LATIN AMER ℃ A dinistas and with the Panamanian Government. And Mexico and people Of Jamaica decided, despite pressure from outside sources, Venezuela have extended oil-credit agreements tO several finan- that they wanted a move away from the left. ' cially strapped Central American and Caribbean countries heavily As the 、、 outside source" with the strongest political and eco- dependent on imported petroleum. nomlC stake in the region, the United States would obviously Friendly persuasion has its limits. Tension in the reg10n will like to see that trend continue. ln EI Salvador, Washington has not be easily relieved by foreign pressure and outside money. tried tO minimize the appeal ofthe revolutionary left by supporting ln the short run, the 0ut100k is for more strife, more violence, a moderate military-civilian government and by urgmg significant more death. "We will certainly see more struggle here," said agranan and banking reforms. And in Nicaragua, American P01- one U. S. diplomat in Central America. 、、 We will see more funerals. lcymakers are trying tO encourage access tO the government by One hopes that intelligent decisions can still be made in these moderate groups. The United States, however, is not the only countries and accepted without violence by their people, that country hoping tO win friends and influence politicians in Central not every country has tO go through its own revolution. '' The America. Castro's Cuba maintains a large force Of 、、 advisers" trouble, as the diplomat sadly noted, is that hope is a fragile in Nicaragua. The Soviets have expanded their embassy staff in Managua and supplemented trade agreements with the San- thing in that part 0f the world. JubiIant Cubans a ⅳ i れ 9 at Key West: An expected trickle of refugees turned into a floodtide Of emigres a consumer society were usually far beyond AN EMBARRASSING EXODUS reach. Some Ofthe immigrants got in trou- ble; 29 tried to skyjack planes to Cuba and At first, it seemed that Fidel Castro had one refugee was charged with the murder months, the Cuban refugees poured into found the perfect means of attacking the the United States by air and sea, hopeful Of his sponsor. More than 1 , 700 who had enemy from within. He temporarily eased of finding on foreign shores what they evl- committed senous crlmes in Cuba or ln restrictions on emigration tO the United dently had lost at home: a belief in the the refugee camps were detained in U. S. States and then allowed thousands of Cu- future. For the vast ma 」 ority Of the new- prisons. Other Cubans—lonely and disil- bans—including more than a few misfits lusioned—asked aloud if the United States comers, resettlement went smoothly, but and common cnminals—to 」 Oin the out- the Cubans found that capitalism isn't all came even close tO a promised land. bound traffic. But the idea backfired. The tape decks and designer 」 eans. LOW pay For all their problems, most of the ref- trickle Of humanity that Castro had ex- and high unemployment interrupted their ugees have settled in with reasonable suc- pected turned int0 a f100d tide of fed-up dreams of the good life—and even sent a cess. They recelve support and advice from C ″わ〃 They clung to the sides ofMiami- few on desperate missions back tO Cuba. the 800,000 Cubans already living in the based fishing boats and pushed their way Said one refugee worker: 、、 They came here United States. Generally, there is a sense ontO transport planes—a tOtal ofmore than and woke up to reality. that, given time, the refugees will ad 」 ust 124 000 islanders who wanted to call it TOday the question remams: are the Cu- tO the United States—and vice versa. Carlos quits. By far, the bulk of the crowd was ArboIeya, whO fled Havana twenty years bans in the United States better 0 than composed 0f law-abiding members 0f the before? After their first euphoric shouts ago, recalls that there were some diffcult working class. For them, Castro's revolu- of 、 / わの・ d / ' ' many refugees began grum- moments when he arrived, t00. 、、 Back then, tion meant little more than empty words bling about life in their new world. The everyone said there was no room, no JObS, 、 and empty plates. lmnugrants were Often treated With sus- noted Arboleya, now a bank president in The exodus put the United States' open- picion—and even hostility. Well-paying Miami. 、、 But things worked out well—and door policy tO the test. For five frenzied jobs were hard to find and the baubles of they will again. AP NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 円新 42

Maggie Steber—Sipa-BIack Star 0 「 ban po ・杙 y in Haiti: す h ・ WO Bank and 彙 h ・ IMF bOth promised tO be mo 「・ 90 れ・′ 0 5 with す h ⅳ WorId ー oa れ 5 must provide long-term loans with less ngorous conditions tO give countries more time tO adjust. Commercial bankers have become much more involved With the more dynamic Third World countries, such as Brazil and South Korea, since they began lending them large sums in the early 1970S. Now, however, they are more apprehensive about their credit-worthiness in the face 0f higher 0 ⅱ prices. ln 1980 , they began looking t0 the IMF as either their guarantor or their debt-collector. Western bankers were ambivalent about clos- er links with the offlcial institutions, and some Of them feared that if they got guarantees they would also get interference. One banker commented: "Our policy is 'help, but hands 0 . The chief advocate of closer links with the IMF was (). W. ) Tom CIausen, president of the Bank of America. And in October, Clausen was nominated tO succeed McNamara as president Of the World Bank. One ofthe ma 」 or issues facing Clausen will be the determination Of the wealthy oil-producing states tO increase their voting power in both the World Bank and the IMF before they take a more active part in Third World development. TO that end, the Arab countries devoted much Of their attention during the year tO beefing up their presence in the tWO institutions. y the end 0f the year, the North-South deadlock, if not broken, was at least more confused. 