapons, tactics and troops in actual based lslamic insurgent group. Apart from small arms and 応 od battle. " Moscow's men and machines will probably pass—but supplies from outside the country, the insurgents have been living the test will take a 10t longer to finish than they had expected. Pascal Manoukian—Sygma NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981

Helsinki accords on European security own problems," he said, "and the Soviet cooperation, the United States warned Union ln no way intends tO interfere in From the Brink 、åoscow that an invasion would make their affairs. ' certain casualty ” Of the agreements. ln a Any Western optimism generated by more low-key attempt tO ease tensions, the land' s peace. Representatives 0f about 3.2 Ponomaryov' S assurance was undercut by Carter Administration urged the European the next day's bristling commentary in million pnvate farmers were demanding Pravda. Signed ・ by 、、 AIeksei Petrov," the allies tO hasten f00d shipments t0 P01and that the government license their union. to help relieve the Christmas shortages. pseudonym used t0 reflect top-level Krem- After the Gdansk ceremony, Warsaw or- The Administration was modestly en- lin thinking, the article was a tough re- dered Poland's first meat rationing since couraged by the sight 0f workers, party j 0inder t0 a NATO comm unique warning World War Ⅱ to ensure an equitable dis- and church coming together in Gdansk on tribution Of ham and other traditional that Soviet intervention in Poland would Christmas foods. a platform Of moderation and reconcili- destroy détente. Pravda said the West ation. AII the same, the sense Of crisis had "would be quite satisfied ” ifthe Communist At Poland ' s borders, Soviet forces re- far from passed. "This will be a long story, mained in a state of full mobilization and Party lost control 0fP01and, and it vaguely said a weary U. S. criSiS manager, "almost accused some NATO members 0f prepar- alert for a second week, but there was no like a Polish soap opera that will go on evidence that the decision tO intervene had ing "t0 step over the generally recognized and on with always the chance ofsomething been made. The Kremlin's apologists were norms Of international relations and pass from ideological intervention in P01ish af- going awry. " With Walesa's help, Kania busy softening up Western European public had shown Moscow that he could calm , . to interference Ofa different kind. ' opinion, arguing that if Poland "invites' ' fairs . at least for the time being, the enthusiasms CasuaIty: The Carter Administration armed Soviet assistance the same cover of Poland's newly emancipated workers. they used for the invasion 0f Afghanistan— kept up its stream Of warnings about the He had yet to show that he could roll back consequences Of a SOViet assault on PoIand. Moscow's move should not be regarded some 0f the sweeping civil liberties and la- At another 0f his on-the-record press brief- as a threat tO détente or tO Western Europe. bor freedoms granted after last summer's ings, national-security adviser Zbigniew Central Committee members Vadim Zagla- strikes. By all signs, the Soviets needed Brzezinski brushed 0 the conciliatory talk din, talking t0 an ltalian newspaper, and more than the evidence 0f a comradely rally from Ponomaryov, declaring: "lt would be VaIentin FaIin, talking tO a West German in Gdansk that Poland's workers were will- a contribution tO a lessening Of tension interviewer, maintained that 、åoscow had ing tO accept the constraints Of a Com- if such statements were accompanied by no intention Of disciplining Poland on its munist system. a disengagement 0f the forces deployed own initiative. On a ViSit tO Par1S, a promi- around P01and and a scaling down 0f their nent Central Committee secretary, Boris STEVEN STRASSER with WILLIAM E. SCHMIDT state of readiness. ' ' At the Madrid con- Ponomaryov, pounded home the point. in Moscow, JANE WHITMORE in Washington ference revlewing compliance With the "The PoIes are big enough to settle their and bureau reports And the peculiarities of the desert will force 0ther changes in bOth operations and equip- ment. "Sand got intO every- thing, ” said Carl Carrano, a squad leader. S01diers needed scarves and goggles tO protect their faces. Thej M-16 rifle proved t00 sensitive tO sand and t00 short-range for the vast desert. Troops would prefer a weapon similar tO the Older, heavier M- 14 or even the So- viet-made AK-47 rifles. Terrain: Helicopters could also be vulnerable in the desert. Sand eroded com pressor-blade tips and tail rotors. The fea- AP tureless terrain posed another kind of problem for pilots. 0 〃川 0 〃 eu e ′ in Eg. ツ 2 た The test ル $ success, み〃ーれ e ル C 住 0 〃ア住 ge な 0 〃イ r With direction and distance al- most impossible tojudge, some desert-bound copters will need better navigating equipment Fighting in 0i1 Country and laser range-finders for missiles. RDF commanders said that, over-all, Bright Star proved the reliability of the American soldier and his machinery— The U. S. Army's green camouflage uniforms were fine for even though the exercise was conducted under circumstances the jungles 0f Vietnam, but on a clear day in the deserts, that were hardly warlike. The 1 48 troops never strayed more an enemy could spot them miles away. That was one Of the than 1 5 miles from their base near Cairo, easing the problem basic lessons learned last month during Operation Bright Star, 0f securing water. Showers, laundry, fresh fruit and even h0t the Rapid Deployment Force' s first taste of duty in the Middle meals were available daily. But Bright Star pinpointed vul- East. After evaluating the twelve-day maneuvers in Egypt, nerabilities that would have passed unnoticed on training ex- RDF commanders last week declared the test a success— ercises in the American Southwest, enabling the RDF tO know but said that work needs to be done before American forces just what it will be up against should the United States actually can fight effectively in 0 ⅱ country. have tO wage war in the desert. For one thing, new orange-gray camouflage iS now on order. 7 NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981

