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Environmental Economics and Policy

物れ血 I e 襯 167 crossing property boundaries, landowners can sell the daily fishing rights. The revenues from these sales provide owners with an incentive tO develop spawning beds, protect the fish habi- tat, and, in general, make the fishing experience as desirable as possible. By limiting the num- ber Of fishermen, the owners prevent overexploitation Of the resource. ln England and Scotland, markets are relied upon tO protect instream uses more than they are in the United States. Private angling associations have been formed tO purchase fishing rights from landowners. Once these rights have been acquired, the associations charge for fishing, using some Of the revenues tO preserve and tO improve the fish habitat. Because fishing rights in England sell for as much as $ 220 , 000 , the holders 0f these rights have a substantial incentive tO protect their investments. One Of the forms this protec- tion takes is illustrated by the Anglers Cooperative Association, which has taken on the responsibility Of monitoring the streams for pollution and alerting the authorities tO any potential problems. Getting the prices right is another avenue for reform. Recognizing the inefficiencies asso- ciated with subsidizing the consumption Of a scarce resource, the U. S. Congress passed the CentraI VaIIey Project lmprovement Act in 1992. The act raises the prices that the federal gov- ernment charges for irrigation water, though the full-cost rate is only imposed on the final 20 percent 0f water received. 12 Collected revenues will be placed in a fund tO mitigate environ- mental damage in the Central Valley. The act also allows water transfers t0 new users. For water distribution utilities, the traditional practice Of recovering only the costs Of dis- tributing water and treating the water itself as a free good should be abandoned in favor 0f a marginal-cost-pricing system that includes a scarcity value for water in the price. Because scarce water iS not in any meaningful sense a free good, the user COSt Of that water must be imposed on current users. Only in this way will the proper incentive for conservation be cre- ated and the interests Of future generations Of users be preserved. lncluding this user cost in water prices is rather more difficult than it may first appear. water utilities are typically regulated because they have a monopoly in the local area. One tYP- ical requirement for the rate structure Of a regulated monopoly is that it earn only a "fair" rate 0f return. Excess profits are not permitted. Charging a uniform price for water tO all users that includes a user cost would generate profits for the seller. (Remember the discussion 0f scarcity rent?) The scarcity rent accruing tO the seller as a result Of incorporating the user COSt would represent revenue in excess Of operating and capital COStS. One way that water utilities are attempting tO respect the rate Of return require- ment while promoting water conservation is through the use Of an increasing-block rate. Under this system the price per unit Of water consumed rises as the amount consumed rises (Figure 9.2 ). ln this example, the first 10 ccf 0f water cost $ 0.70 per ccf. 13 The next 10 ccf cost $ 0.80 per ccf, and the third cost $ 0.90 per ccf. A customer using 26 ccf would pay a bill for the month of $ 20.40 ( 10 x $ 0.70 + 10 x $ 0.80 + 6 x $ 0.90 ). 12An alternative 叩 proach would be tO issue transferable coupons for the low-cost water. This system would have the further advantage that the low-cost water would not be squandered, because it could be sold t0 someone wh0 valued it more. For a detailed analysis Of this proposal see R0bert A. collinge, "Revenue Neutral Water Conservation: Marginal Cost pricing with Discount Coupons," Ⅲ催 0 ″尾 es R e 28 (March 1992 ) : 617 ー 22. 13A ccf is 100 cubic feet, or 748 gallons.