市ⅱ e the ideologues of free enterpnse, such as Thatcher or Milton Friedman, insisted on the sanctity Of the international capital market, many bankers were not sure hOW sanctified they wished it tO be. Third ′ orld militants still insisted on drastic restructuring to achieve their "new international economic order, " but many Of them looked t0 Western investment and bank loans for help. StiII, the Third WorId's prospects for the 1980S remain full of uncertainty. The extension of both lending and aid depends NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 critically on East-West relations and the cost Of the arms race. ln cynical terms, greater arms spending by bOth sides could stim- ulate economic activity and push up the pnce Of some Third WorId commodities—perhaps providing a new boom for several countnes, particularly in Latin America. But it would cut back the surplus funds available for international lending and aid not linked to military 0bj ectives, causing new hardships for Third WorId countries that produce purely peaceful commodities, or simply struggle t0 survive. any Third WorId leaders enter 1981 with renewed fears in the political arena as well. They worry that preoc- cupation with the Communist threat and the rhetoric of a new confrontation could lead the West back to crude cold- war simplifications, particularly the assumption that the whOle world must be classified as either pro-Communist or anti.Com/ munist. Past turnabouts in Asia and Africa, they note, have shown the dangers Ofthis assumption. Many newly independent countnes once lOOked tO the SOViet Union tO provide arms for their wars of liberation, only t0 become disillusioned by the inability of the Soviets tO provide the peaceful equipment they desperately needed later for development. Even among those Third World states which apparently had been moving closer tO Moscow, the SOViet invasion Of Afghanistan provoked protests and concern. The I ran-lraq war also has raised senous questions about which side is the least unfriendly tO Western interests. The events 0f 1980 showed the danger 0f generalizing about the line-up between the Third World and the Soviet Union. ln the months ahead, the challenge for both the West and the Third World will be to resume their dialogue with a heightened sense 0f urgency fostered during the last dangerous year. NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL CO れル″″れ g ed ″ 0 ′ / 〃 0 れア Sa 襯 2 $ 0 〃 0 ん 0 d the 召 ra れ市 CO 襯な豆 0 〃′ 0 な

0 N ℃ N Theo Sommer HOPE—AND PARITY he year began with Soviet tanks rumbling into KabuI and ended with Soviet divisions closing the ring around Poland. The rush of events has forced military security back to the top 0f the ・ West's agenda, and the AtIantic alliance must decide how t0 meet the challenges from the Communist bloc. Like previous debates about defense, the present round centers in part on facts and figures, in part on fictions and apprehensions and it is not always easy tO tell which is which. Pessimism colors the presentation Of the facts, fear influences the tabulation of the figures and fiction frequently overrides reality. lt is a fact that Soviet military power has grown enormously over the past two decades, in both relative and absolute terms. Moscow's capability to apply force all over the globe is greater, its posture in Europe more formidable than ever. But the ar- gument that the Kremlin has gained "usable' ' superiority in any significant field is sheer fiction. ln the area 0f strateglc nuclear weapons, the SOViets have attained rough parlty with edness are inadequate. But again it iS sheer fiction tO assume that the SOViet Army is without its shortcomings. Russia's state Of battle readiness is relatively 10W. lts technology leaves much tO be desired. Ship days at sea are far below Western norms and Soviet Air Force pilots 10g only half the number of flying hours of their Western counterparts. At least one-fifth of the Soviet military effort is directed toward China, while the forces Of its East European satellites are underequipped and unrel iable. By contrast, America's West European allies make a powerful contribution t0 Western defense. They provide 91 per cent of NATO's ground forces, 86 per cent of the air forces, 75 per cent of the tanks. They keep 3 million soldiers ready for any crisis contingency, whereas the United states has 2. i million troops under arms and on ly a limited mobilization reservorr. The Atlantic alliance faces stiff problems. lt must continue t0 spend a significant share 0f GNP on defense. Three per cent would seem a fair proportion, but just spending money is not the United States rough be- cause they have more delivery