THETH 旧 DWORLD A MUTED 0 ー A し OGUE on the agenda despite opposition from British Prime Minister By Anthony Sampson Margaret Thatcher. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt from West Ger- many and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau from Canada were he first year of the new decade raised both new fears and the most energetic supporters Of a new deal for the South. But some new hope for the Third World. The economic position Thatcher resisted, and encouraged President Jimmy Carter tO Of the poorest countnes was more perllous than ever, and play down the issue as well. there were signs that the rich countries were turning their backs. ln Britain, Thatcher saw the Third WorId in the context 0f But there was also some movement toward rethinking glObal the Communist danger and her own commitment tO free-enterpnse relationships. policies. Thatcher's ministers viewed international institutions, A commission, headed by former Chancellor Willy Brandt, including the United Nations and the World Bank, as global outlined the extent 0f the Third World's predicament in a report equivalents Of the welfare state, undermining the principles Of it published ⅲ February. The commission, with eighteen members self-help and free enterprise. As a result, the Foreign Offce pub- from five continents, was a microcosm ofdisagreement and debate: lished a negative reply t0 the Brandt report. ln it, the government its members ranged from an Algerian radical, Layachi Yaker, dismissed the concerns Of the development experts, 」 ust as Other tO a Republican American banker, Peter Peterson. But despi te Thatcher advisers deplored any attempt tO promote assistance their differences, the commissioners came tO share some Of the programs that might fuel inflation. same views about causes and cures. They agreed that large amounts Many Western advocates Of more free enterprise saw signs that the South alSO was moving t0 the right. The Chilean exper- lment With StriCt monetansm encouraged Ecuador and Peru t0 follow similar recipes. The failures of socialist or Marxist states in Africa, such as Mozambique and Ang01a, led them tO seek some rapprochement with Western investors. The newly independent Zimbabwe pointedly excluded the Soviets. . the economic success Of super.com/ petitive countrles in East Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, in- duced Other Asian countries, including Sr1 0 Lanka and lndia, to move toward more traditionally conservative policies. till, the conservative mood in the West seemed tO work against any discussion ofrestructuring the world economy on the scale recommended by Brandt or agreeing tO the proposed summit t0 discuss North-South relations. The skep- ticism seemed tO be confirmed when the United Nations held its special session as a prelude t0 "global negotiations" in the summer. That session ended without any measurable progress. But behind the diplomatic deadlock there were important groundswells 0f public 日「 a れ d 彙 with U. 2. S ・ 0 「・ ta 「 y ・ Gen ・「 Kurt WaIdheim: Hopes and fears opinion, at least in Europe. The younger generation there reacted tO th e Brandt proposals with an en- Of emergency assistance are needed tO prevent mass starvation thusiasm that surprised many Of the commissioners. ln Holland, in the Third WorId, and they deplored the decreasing aid flow always the vanguard 0f European concern for the Third World, from richer countries. The commissioners strongly urged a sive transfer Of resources ” from developed nations tO the Third religious groups and political parties held mass meetings and WorId. They also pressed for a fundamental reorganization of issued endorsements in favor Of the report. ln Britain, the gov- ernment's apathy met with an indignant response from young the world monetary system set up under the Bretton / OOds agree- people, Christian groups and the media. And the election victory ment in 1944. They called for long-term 0i1 price stability and more effective guarantees for conserving 0i1 and for maintaining of Schmidt in West Germany gave him a new mandate to press for the proposals of Brandt, his party chairman, the value Of 0i1 revenues. By the time the report was released, however, the world scene Different kinds of pressures emerged from banks and the global had darkened. The gröwth of extremism in lran and the Soviet institutions. Both Robert McNamara at the World Bank and Jacques de Larosiére at the lnternational Monetary Fund were invasion Of . Afghanistan increased fears Of an East- 、 con- frontation, which pushed aside the longer-term warnings 0f a increasingly aware that their organizations had tO be more flexible and more generous in lending t0 the Third World. McNamara crisis between North and South. The first ma 」 or test of the West's political mood came with issued proposals for "structural adjustment" loans tO help coun- tries pay their 0 ⅱ bills, while de Larosiére argued that the IMF the Venice summit in June. There, North-South relations stayed Brian F. NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 50