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HACK # 14 62 2 章 ファイルとファイルシステム man whereis man WhatiS ・ man find ・ man grep H A C K 役に立つ。 grep は、ファイルの中を検索して、特定のテキストが入っている行を報告する。 の中身の一部は覚えている」ことがあるだろう。そんなとき、奇妙な名前の g て ep コマンドが 特定のファイルを見つける必要があるとき、「ファイルの名前は思い出せないが、ファイル ー grep は、名前は奇妙だが、とても役に立つ grep を最大限に活用 ・ ] ; then user="$USER"; fi mount-user:if [ "$user" - override $USER as the user t0 backup ・ mount-user: echO [-u user] mount-host :mounted=$()f ー grep "$ALM AFP MOUNT/$USER") del-user:if [ "$USER" ! = " て 00t " ] ; then " ] ; then user="$USER"; fi bu-user:if [ "$user" bu-user: ech0 [-u user] - override $USER as the user t0 backup ・ add-user:if [ "$USER" ! = " 印 ot " ] ; then % grep - 5 ・ $USER ・ * してみればよい。 複数のシェルスクリプトから "$USER" というテキストを検索したいとする。次のように試 テキストを探す mount-user mount-host del-user bu-user add-user % grep -15 ・ $USER ・ * プションを付ければよい。 テキスト $USER が入っているファイルの名前だけを知りたいとする。この場合には、 -1 オ あっても、 grep はエラーメッセージを出さない。 一重引用符で囲む。 - s オプションを付けると、検索対象がファイルでなくディレクトリで 入っている行をすべて表示した。シェルが特殊文字を解釈することを防ぐため、テキストを この例では、 grep はカレントディレクトリのすべてのファイルを検索し、テキスト $ USER が

Environmental Economics and Policy

238 劭叩 / 催 72 窺 0 市″ : Com 襯邵 c 阨ん Species B0th the private and public sectors have moved tO ameliorate the problems associated with past mismanagement Of wildlife populations. For marine-based wildlife, J 叩 an and Other countries have stimulated the development Of aquaculture by reasserting private-property rjghts. Governments in canada and the United states have moved tO limit overexploitation Of the pacific salmon. lnternational agreements have been reached that place limits on vhaling. -ー・ For IandLbased wildlife, countries such as Z. imbabwe have initiated strategies tO prevent excessive conversion Of land currently used for habitat tO uses such as and urbanization. ln part, these strategies protect habitat by recognizingand-c-ap!.yr()g the value ofthat particular use 0f the land Creative strategies for shåring the gains from moving tO an efficient level Of use could prove tO be a significant technique in the arsenal 0f we 叩 ons designed tO protect a broad class or to failure. the world. ldentifies those features of limited-entry programs that seem to contribute to success 66 ( 1990 ) : 361 ー 78. Reviews the relevant experience with about 30 limited-entry programs around Townsend, Ralph E. "Entry Restrictions in the Fishery: A Survey of the Evidence, ”んれ d Economics number Of empirical studies. analyzing a number 0f property-rights regimes and use this framework tO interpret findings from a Analysis," んれ d Economics 68 ( 1992 ) : 249 ー 62. The authors devel 叩 a conceptual framework for Schlager, Edella and Elinor Ostrom, "Pr 叩 erty-Right Regimes and Natural Resources: A ConceptuaI at the experience with ITQS around the world. TO 盟ルわれ記 PO ″ cy 0 れ F なをれ 0 Q ″ 0 s. Washington, National Academy Press. A detailed 100k National Research Council Committee t0 Review lndividual Fishing Quotas ( 1999 ). S 砿加 0 the F なん rights regimes. lie current understanding Of the exploitation Of renewable resources under a variety Of property- ed. (New York: Wiley lnterscience, 1990 ). CarefuI devel 叩 ment of the mathematical models that under- CIark, CoIin W. e 襯″ c Bioeconomics: The 0 〃″襯 Ma れ 20e 襯例ー砿 R 例 e 盟わ Resources, 2nd on fisheries management. Folmer, eds. in (Cheltenham, UK, Edward E 厄 ar ) : 153-188. A review 0f current economic research れ″ 0 れ記砿わ 00 ん 0fE れ ro れ襯例ね 1 れイ R 0 ″ rce Economics ノ 998 〃 999. T. Tietenberg and H. Bjørndal, T. and G. R. Munro ( 1998 ). 'The Economics 0f Fisheries Management: A Survey," The 加た FURTHER READING fall before the pressing need for effective management remains tO be seen. ocean waters, and the difficulties Of enforcing various approaches. Whether these barriers will fishermen tO submit t0 many forms Of regulation, the lack Of a firm POlicy governing open lt would be fOlly t0 ignore barriers tO further action, such as the reluctance 0f individual tO prevent overexploitation Of this resource. ties a stake in preserving elephant herds has provided a vehicle for building political coalitions of those whose livelihoods depend on harvesting them. Furthermore, giving local communi- able quotas (ITQS) offers the possibility tO preserve stocks without jeopardizing the incomes Of biological resources fror れ overexploitation. An increasing reliance on individual transfer-