systems than the Americans while U. S. arsenals hold far more warheads. Russia's theater nucle- ar weapons assigned tO Europe have been modernized and strengthened, but anyone whO contends that the Kremlin has a clear edge over NATO would be guilty 0f making a very unsophis- ticated numerical analysis. ln the conventional field, the Soviets are ahead in numbers and weapons Despite the Soviet Union's military buildup, the horrid,though effective, balance Of te 了「 0 「 remains essentially れ change everything. The reintroduction Of the draft in the United States would dO more tO bolster Western defense preparedness than any conceivable decision abou t weap- ons procurement. Three Other sig- nificant tasks lie before NATO: First: NATO must decide how to deal with challen ges ar1Sing out- side the treaty area. Ad hoc CO- operation Of the kind practiced at present in the lndian Ocean would appear tO be the best answer. But such cooperation presupposes but they would be loony t0 attempt a walkover in Europe. The basic balance—the horrid, though effective, balance of terror t0 which the world owes 35 years of peace in the Northern Hemisphere has not changed. lt is a fact that SOViet intercontinental missiles pose more of a threat to the land-based U. S. missile force than they did at the time Of the Cuban cr1Sis in 1962 ; they are more numerous, more accurate, more powerful. Yet it is a figment Of despondent imagination that the Kremlin leaders might yield t0 the temptation of "taking out' ' the U. S. land-based missiles with one devastating blow. Such fears totally neglect the technical diffculties of such an operation, the improbability 0f success and, above all, the certainty Of a retaliatory American strike from its missiles in the depths of the world's oceans. The fundamental truth of the nuclear age belies the fears of the military's gold-braided button- counters : the underlying panty in mutual destructive power will continue tO deter the main actors on the world stage from en- croaching on each other's spheres Of protection. lt is a fact, t00 , that NATO must not slacken its defense efforts if it wants tO keep pace with the 、 Marsaw Pact. The Western armed forces have their weak spots—their stocks Of ammunition, prepositioning Of equipment, reserves and general state Of prepar- NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 agreement about what we may have tO confront. The West cannot engage itself on behalf 0f every faraway African or Asian nation whose dictator elects tO call for Soviet help. Second : The AtIantic alliance must give serlous thought to the practical implications Of what the concept Of "division of labor ” actually means. There are many things that only the Ameri- cans can dO. B ut at the same time the allies cannot leave everything to Washington. What compensatory measures, for instance, are the Germans, the British and the French going to take if the Pentagon decides t0 withdraw forces from Central Europe for rapid deployment elsewhere? Third : BuiIding up military strength is not suffcient to obtain security. ・ Winding down the arms race and creating economic and societal stability are 」 ust as important. We had a pretty bad year in 1980 , a year of confrontations between and within alliances, Of accelerating arms programs and a darkening 0ut100k for world peace. Beefing up transatlantic cooperation is one task Of the future. The Western nations will need clarity 0f purpose t0 d0 what is necessary, sober judgment tO recognize what is impossible and enough wisdom tO tell the one from the other. Theo So 襯な e 市た加 - c んイ 0 / の Zeit.

BorreI—Sipa-BIack Star UPI T 〃 r 川 0 ″加ー S 記イ 0 ら the ル 0 ′加 eg 〃 ~ 0 co 〃 $ / 0 ア r 川 , 〃〃 0 襯房 g 〃 0 ' eag 住ル〃 g / 0 尾 ig 〃ア 0 ″ A P01icy of Resurgence drifting from criSiS tO criSiS, Reagan's ad- visers believe. American military readiness will be substantially improved, and any arms-control talks with the Russians will By Fred CoIeman, DipIomatic Correspondent be conducted from a position Of renewed strength. At a minimum, this means mam- f RonaId Reagan and Alexander Haig abroad again, but this time on a more se- I tenance Of the present . American air and lective basis than that 0f world police- have their way, U. S. foreign policy will sea superiorlty in order tO stop the Soviets man. TO be successful, resurgence requires radically change course beginning in 1981 , from projecting their military power t0 dis- the right choices—which weapons t0 build, for only the third time since World r tant parts Of the world. Accommodations Ⅱ . Phase 1 , the containment of Commu- WhiCh issues tO stress, WhiCh reglons tO defend by force, which burdens t0 shift such as trade and arms-control agreements nism, ended with the American defeat in will be firmly linked to Soviet behavior on tO allies. Reagan insiders consider fu- Vietnam. Phase 2 , the relaxation Of ten- the world stage. "I have alway been a pro- sions promised by détente, collapsed with tile any attempt by the United States t0 ponent 0f linkage," Haig says ・ the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the regain unilateral supenority over the SO- ・ Modernizing the alliance. NATO was threat to the Persian Gulf 0 ⅱ fields. Phase viets across the board. The world Reagan and Haig inherit is formed for the conditions of the 1950S , the 3 , the Reagan watershed, is intended