Environmental Economics and Policy

376 劭叩 r 78 Solid Ⅳイ Req c ″れ 0 Of government control are bOth inaccurate. The efficient role for government in achieving a balance between the economic and environmental systems requires less in S01 e areas and more in others. FURTHER READIN G Bohm, peter. D os ″ - Re ルれイ S. 襯 . ・ eo and 〃〃″ c われね E れ ro れ襯 l, , CO れ翔われ , れイ CO れ襯 PO ″ c. (Baltimore, MD: J0hns Hopkins UniversitY Press, for Resources for the Future' 1981 ). A highly readable and analytically sound exploration 0f the experience with and potential 叩 plications for deposit-refund systems. curlee, T. Randall. The ECO れ 0 襯た Fe ″″砿 Rec. c ″れ 0. ・ Case S ル 0fPlastic Ⅳ (New York: praeger, 1986 ). Analyzes in nontechnical language the incentives for, and barriers t0' recycling plastic. Dinan, Terry. "Economic Efficiency Aspects 0f Alternative P01icies for Reducing Waste Disposal' 面″記砿 Env か 0 れ襯例 I Economics イ Ma れ ge 襯 e 25 ( 1993 ) : 242 ー 256. Argues that a tax on virgin materials iS not enough tO produce efficiency; a subsidy on reuse iS alSO required. Jenkins, R0bin R. The Eco れ 0 襯た s SO ″ d Ⅲ Red 乢″ 0 れ . ・ The / 襯〃 ct 砿 Fees (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1993 ). An analysis that examines whether user fees d0, in fact, encourage people t0 recycle waste. Using evidence derived from nine U. S. communities, the author concludes that they dO. Kinnaman, T. C. , and D. Fullerton. "The Economics 0f Residential S01id Waste Management," in 2 加 m われ記砿わ 0 砿 E れ ro れ襯例 I Resource ECO れ 0 襯た s 20 側 / 20 . T. Tietenberg and H. FoImer, eds. (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2000 ) : 100 ー 147. A survey 0f the economics litera- ture that reviews trends in residential solid waste and the effectiveness Of policies designed t0 com- bat inefficiencies. Repetto, R0bert, et al. Green Fees: ・〃 0 Ta ェ S ん″ C れⅣ 0 for the E れ ro れ襯例ーれ the ECO れ om (Washington, DC: World Resources lnstitute, 1992 ). One 0f the case studies involves an examina- tion 0f pay-by-the-bag disposal pricing. Reschovsky, J. D. , and S. E. Stone. "Market lncentives t0 Encourage Househ01d Waste Recycling: Paying for What You Throw Away," 面″砿 PO ″ c. れ s なイ M れ e 襯 e 13 ( 1994 ) : 120 ー 39. An examination Of ways tO change the zero-marginal-cost-of-disposal characteristic Of many current disposal programs. Roxburgh, Nigel. PO ″ C Re 0 ね Resource D 印″ 0 れ . ・ The Case 砿 M 催 c ″ (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1980 ). An intensive examination Of the depletion experience with one particular material— mercury. lncludes chapters on the resource base, extractive and scrap metal industries, and various industries that are heavy users Of mercury. TiIton, J0hn E. , ed. Mineral Ⅳ〃ん and ECO れ 0 襯た Development(Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1992 ). Explores why a number Of mineral-exporting countries have seen their per capita incomes decline or their standards Of living stagnate over the last several decades. ADDITI ONAL REFERENCES AIIen, J. , et al. "Using Coupon lncentives in RecycIing AIuminum: A Market Approach to Energy Conser- vation P01icy , " 面″ m 記砿 CO れ襯 27 ( 1993 ) : 300 ー 318.

Environmental Economics and Policy

Po れ血 / e 襯 e 市és 165 cEx USING ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES T0 CONSERVE WATER IN CALIFORNIA ln 1977 , when California governor Jerry Brown negotiated a deal to settle one of the state's perennial water fights by building a new water diversion project, environmental groups were opposed. The opposition was expected. What was not expected was the form it t00k. Rather than simply block every imaginable aspect of the plan, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) set out tO show project supporters how the water needs could be better supplied by ways that put no additional pressure on the environment. According t0 this strategy, if the owners 0f the agricultural lands tO the west 0f the water district seeking the water could be convinced tO reduce their water use by adopting new, water-saving irrigation techniques, the conserved water could be transferred tO the district and the project rendered unnecessary. But the growers had no incentive t0 con- serve, because conserving the water required the installation Of costly new equipment and, as soon as the water was saved, it would be forfeited under the "use it, or lose it" regula- tions. What could be done? On 17 January 1989 , largely through the efforts of EDF, an historic agreement was nego- tiated between the growers association, a major user Of irrigation water, and the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) 0f California, a public agency that supplies water to the LOS Angeles area. Under that agreement, the MWD bears the c 叩 ital and operating costs, as well as the indirect costs (). g. , reduced hydro power), 0f a huge program t0 reduce seepage losses as the water is transported t0 the growers and t0 install new water-conserving irrigation techniques in the fields. ln return, they get all Of the conserved water. Everyone gains. The district gets the water it needs at a reasonable price; the growers retain virtually the same amount Of irrigation benefits with- out being forced t0 bear large additional expenditures. Because the existing regulatory system created a very large inefficiency, moving tO a more efficient allocation Of water necessarily increased the net benefits. By using those additional net benefits in creative ways, it was possible tO eliminate a serious environmental threat. source: R0bert E. TayIor, ん ea 砿 e C ″耀 S ん叩加 0 Ⅳ SO ″ 0 E れ ro れ m 例ね / 0 2 襯 s (New York: Environmental Defense Fund, 199 の . Though they dO exist (see Example 9.2 ) , water rights for instream flOW maintenance are few in number relative tO rights for consumptive purposes. Those few instream rights that dO exist typically have a IOW priority relative tO the more senior consumptive rights. a practical matter, this means that in periods 0f IOW water flow, the instream rights lose out and the water is withdrawn for consumptive uses. As long as the definition 0f わ e れ e 〃 ci 記 use requires diversion, as it does in many states, water left for fish habitat or recreation iS undervalued.

The Canadian Rockies: A History in Photographs

THE CANADIAN ROCKIES: A HISTORY 爪 PHOTOGRAPHS 97 第を - イ BO om : Skoki Lodge, first backcountry ski lOdge in the ROCkies. The original building opened in the winter Of 1931. Construction of this addition tOOk place in 1936. Top. Skiers demonstrating the s 厄 Of the day near Sk0ki, 1932.

Who Was Abraham Lincoln?

chair and Mary hung on his arm and flirted with her husband. John Wilkes Booth learned Lincoln was going to be at the theater. Booth had acted there and knew his way around the building. So he had no trouble getting in and sneaking upstairs tO the president's private box. He crept up behind