to perceived SOViet threat tO Western Europe. dominated by these grim facts: the Soviets mark the-resurgence Of American power. already equal U. S. nuclear strength and The alliance is ill equipped to deal with As Haig put it last year: "A firm, un- the principal challenge 0f the 1980S , in- ambiguous demonstration Of renewed U. S. may surpass it, U. S. policymakers can no longer orchestrate the way European allies stability in the Persian Gulf. Reagan ad- strength and ability t0 lead is long overdue. '' V1sers believe that a consistent policy, free and Japan respond to the Soviet challenge, 、 resurgence iS a wise or even from the zigzags Of the Carter years, will and the West survives on energy supplies feasible policy remains tO be seen. But there from the politically unstable Persian Gulf, encourage the Europeans tO share more can be little doubt it will be tried, perhaps Of the military and economic burdens in under another name. Richard Allen, Rea- inconveniently located in 、 IOSCOW ' S stra- meeting the Soviet challenge beyond Eu- tegic backyard. Haig thinks such factors gan's foreign-policy adviser, prefers the rope. ThiS iS by no means certain. Euro- could converge t0 make the 1980S the most word "renalssance. " Zbigniew Brzezinski, peans like tO think they have the statesmen President Carter's national-security advis- dangerous decade since World War Ⅱ . But and Americans have the power. They are er, talks Of "revitalization. '' AII draw sup- his goals are far more modest than renewed American superiority. "Clearly the task wrong on bOth counts. Vietnam and lran port from the same sea change in American proved the limits 0f American power. And ahead in this vital decade will be the man- thinking. Reagan will be the first American there has been no European statesman since President to take omce since the Vietnam agement 0f g10bal Soviet power," the Sec- Charles de Gaulle able to move beyond retary-designate t01d the Republican con- War with a broad, bipartisan consensus for national interest toward a ViSion Of Europe vention last summer. He warned that the a more assertive foreign policy tO protect as a united political power. The time may United States cannot do the job alone. "I the country's vital interests abroad. have come for AmericanS tO question their have reminded our friends in Europe that There are, of course, very sharp limits policy 0f Europe first. America' s trade with the days are gone when they could sit on tO that mandate. Resurgence does not imply Asia is more important than its trade with the sidelines," said Haig. a return to the cold war, an all-out arms Europe. The Third World is a bigger export Many details ofthe Reagan-Haig foreign race, another try at glObal containment Of market for the United States than Europe policy haven't yet been worked out. But Communism or an automatic willingness and Japan combined. If the Europeans and the ma. 」 or priorities already are clear. They t0 intervene with force abroad. The key the -Japanese cannot agree on more equl- question bOils down t0 this: dO you send include: table burden-sharing within the alliance, in the Marines? If the Soviets try tO station ・ Reinvigorating ま he American domestic the United States has the option Of uni- economy. NO Other single step in the new nuclear missiles-in Nicaragua, the answer laterally shifting its attention tO vital areas Administration 's first tWO years could con- is probably yes. If Marxists seize power tribute more tO its ability tO influence bOth like the gulf, forcing the allies t0 d0 more there an d redistribute the land, the answer tO defend their own regions. is probably no. adversaries and allies abroad. ■ Rethinking the ル d10 East. Carter's ln short, resurgence IS something new, ・ Meeting 山 0 Soviet challenge. Engage- greatest foreign-policy success was prob- a readiness tO flex Amencan muscles ment on the world scene is less risky than NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 16 FA 旧 S

THETH 旧 DWORLD A MUTED 0 ー A し OGUE on the agenda despite opposition from British Prime Minister By Anthony Sampson Margaret Thatcher. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt from West Ger- many and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau from Canada were he first year of the new decade raised both new fears and the most energetic supporters Of a new deal for the South. But some new hope for the Third World. The economic position Thatcher resisted, and encouraged President Jimmy Carter tO Of the poorest countnes was more perllous than ever, and play down the issue as well. there were signs that the rich countries were turning their backs. ln Britain, Thatcher saw the Third WorId in the context 0f But there was also some movement toward rethinking glObal the Communist danger and her own commitment tO free-enterpnse relationships. policies. Thatcher's ministers viewed international institutions, A commission, headed by former Chancellor Willy Brandt, including the United Nations and the World Bank, as global outlined the extent 0f the Third World's predicament in a report equivalents Of the welfare state, undermining the principles Of it published ⅲ February. The commission, with eighteen members self-help and free enterprise. As a result, the Foreign Offce pub- from five continents, was a microcosm ofdisagreement and debate: lished a negative reply t0 the Brandt report. ln it, the government its members ranged from an Algerian radical, Layachi Yaker, dismissed the concerns Of the development experts, 」 ust as Other tO a Republican American banker, Peter Peterson. But despi te Thatcher advisers deplored any attempt tO promote assistance their differences, the commissioners came tO share some Of the programs that might fuel inflation. same views about causes and cures. They agreed that large amounts Many Western advocates Of more free enterprise saw signs that the South alSO was moving t0 the right. The Chilean exper- lment With StriCt monetansm encouraged Ecuador and Peru t0 follow similar recipes. The failures of socialist or Marxist states in Africa, such as Mozambique and Ang01a, led them tO seek some rapprochement with Western investors. The newly independent Zimbabwe pointedly excluded the Soviets. . the economic success Of super.com/ petitive countrles in East Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, in- duced Other Asian countries, including Sr1 0 Lanka and lndia, to move toward more traditionally conservative policies. till, the conservative mood in the West seemed tO work against any discussion ofrestructuring the world economy on the scale recommended by Brandt or agreeing tO the proposed summit t0 discuss North-South relations. The skep- ticism seemed tO be confirmed when the United Nations held its special session as a prelude t0 "global negotiations" in the summer. That session ended without any measurable progress. But behind the diplomatic deadlock there were important groundswells 0f public 日「 a れ d 彙 with U. 2. S ・ 0 「・ ta 「 y ・ Gen ・「 Kurt WaIdheim: Hopes and fears opinion, at least in Europe. The younger generation there reacted tO th e Brandt proposals with an en- Of emergency assistance are needed tO prevent mass starvation thusiasm that surprised many Of the commissioners. ln Holland, in the Third WorId, and they deplored the decreasing aid flow always the vanguard 0f European concern for the Third World, from richer countries. The commissioners strongly urged a sive transfer Of resources ” from developed nations tO the Third religious groups and political parties held mass meetings and WorId. They also pressed for a fundamental reorganization of issued endorsements in favor Of the report. ln Britain, the gov- ernment's apathy met with an indignant response from young the world monetary system set up under the Bretton / OOds agree- people, Christian groups and the media. And the election victory ment in 1944. They called for long-term 0i1 price stability and more effective guarantees for conserving 0i1 and for maintaining of Schmidt in West Germany gave him a new mandate to press for the proposals of Brandt, his party chairman, the value Of 0i1 revenues. By the time the report was released, however, the world scene Different kinds of pressures emerged from banks and the global had darkened. The gröwth of extremism in lran and the Soviet institutions. Both Robert McNamara at the World Bank and Jacques de Larosiére at the lnternational Monetary Fund were invasion Of . Afghanistan increased fears Of an East- 、 con- frontation, which pushed aside the longer-term warnings 0f a increasingly aware that their organizations had tO be more flexible and more generous in lending t0 the Third World. McNamara crisis between North and South. The first ma 」 or test of the West's political mood came with issued proposals for "structural adjustment" loans tO help coun- tries pay their 0 ⅱ bills, while de Larosiére argued that the IMF the Venice summit in June. There, North-South relations stayed Brian F. NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981 50

HOME 、 4 Z/NBAB Ⅷ。。、第、 : る 0 、イ , the 90 0 「れ me れ t meet their 「 isi れ 9 expectations? Guerrillas turn in their guns: FO 「 some, the 響 a 「 90e5 0 れ Photos by Stephen Hone Mugabe would like tO correct the imbalance, but there are two powerful constraints working against redistribution: the white farmers are Zimbabwe's biggest earners of foreign exchange, and the Lancaster House Constitution says land may not be seized for resettlement, but must be bought by the government. Apart from the fact that he cannot afford it, Mugabe is strongly opposed t0 buying back land that white settlers took from Africans decades ago. He t0 旧 one group Of white farmers recently that he 、、 did not feel inclined to pay for land plundered decades ago from the indigenous people by the colonialists"—・ and then threatened tO seize their property without compensatlon unless Britain comes up with more aid. hat message was aimed more at reluctant aid donors ln the West than at the white farming community, and it was swiftly followed by a retraction. The reversal was part Of the secret Of Mugabe's success: his skillful use of ambiguity. The Prime Minister condemns multinationals for exploiting his country's resources, while at the same time assuring the foreign firms that their investments are safe in Zimbabwe. He preaches socialism, but says he will retain a free-market economy. SO far no one has taken Mugabe tO task. But he may run into trouble as the contradictions become more transparent. An even greater threat facing the Prime Minister comes from his inability to disarm 25 , 000 ex-guerrillas not yet integrated into the new national army. One-third are members of the old ZIPRA