Environmental Economics and Policy

E 市 c れ / 加 2 襯〃 0 川 / ″ bc / 0 123 tO maximize the present value of net benefits coming from the resource. For a depletable, nonrecyclable resource, thiS maximization requires a balancing 0f the current and subse- quent uses Of the resource. ln t() review hOW the dynamic-efficiency criterion defines this balance, we shall elaborate on the very simple two-period model developed in Chapter 2. We shall show how these earlier conclusions can be generalized to accommodate longer plan- ning horizons and more complicated situations. The Two-Period Model Revisited ln Ch 叩 ter 5 we defined a situation involving the allocation, over two periods, of a finite resource that could be extracted at a constant marginal cost. With a stable demand curve for the resource, an efficient allocation meant that more than half of the resource was allocated to the first period and less than half to the second period. This allocation was affected both by the marginal cost 0f extraction and by the marginal user cost. Because of the fixed and finite supplies 0f depletable resources, production of a unit today precludes production of that unit tomorrow. Therefore, production decisions today must take forgone future net benefits into account. Mar- ginal user cost is the opportunity cost measure that allows balancing to take place. The marginal cost of extraction is assumed to be constant, but the current value of the marginal user cost rises over time. ln fact, as was demonstrated in Chapter 5 , when the demand curve iS stable over time and the marginal C()St Of extraction is constant, the rate 0f increase in t—gcurrentvalueofthe-marginal user cost is equal tO the discount rate. Thus, in period 2 , the marginal user cost would be 1 十 r times as large as it was in period 1.2 ln an efficient alloca- tion, marginal user COSt rises at rate in order tO preserve the balance between present and future production. ln summary, our two-period example suggests that an efficient allocation of a finite resource With a constant marginal COSt Of extraction involves rising marginal-user COSt and falling quantities consumed. We can now generalize tO longer time periods. The N-Period Model We begin this generalization by retaining the constant-marginal-extraction-cost assumption while extending the time horizon within which the resource is allocated. ln the numerical example shown in Figures 7.2 ( a ) and 7.2 ( b ) , the demand curves and the marginal-cost curves from the two-period case are retained. The only changes in this numerical example relative to the two-period case involve spreading the allocation over a larger number of years and increasing the t0tal recoverable supply from 20 t0 40. Figure 7.2 ( a ) demonstrates h0W the efficient quantity of the resource extracted varies over time, whereas Figure 7.2 ( b ) shows the behavior 0f the marginal user cost and the mar- ginal cost Of extraction. T0tal 襯加 CO refers tO the sum 0f the 朝 0 costs. The marginal cost Of extraction is represented by the lower line, and the marginal user cost is depicted as the vertical distance between the marginal extraction cost and the tOtaI marginal cost. TO 2The condition that margi nal user cost rises at rate r is true only when the marginal cost Of extraction is constant. For the more complicated case see T. H. Tietenberg, E れ ro れ襯 e れ / イⅣ 2 ル川 I 0 ″尾 e Eco れ 0 襯た 5 (Reading, : Addison-Wesley, 2000 ) : Ch 叩 ter 7.

The Canadian Rockies: A History in Photographs

22 THE CANADIAN ROCKIES: A HISTORY PHOTOGRAPHS 膚川謝 Top:lnterior of Ban 幵 Springs Plans 、 dra 、 ln 1911 raftsmen worked with the Hotel, ca. 1914. to completely overhaul the finest materials.Windo 、 building, but initially 0n1 メ 、 vere lmported 伝 0n1 Europe, Opposite top: View from the terrace 0f the Banff Springs and stone 伝 0n1 Manitoba. one maJor expanslon 、 Hotel, ca. 1940. undertaken ー the 2 million The furniture and orna- dollar Pa1nter Tower, ments were pamstaklngly Opposite わ 0 om. Courtyard Of the Banff Springs HoteI, ca. completed in 1914. Between detailed to match period 1912. 1925 and 1928 , the remainder preces. Much Of the exterl()r Of the expansron and recon- of the building was eventu- structron tOOk place, ally finished in "RundIe yielding the main building rock" quarried 仔 om the we see today. Other addi- banks of the Spray River t10ns 、 vere completed in nearby. 1990. The CPR lavished a great deal of money on furnishing the pride of its ho tel fleet. Talented