army, predominantly Ndebele tribesmen and fanatically 10Ya1 to Nkomo, whom they see as frozen out of the government. The rest are Shonas 0f Mugabe's 01d ZANLA force. Both factions have terrorized civilian villagers ln 、、 contested" rural areas. They have also raised the level Of violence in the black townships near Salisbury and Bulawayo, where the government has housed thou- sands 0f its out-of-work 、、 comrades. '' About 200 people have been killed in factional fighting since independence, including 55 who recently died during a vicious battle in Bulawayo. Mugabehas had almost as much trouble dealing with the flagrant excesses Of hiS own Cabinet. Some rmmsters seem more interested ln acqmring fancy homes, driving around in expensive Mercedeses and eating in gourmet restaurants than in constructive belt tight- NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 19 引 ening. Others appear t0 be b0th racist and needlessly offensive. HeaIth Minister Herbert Ushewokunze angered white hospital workers by accusing them ofdiscriminating against black patients. Finance Minister Enos Nkala sparked the Bulawayo fighting by suggesting—in the heart 0f Matabeleland, Nkomo's home turf— that Nkomo should be removed from the government. But the two men whO most embarrassed Mugabe were Tekere and Lt. Gen. Peter Walls. Walls, who had devoted most of his life tO propping up white-minority rule, surprised everyone at independence by offering t0 stay on as Mugabe's top soldier and help integrate the new Zimbabwean Army. Because he couldn 、 t conceal his distaste for the men he had to work with, Walls resigned in July. The general further angered Mugabe by disclosing that he had asked Margaret Thatcher to cancel the Zimbabwean election result because Of intimidation by Mugabe's supporters, and that he had considered the option Of a military coup. alls's departure dismayed whites, but they were more disturbed by Tekere's murderofa white farmer. Although he admitted the crime, Tekere escaped punishment through a legalloopholedesigned to shield the 01d white Rhodesian regime from prosecution for wartlme atrocities. The three-man bench found Tekere guilty as charged, but two black assessors overruled the white judge in granting Tekere immunity under a 1975 act that protected government ministers acting 、、 ln good faith for the suppression of terronsm. '' The split verdict reduced the chances Of a Cabinet reshume. Government insiders say that while he did not suspend Tekere from party or state functions during the trial, the Prime Minister had hoped for a conuction. With Tekere out of the way, he could have spiked the guns 0 「 his troublesome left wing. lnstead, Tekere emerged even stronger. Mugabe must now regain the confidence 0f whites, who think that Tekere has been given a license tO kill, and at the same time satisfy the rising expectations Of blacks. A rash Of strikes and labor unrest reflects their frustration, and they are putting pressure on the Prime Minister tO move more quickly down the road t0 socialism. Balancing the demands 0f blacks and whites will require a long-running high-wire act by Mugabe. If he falls, Zimbabwe's revolution could go down with him. 39

GameWarden EIias Lasheri. Murdered い rhmo poachers June lst 1979. HINO POACHINGisn't a question up tO $ 600 an ounce tO people wh0 of a few African tribesmen bend- have been f001ed int0 thinking it ' s an aphrodisiac ー which it isn't. ing the rules. lt' s highly-organised slaughter for Without your help the rhino hasn 't profit by gangs 0f men armed with a chance. If the present rate 0f machine guns and Kalashnikov as sault slaughter is allowed t0 conunue , by rifles. Like the ones they used t0 k11 1982 all rhinos ⅲ East Africa could be gone. Forever. Elias Lasheri at K1ripa ⅲ Tanzania. The stakes are high. Rhino horn is The World Wildlife Fund is moun- more prized than gold. lt's sold for ung an urgent campalgn t0 save the rhino from extinction. Your help is needed now. Your contribuuons can help pay for more men and eqtupment tO stop the poachers. TO persuade governments t0 totally ban trade ⅲ rhino products, as Kenya, Hong Kong and 57 other countries have done. You can help move vulnerable rhinos t0 safer, better-patrolled re- serves. Most ofall, you can help expose the profiteers , the men wh0 provide the market that tempts Others intO poachmg. And murder. EIias Lasher1 gave his life trying t0 protect the rhino. Won' t you give somethmg? S end your donatlon tO your national 、、 VF organlzatlon or direct to: S ave the Rhino Campamgn: 、 Vorld Wildlife Fund, 1196 GLAND, Switzerland. 月市盟ⅵ記〃盟″川・孕Ⅲ・翻ロ 2 / た“尾たに , ( ) 朝 / い , & M 卍厖に WIY'F 訛んれ , た dg いに法 , na 礒 , ″ ( ゾな、ヘれ℃の , N' い心ん NA2