Environmental Economics and Policy

scheme is generally consistent with efficiency. ) Marginal External Cost Rule Used by the GIob 引 EnvironmentaI FaciIity to disperse funds. According tO this rule the facility will fund additional expenses associated with investments that contribute to the globalenvironmental(produce positive global net benefits), but cannot be justified domestically (since the domestic marginal costs exceed domestic marginal benefits). Countries are expected tO pick up that portion Of the expenses that can be j ustified domestically (where the domestic marginal b enefits exceed domestic marginal costs). Marginal Extraction Cost The cost of mining an additional unit Of resource. Marginal Opportunity Cost The additionalcost of providing the last unit Of good as measured by what iS given up. Marginal User COSt Present value of foregone future opportunity costs at the margin. MarginaI Willingness to Pay The amount of money an individual is willing tO pay for the last unit Of a good or servrce. Market Economy An economic system in which resource allocation decisions are guided by prices which result from the voluntary production and purchasing decisions by private consumers and producers. Market FaiIure An inefficient allocation produced by a market economy. Maximum Net Present Value Criterion Resources should be allocated to those uses which maximize the value of the net benefits received from all possible uses Of those resources. Maximum Sustainable Yield The maximum harvest that could be sustained forever. Mean AnnualIncrement The cumulative volume of a forest stand at the end 0f each decade divided by the number Of years the stand has been in existence. Microeconomic Theory 0f Fertility A theory that attempts tO attribute differences in fertility tO the economic environment within which childbearing decisions are made. Mineralogical Thresh01d A sharp discontinuity in the manner in WhiCh minerals are extracted; the existence of this threshold implies a sharp discontinuity in the marginal extraction cost. Minimum ViabIe Population The level Of population below which regeneration is negative, leading ulti mately tO extinction. Model FormaI or informal frameworks for analysis that highlight some areas 0f the problem in order better tO understand complex relationships. Monop01y A situation in which the seller side 0f the market is dominated by a single producer. Glossary 477 Myopia Near-sightedness; excessive concern for the present. Natural Equilibrium Stock levels which persist in the absence Of outside influences. Negative Feedback LOOP A closed path 0f action and reaction that is self-limiting rather than self- reinforcing. Negligence A doctrine in tort law suggesting that the party responsible for pollution contamination owes a duty tO the affected party tO exercise due care. Failure t0 fulfill that duty can lead tO a requirement for the injurer tO pay compensation tO the victim. Net Benefit The excess of benefits over costs resulting frOI れ some allocation. Netting A transferable permit program for air pollution control in which fi rms undergoing modifications or expansion may avoid New Source Review requi rements if the resulting increase in emissrons falls under a prespecified threshold. New Scr 叩 Waste composed of the residual materials generated during production. New Source Bias A bias in investment choices related tO the decision whether tO build a new source versus keeping an 01d source running longer. The bias is against building a new source because new sources Of pollution face more stringent control requirements than existing sources, resulting in higher compliance COStS. New Source Review Process Alllarge new or expanding sources are subj ect tO preconstruction review and permitting. These firms are pi subjected t0 more stringent requirements. The specific requirements depend on whether the source is attempting tO locate in an attainment or nonattainment area. New Source Performance Standard A legally specified amount Of emission control required Of new market entrants regardl ess Of production location. States can require more, but not less, than this degree of control. Nonattainment Region A region in which the pollution concentrations exceed the ambi ent standards. Noncompliance Penalty A charge used t0 reduce the profitability Of noncompl iance with pollution control requirements. lt is designed tO eliminate all the economic advantage gained from noncompliance. Nonexcludability NO individual or group can be excluded from enJOYing the benefits a resource may confer, whether they contribute tO its provision or not. Nonpoint Sources Diffuse sources such as runoff from agricultural or devel 叩 ed land. Nonrenewable Resources Resources that cannot be reproduced during a human time scale, SO their supply is finite and limited.