GIVING PEACE A CHANCE states have been able tO dO. 、、 lt is a refreshing change tO work By HO e 「 3e05e0 with a government that is not 」 ust seeking handouts but actively striving for self-reliance," said one U. N. offcial. s the Union Jack came down on Rhodesia and a new, The country has repaired war-damaged roads, clinics and multi-colored flag rose over Zimbabwe last April, Africa schools. There are now 235 000 more black children attending celebrated the birth Of its newest black nation. lt was a schools than there were at independence. Mugabe has instituted country born of high hopes and heavy bloodshed. More than a mlnrmum wage—S65 a month for domestic and agricultural 25 000 people died in Zimbabwe's seven-year guerrilla war, and workers, $ 140 for industrial workers—which, in some cases, dou- itS first election campalgn was as memorable for itS violence as bled their income. Although white emigration has accelerated for its voting. But by the time a white 」 udge administered the smce Mugabe t00k over—more than 2 , 000 are leaving every oath Of offlce tO Prime Minister RObert Mugabe, many whites month—most departures appear tO be blue-collar workers and seemed prepared tO give Mugabe—and peace—a chance. After eight months in offlce, the former guerrilla leader can low-grade civil servants wh0 would have been replaced by blacks anyway. Skilled professionals, manufacturers and the nation 、 s claim a qualified success. Against all the odds, he has held Zim- farmers have been persuaded tO stay, either because they have babwe together. lt has not been easy. Mugabe's coalition with been pleasantly surprised by Mugabe's policies, or because they Home Minister Joshua Nkomo is shakier than ever. Tribal ani- can't take their money with them. mosities are inflamed, and the tWO guerrilla arnues sometimes Economically, Zimbabwe has been remarkably resilient. Third- seem unaware that the war IS over. The members Of Mugabe's quarter estimates suggest real growth Of at least 6 per cent this own Cabinet have undermined his attempts at reconciliation with year—the strongest since the first quarter 0f 1974. Manufacturing Zimbabwe's whites, and one has even committed—and gotten output hasincreased 14 percent sinceindependence, mming output away with—murder. Manpower Minister Edgar Tekere, wh0 ad- by 50 per cent and agriculture is d0ing better than expected. mitted killing a white farmer last August, went free through Even the balance ofpayments is strong by Third World standards: a legal loophole originally designed t0 protect the white-minority the country has a forecast deficit ofonly $ 140 million. reglme. Mugabe's political opponents complain that he is more con- or all its successes, many Of Zimbabwe's toughest problems cerned with maintaining the white-controlled economy than with remain. A 6 per cent growth rate will create only 50,00() transforming Zimbabwe intO a socialist nation. Although the to 60 , 000 additional 」 obs annually, while Zimbabwe has strength 0f the rival forces IS such that an open dispute could 150 , 000 employable youths commg on the market every year. lead tO civil war, Mugabe has so far performed an amazing high- W1re act. He has balanced black expectations with white interests, OnIy 1 million of the country's 7.2 million blacks are employed in the cash economy, and those whO expected overnight change and his Marxist ideals with the realities ofthe marketplace. One Of the government's most notable achievements involves when Mugabe came tO power are growing angry. Land is a particularly sensltlve lssue. Mugabe inherited a nat1011 the 1 million people displaced by the war. With help from the Off1ce of the United Nations High Comm1ss10ner for Refugees where 5 , 500 white farmers owned 14.8 million hectares of the best arable land. Five million Africans crowded ontO the rest ・ー- and a highly effcient civil service, Zimbabwe has begun rein- tegrating them int0 the economy—something few black African 16.3 million hectares of substandard soil in the tribaltrustlands. SaIisbury b ね 0k5 celebrate independence: 00u 馗 Terry Fincher—・ PhOtographers lnternational Mugabe sa 0 「 s his e 厄 ctiO れⅵ 0t0 「 y : A れ 9- 「 u れれ i れ 9 high-wire act NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 、い ) 3 8

AFGHANISTAN AIain Dejean—Sygma GuerriIIas swarm 0 e 「 a wrecked Soviet helicopter: Despite the rebels' resistance, Moscow seems likely tO get its way MOSCOW'S QUAGMIRE? By Barry Came ntil recently, Hafiz Khan was an artillery major in Af- ghanistan's army and strictly a soldier's soldier. He be- longed neither t0 the Khalq nor the Parcham factions 0f the dominant People's Democratic Party, and he shunned the mullah-ridden ranks of the country's insurgents. After Soviet troops invaded his land a year ago, he wept in humiliation but decided he could not leave. Then, in October, when Afghanistan's Soviet-instaIled President Babrak Karmal flew to Moscow and was wrapped in a bear hug by SOViet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Hafiz Khan packed his bags for Pakistan. "Up to that point," he said, “ I kept telling myself that things were so bad they could not go on. But when Babrak got Moscow's continued support, I knew it was going tO get much, much worse. ' One year after SOViet armor rolled intO Afghanistan, it is diffcult to dispute that bleak assessment. RoughIy 1.2 million Afghans have fled through the mountain passes to seek refuge in Pakistan, and for those le れ behind freedom is only a memory. Close tO nine full-strength SOViet divisions are scattered across Afghanistan; another three are perched in support 」 ust across the Oxus River in Soviet Central Asia. The troops themselves— 90 , 000 inside the country and 30 , 000 on the border—are backed by 2 , 450 tanks, 3 , 150 armored personnel camers and 320 com- bat aircraft, including six squadrons of deadly Mi-24 helicop- ter gunships. However, despite their massive military presence, the Soviets cannot claim full control Of Afghanistan. 、 OSt areas outside the major cities and roadways remain in the hands Of elusive, hydra- headed insurgent bands. As the Soviet occupation enters its second 30 winter Of warfare, no one sees an end tO the battle that has vanquished most vestiges Of government in Afghanistan , terrified neighboring countnes, soured East-West relations and trans- formed one Of the reglon's traditional buffers intO a Russian sat- ellite. Said one Asian diplomat : " Barring some unforeseen change, I see a continuing SOViet presence and a continuing low-voltage war in that unhappy country for years tO come. ' s the fighting goes on, the offensive is likely to remain firmly in Soviet hands. The Afghan Army, which numbered more than 80 , 000 before the invasion, has now dwindled to fewer than 30 , 000 , most 0f whom are unwilling, unreliable conscnpts. At the same time, SOViet forces are abandoning their onginal attempts tO win the hearts and minds Of the population and turning more and more tO what analysts describe as " search and destroy, rather than clear and hOld ” missions against the guerrillas. The change in tactics has been punishing. ln their attempts t0 deny the rebels food and safe haven, the Soviets have destroyed villages, crops and animals. And tO cut 0 the insurgents' supply routes, they have planted thousands Of anti- personnel mines along the main trails. AS one intelligence source puts it : "The Soviets entered Afghanistan as an army Of liberation. lnstead they have become an army Of occupation. ' On the civilian front, there is even greater turmoil. Babrak K. armal' S government has been in tatters since hiS SOViet sponsors plucked him from exile in Eastern Europe and installed him in KabuI. Karmal was supposed to reunite the warring KhaIq and Parcham factions under the umbrella of the Communist Peo- ple's Democratic Party. But after some initial progress the alliance began unraveling last summer. The beginning 0f the end came NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 , 1981

THE MIDDLE EAST Arnaud BorreI—Slpa-BIack Star An lraqi casualty in Baghdad: An unexpected and seemingly unwinnable war brought れ e 物 turmoil tO a troubled 「 egiO れ By Tony 0 ftO れ raq and lran plunged headfirst intO an unexpected—and ap- parently unwinnable—war for control Of their vital Persian Gulf 0 ⅱ fields and waterways. Syria and Jordan, never the best of neighbors, ordered thousands of troops tO a face-off on their border in a bully-boy maneuver that re-emphasized the Arab world's internal divisions. The ever-glacial peace talks between lsrael and Egypt stopped dead once again because Of lsrael's drive tO establish more settlements in the occupied West Bank and the disputes within Menachem Begin's government. As a result, 1980 was an ominous year for the fractious MiddIe East— and it may have marked the beginning Of the most dangerous decade in modern history for that chronically troubled region. ln past years the bitter and bloody clashes between lsraelis and Arabs have been the area's most clear and present danger. But in 1980 the prospect of another all-out war on that front faded somewhat because 0f the Camp David agreement. Whatever its failings are, or may prove tO be, the accord temporarily removed the most immediate source Of tension and kept the lid on a Slm- mermg pot. But then lran's messlanic ruler Ayat011ah Ruh011ah Khomemi set a new caldron boiling. Throughout the year he and his numons not only prolonged the seemingly senseless cap- tivity 0f 52 American hostages but waged a propaganda war with Teheran's lslamic rivals in Baghdad. When September came, the tWO countries stopped trading words and started trading bul- lets. The fighting since then has been nonstop, and Middle East 26 experts fully expect that the battle will continue well int0 1981. The consensus is that lraq's President Saddam Hussein made a monumental mistake when he started shooting. lranian exiles, notably former Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, had whispered tO Saddam that Khomelni's regime was tottering and that a mere nudge would topple it. The lraqi leader believed what he was told. He ordered his well-equipped army and air force tO launch a pre-emptive strike against lran. HiS aims were clear: tO force lran tO surrender the islands known as Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Strait of Hormuz; tO take control Of the Shatt al Arab, the entryway t0 the Gulf; t0 seize lran's oil-pro- ducing province 0f Khuzestan with its refinery complex at Aba- dan—and t0 spark a popular revolt against Khomeini. So far, Saddam has failed in every respect. hree months after his initial assault, his forces remained at a standstill. They have secured only a shaky f00th0 旧 in lranian territory. They have been continually harassed and bloodied by lran's revolutionary guards and by a surprisingly effective lranian Air Force. NOW the invading lraqis face three months Of rainy winter weather, which will make any further advances punishing, and perhaps impossible. Far from being top- pled, Khomeini has been able to invoke the threat from a second 、、 foreign devil" tO persuade the lranian masses tO unite against an ancestral Arab enemy and consolidate his grip on power. By contrast, all that Saddam has managed tO dO is tO give lran 、 s zealots added strength—and imperil his own position. NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 5 、円引